When should a woman discharge a man’s obligations?
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In Brief
What is the basic halacha here?
A woman can generally discharge a woman or man’s obligation when she is obligated on the same (or a higher) level.
Then why don’t women discharge men’s verbal obligations or recite berachot for men more often?
- When the woman does so because the man has not learned how to recite a relevant mitzva or beracha, the Talmud takes a negative view of his failure to learn.
- Tradition bears halachic weight.
- Some early halachic authorities express objections to or reservations about women’s discharging men’s obligations.
Aside from tradition, what would be the concern about women discharging men’s obligations?
Tosafot suggest that it would be undignified in some contexts, without providing a clear explanation why. Their view has been interpreted in a few different ways:
- Perhaps a woman should discharge a man’s obligations only if he is a member of her household (Mishna Berura).
- Perhaps a woman should discharge a man’s obligations only if the setting is private (Aruch ha-shulchan).
- Or perhaps a woman should discharge a man’s obligations only when the mitzva is not inherently communal, e.g., kiddush: yes; megilla: no (Rav Yedidya Weil).
What is the practical halacha?
Each of the above approaches has halachic support. Shulchan Aruch’s approach is unclear. He rules without hesitation about kiddush, but mentions a more restrictive opinion when it comes to megilla.
Many halachic authorities discourage women from discharging men’s obligations, while others look to encourage this as much as possible. On the whole, the more public the space, the more tendency there is to be restrictive. Ultimately, the question is one for a community and its halachic leadership to work out, keeping in mind potential costs and benefits.
We’ll discuss specific mitzvot as they come up on Deracheha.
In Depth
Rav Ezra Bick, Ilana Elzufon, and Shayna Goldberg, eds.
Can vs. Should
Based on what we have learned, there should be no bar to a woman discharging a man’s obligation whenever she is obligated on the same (or a higher) level.
Indeed, some halachic authorities voice no reservations about a woman discharging a man’s obligations when she shares them. Rashi, for example, writes simply that women may discharge men’s obligations in megilla:1
רש”י ערכין ג.
לאתויי נשים – שחייבות במקרא מגילה וכשרות לקרותה ולהוציא זכרים ידי חובתם.
Rashi Arachim 3a s.v. le-atuyai nashim
For they are obligated in reading megilla and fit to read it and to discharge men’s obligations.
Kol Bo writes in the name of Rash, a tosafist, that a woman may freely discharge men’s obligations in kiddush:
ספר כלבו סימן לא
ואשה היודעת לקדש מקדשת ואם לאו מקדשין לה, וביאר הר”ש ז”ל ואפילו להוציא אחרים ידי חובתם שאינן יודעין לקדש
Sefer Kol Bo 31
A woman who knows how to recite kiddush recites kiddush, and if she does not know how, others recite kiddush for her. Rash explained that that [she can recite kiddush] even to discharge the obligations of others who do not know how to recite kiddush.
There is no suggestion here of any restriction on a woman’s reciting kiddush for men, though Kol Bo mentions the rationale of helping others, and might assume that a woman would typically not take the lead in a case of “be-rov am hadrat melech.”
In practice, however, women don’t seem to discharge men’s obligations in mitzvot or to recite berachot for men very often. Why is that the case?
Talmudic Reservations
A Talmudic passage that describes a woman reciting birkat ha-mazon on behalf of her husband might seem to shed light on this question:
תלמוד בבלי ברכות כ:
…ואשה מברכת לבעלה, אבל אמרו חכמים: תבא מארה לאדם שאשתו ובניו מברכין לו.
Berachot 20b
A woman recites [birkat ha-mazon] for her husband. But the sages said: Let a curse come upon a person whose wife and sons bless for him.
This passage opens by asserting that a woman’s beracha can effectively discharge her husband’s obligation. Yet it continues by discouraging us – very strongly – from putting this halacha into practice, without explaining why.
Note that the curse befalls the husband and not the wife. How has the husband behaved improperly? The ge’onim understand the case as one in which he does not know how to recite birkat ha-mazon himself. He deserves a curse because he has not learned birkat ha-mazon when he ought to have:
תשובות הגאונים החדשות – עמנואל (אופק) סימן קפט
כשאמרו חכמים תבא מאירה למי שפשע ולא למד, שפעם שהוא אוכל ואין שם בנו שמברך לו נמצא בטל מן הברכה, אבל מי שהוא למד ופעמים שהוא זקן או חולה ונותן רשות לבנו או לאחד מבני ביתו לברך הרשות בידו, ש’שלוחו של אדם כמותו’ ואין לו מארה…
Responsa of the Ge'onim, Imanuel 189
When the sages say ‘a curse should befall him,’ [it refers] to someone who was negligent and did not learn. For sometimes he eats when his son is not there to recite birkat ha-mazon for him, and he winds up not reciting the beracha [at all]! But someone who did learn and at times when he is old or sick authorizes his son or a member of his household to recite a beracha, he may do so, for ‘a person’s agent is like himself,’ and he does not deserve a curse…
This responsum indicates that a person may have someone else discharge personal obligations for a variety of reasons,2 and does not distinguish between men and women per se. The Talmud does not critique a woman’s discharging her husband’s verbal obligation when he has learned to recite it for himself, but has difficulty doing so, due to age or illness..
Objection
We do see an objection to women discharging men’s obligations in the name of Ri Ha-zaken. Ha-aguda reports that Ri rules against women discharging men’s obligations, even when their level of obligation is the same:
האגודה מסכת סוכה פרק ג
פר”י [=פירש ר”י] נשים אין מוציאין אנשים דאכלו שיעור דאורייתא וכן אין מוציאין אנשים ממגילה אף על פי שהן חייבות כאנשים וכן לענין קידוש היום אף על פי שהן חייבות כדאמרינן פרק מי שמתו [כ’ ע”ב]. אבל נראה לי דנשים מוציאות נשים בין לברכת מזון בין לקידוש ומגילה…
Ha-aguda Sukka 3
Ri explained: Women do not discharge the obligation of men who ate the amount [of food to be obligated in birkat ha-mazon] on a Torah level, and so too they do not discharge the obligation of men in megilla, even though they are obligated [in megilla] like men. So too with regard to kiddush, even though they are obligated, as we say in the second chapter of Berachot (20b). But it seems to me that women discharge women’s obligations whether in birkat ha-mazon or kiddush or megilla…
Ha-aguda provides no explanation for Ri’s ruling. Ha-aguda does allow for women discharging women’s obligations, though, without writing what the Ri would say about it.
Reservations
What might be the concern about women discharging men’s obligations?
One reservation might be simply that something does not sit well about having men discharge obligations through women. Ohel Mo’ed, a fourteenth-century halachic authority, rules that a woman can technically discharge a man’s obligation in kiddush, but she shouldn’t, even if he is her husband:
ספר אהל מועד שער קידוש והבדלה דרך א
נשים חייבות בקידוש היום לפיכך אשה מוציאה לבעלה אלא שמגונה הוא.
Ohel Mo'ed Sha'ar Kiddush and Havdala 1
Women are obligated in kiddush; therefore, a woman can discharge her husband’s obligation, but this is unseemly.
It’s difficult to know what motivates Ohel Mo’ed’s concern. By singling out the husband, he might hint that, especially in the marital context, having the woman recite kiddush is simply not the way things are done. Or perhaps he is merely paraphrasing the Talmud’s mention of a ‘curse,’ in which case the reservation results from the assumption that the husband did not learn how to recite kiddush.3
In the course of a discussion of why a woman may not be able to discharge the obligation of a group of men4 in birkat ha-mazon, Tosafot present a reservation of their own, with implications for other mitzvot:5
תוספות סוכה לח: ד”ה באמת
ובתוספתא קתני גבי ברכת המזון דאין אשה ועבד וקטן מוציאין את הרבים ידי חובתן … אין מוציאות…משום דרבים זילא בהו מלתא דהרי מגילה דנשים חייבות בה ופירש בה”ג דאין נשים מוציאות את הרבים ידי חובתן במגילה.
Tosafot Sukka 38a, s.v. be'emet
In the Tosefta it teaches regarding birkat ha-mazon that “a woman, a bondsman, and a minor do not discharge the obligation of a group [including men]”…Women do not discharge [the obligation of a group of men]… because it is rabbim [lit. many], the matter is undignified for them. For regarding megilla, in which women are obligated, Behag explained that women do not discharge the obligation of the rabbim in megilla.
This suggestion can be challenging to read. Let’s try to understand it.
According to this position, a woman may freely discharge a man’s obligation in a situation that is not rabbim. Rabbim here can be interpreted in a few different ways, each with unique halachic implications:
I. Non-household Members On this reading, a woman may not discharge the obligation of men who are not members of her household. Eliya Rabba makes this argument:6
אליה רבה סימן רעא ג
… שלא להוציא אנשים שאינם בני בית הזה, דהא כתבו תוס’ שם הכי גבי ברכת המזון דאין מוציאה רבים ידי חובתן… אנשים אחרים, דזילו בהו מילתא
Eliya Rabba 271:3
[A woman] should not discharge the obligation of men who are not members of that household, for thus Tosafot wrote there regarding birkat ha-mazon, that she does not discharge the obligation of the rabbim… [Rabbim means] other men, for the matter is undignified for them.
The distinction between members of her household and outsiders may reflect concerns about the tzeniut of the situation. Mishna Berura maintains that we should ideally be stringent in accordance with this opinion, but acknowledges that it is not the fundamental halacha:
משנה ברורה רעא : ד
ומוציאות את האנשים… ומ”מ [=ומכל מקום] יש להחמיר לכתחלה שלא תוציא אשה אנשים שאינם מבני ביתה דזילא מילתא [א”ר ודה”ח]:
Mishna Berura 271:4
They [women] discharge men’s obligations…in any case, one should ideally be stringent that a woman not discharge the obligation of men who are not from her household, for the matter is undignified.
Mishna Berura expresses no objection to a woman discharging household members’ obligations.
II. A Public Group On this reading, a woman may discharge a man’s obligation without hesitation, whether or not he is a member of her household, but should not discharge men’s mitzva obligations in public.
ערוך השלחן רעא:ה
ויש רוצים לומר שאינן מוציאות אנשים כמו במגילה לקמן סימן תרפט [רש”ל וב”ח] ואינו עיקר, דבשם כיון דברבים הוא זילא מילתא כמו שכתבו התוספות בסוכה, מה שאין כן בקידוש, וכן כתבו מפרשי השולחן ערוך [הט”ז והמג”א סק”ב[
Aruch Ha-shulchan 271:5
There are those who wish to say that women do not discharge men’s obligations as with megilla, and this is not the fundamental halacha. For there [in the case of megilla], since it is in public, the matter is undignified, as Tosafot wrote in Sukka. This is not the case regarding kiddush, and so wrote the commentators to Shulchan Aruch [Magen Avraham and Taz].
The lack of dignity here might again be a concern for the tzeniut of a situation, specifically here when women take public roles. A woman can freely discharge men’s obligations in a private setting such as her home, but should not when they gather in a more public setting.
III. A Communal Mitzva On this reading, a woman may discharge a man’s obligations whether they are members of her household or not and whether they are a public group or not, but may not discharge even one man’s obligation when the nature of the mitzva is communal, such that it should ideally be performed in a minyan or quorum (like megilla) or a group (like zimmun).
Rav Yedidya Weil (18th-century Germany) makes this suggestion:7
גנזי המלך על הרמב”ם א:א
דאין שייך לומר זילא מילתא דאישה תוציא רבים אלא היכא דמצותן ברבים…
Ginzei Hamelech on Rambam Megilla 1:1
For it is not relevant to say it is undignified for a woman to discharge the obligation of the many except where the mitzva is communal.
Here the issue is women taking the lead in a mitzva recitation that is inherently communal, a more narrowly-defined concern about women in public roles. Rabbi Dr. Aryeh Frimer reports that Rav Aharon Lichtenstein took this approach:8
Rabbi Dr. Aryeh Frimer, 'Women in Communal Leadership Positions.'
As in the previous case, there were those who were in favor of allowing women to make Kiddush for the shul Shabbat morning, while others were adamantly against it. Rav Aharon [Lichtenstein] felt that here too there were poskim on both sides of the issue, but he feels that there is substantial room to be lenient…In contradistinction to keriat haTorah and megilla, which are inherently public mitsvot requiring a minyan [at least le-khathilla in the case of megilla], Kiddush is inherently a private mitsva. Hence there is no kevod ha-tsibbur or zila milta… Rav Aharon would personally prefer if women were not involved… [because of the stringent positions]; however, he would not be critical or withdraw his involvement in a shul which was lenient.
Rav Lichtenstein would permit a woman to discharge men’s obligations in public if the mitzva was not inherently of a communal nature, though he was not enthusiastic about the idea. This hesitation is striking given that his teacher, Rav Yosef Soloveitchik, reportedly had no reservations about a woman making kiddush for a public group.9
Broyde, Michael, 'Further on Women as Prayer Leaders,' Judaism, 42:4 (1993), fn. 12
Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik recounted, in a response to a halakhah l’ma’aseh question, in a public lecture at Yeshiva University on November 6, 1984, that a woman can — without any hesitation — recite kiddush even for a large group of people (men and women) in any circumstance, and that this was completely permissible (mutar le’hathila), since no minyan/quorum is required for this act and therefore the group is not considered a zibbur that need be concerned with its honor.
In Practice
Aside from the viewpoint attributed to Ri, the authorities we have seen recognize that a woman can discharge a man’s obligations when she shares the same (or higher) level of obligation. Reservations have centered on what should be done, not on what can be done.
Shulchan Aruch’s approach to what should be done is debated. On the one hand, he rules like Kol Bo when it comes to kiddush.
שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות שבת סימן רעא:ב
נשים חייבות בקידוש … ומוציאות את האנשים הואיל וחייבות מן התורה כמותם.
Shulchan Aruch OC 271:2
Women are obligated in kiddush…and they discharge men’s obligation since they are obligated on a Torah level like them.
He mentions a more restrictive opinion, however, when it comes to megilla:
שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות מגילה ופורים סימן תרפט
וי”א [=ויש אומרים] שהנשים ה אינם מוציאות את האנשים
Shulchan Aruch OC 689
There are those who say that women do not discharge men’s obligation [in megilla].
We can explain the discrepancy in a number of ways. It may have to do with different levels of obligation in megilla (Taz),10 in which case, the critical ruling about women discharging men’s obligations is the one on kiddush.
Then again, perhaps women’s obligation in megilla is the same as men’s, and these rulings are inconsistent, in the face of which we must be stringent (Bach).11 Or perhaps megilla is different either for an ancillary reason,12 or because it is often done in a public group, or because it is inherently communal, leaving room for women to discharge men’s obligations in other circumstances.
We are left without a single, definitive approach to practical halacha.
Concluding Thoughts
In general, men can recite birchot ha-nehenin or discharge verbal obligations like kiddush for other men and for women; women can certainly do this for women.
When a woman has the same level of obligation as a man, and there are no properties specific to the mitzva that preclude her from discharging his obligation, her doing so works. When, or whether, she should discharge a man’s obligations is less clear.
Faced with this question, while many halachic authorities will discourage a woman from discharging a man’s obligations, as a way of satisfying all opinions,13 others will look to permit what can be permitted. Rav Lichtenstein put this well:14
Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, 'Women in Leadership,' p. 34
In this connection [women’s public roles] serious and responsible posekim, impeccably committed and with catholicity of Torah knowledge, should, I believe, give greater weight than, in recent generations, has been assigned to the dispensation of la’asot nahat ruah le-nashim, cited in the Gemara and in Shulhan Arukh as the basis for permitting what might otherwise have been proscribed.
Following this approach, we can say that one should weigh carefully the potential benefits of having women discharge men’s obligations when halacha allows for it. The more private the mitzva or the setting, the less reason to be restrictive.
Ultimately, the question is one for a community and its halachic leadership to work out. Not all communal settings will be more restrictive. For example, a more innovative approach may have more potential benefit in a college campus or singles community, where distinctions between the religious lives of men and women tend to be less pronounced.
A private affair or family setting, where concerns of rabbim are reduced or absent, is more flexible and subject to fewer rabbinic reservations. Here too, open and honest communication should accompany any changes in practice. While there are fewer stakeholders to take into account, domestic traditions exert their own pull.
How should we relate to 'shouldn't's when the halacha isn't 'no'?
For some readers, arguments rooted in tradition, that women should not discharge men’s obligations even when technically permissible, may resonate deeply. Certain patterns of Jewish life, such as having men responsible for public ritual roles and women’s religious roles being more domestic in orientation, have been customary for millennia. That precedent is not dismissed lightly.
A person accustomed to playing a certain role, whether as reciter or listener, may be attached to it and wish to keep it, especially if it echoes the traditional practice of parents and grandparents. Even a woman who sometimes wishes to, say, recite kiddush for her family might find herself balking should her husband request to light the Shabbat candles.
Rachel Sharansky Danziger writes that women seeking to venture into new modes of practice should neither too quickly or easily abandon the traditional paths of our mothers nor look condescendingly upon the practice of previous generations.15
Rachel Sharansky Danziger, “Reclaiming Our Mothers’ Religion,” The Times of Israel, December 11, 2014
As we struggle to redefine our place in Judaism, regardless of our bid for greater communal involvement and new roles, let’s not neglect the powerful heritage of our mothers. Let’s not accept the devaluation of their religion. …. Let’s reclaim the body and the family as a powerful arena of growth.
For others, it has become increasingly difficult to identify with reasoning that restricts women in any way beyond what the letter of the law would dictate. Women have taken on more public roles in non-ritual areas of life and have gained scholarly Torah knowledge, and often a desire to take the lead in more forms of avodat Hashem accompanies such changes, from a positive place of connection to Torah and mitzvot.
In the case of discharging obligations when the level of obligation is the same, Chazal did not make a specific decree to deter women, and there is a range of views among early halachic authorities. That leaves room to respond affirmatively to these desires in some contexts.
What practice suits which context is a complex issue that by its nature can vary in different communities. Adressing it depends on the values that guide us and how much relative weight we assign them. We need to ask: Is there inherent spiritual value in a woman’s discharging a man’s obligation here? What is it, who stands to benefit, and in what cases does it most clearly apply?
Notes
2. In a parallel case in the mishna, a man deserves a curse for repeating hallel after his wife or child. Rashi there writes that he would deserve a curse in that case even if he had learned how to recite hallel, because it is demeaning to God (and presumably to the mitzva) to choose such agents. Tosafot elaborates, explaining that it is demeaning for a person who is obligated in a mitzva to choose agents who are exempt from it.
רש”י סוכה לח.
ותבא מאירה – שלא למד, ואם למד – תבא לו מאירה שמבזה את קונו לעשות שלוחים כאלה.
Rashi Sukka 38a, s.v. Ve-tavo me’eira
A curse should come upon him: because he did not learn [to recite hallel]. And if he had learned, a curse would come because he showed contempt for his Creator by designating such agents.
תוספות סוכה לח. ד”ה ותהי
ומשום דמבזה במה שאלו מברכין לו דלאו בני חיובא נינהו המקרין אותו קלייט ליה
Tosafot Sukka 38a s.v. Va-tehi
Because he shows contempt in that these [his wife or son] recite the beracha for him, that those calling [the words] out to him are not obligated in the mitzva, [for this reason] he cursed him.
3. Or perhaps he had in mind something like Shulchan Aruch Ha-Rav, who suggests that men will not take all their mitzvot seriously if women begin discharging them.
שולחן ערוך הרב אורח חיים רעא:ו
וכיון שהנשים חייבות בקידוש היום מן התורה כמו האנשים יכולות להוציא את האנשים ידי חובתם אלא שלכתחלה אין להורות כן לשואל הלכה למעשה (שלא יבאו לזלזל במצות:(
Shulchan Aruch Ha-Rav OC 271:6
Since women are obligated in kiddush on a Torah level like men, they can discharge men’s obligations, but ideally one should not rule thus to someone who asks about practical halacha (lest they come not to take the mitzvot seriously).
5. Tosafot suggest another possible rationale for women not discharging men’s obligations, specific to birkat ha-mazon: that this relates to men’s ability to form a zimmun in which women can participate, in which respect men have a higher standing. Tosafot Ha-Rosh explains this higher standing as a function of men’s being obligated in more mitzvot.
תוספות סוכה לח.
… כיון דאין מצטרפות לזימון כדתנן פרק שלשה שאכלו (שם דף מה.) אין מוציאות אף על פי שהאיש מוציאן שאני איש דחשיב טפי
Tosafot Sukka 38a, s.v. Be'emet
…Since they don’t join men to form a zimmun, as the mishna teaches in Berachot, they don’t discharge men’s obligations even though the man discharges theirs. A man is different because he has a higher standing…
תוספות הרא”ש סוכה לח.
לא חשיבי להוציא אנשים דחשיבי טפי שחייבים בכל המצות
Tosafot Ha-Rosh, Sukka 38a
They are not of sufficient standing to discharge the obligations of men, who are of higher standing because they are obligated in all the mitzvot.
6. Eliya Rabba finds precedent for his ruling in Ha-aguda, the early commentator who had quoted Ri, who himself is reluctant even to let it be known that a woman could discharge the obligations of household members.
האגודה מסכת שבועות פרק ג
נשים מוציאות בקידוש נשים וקטנים, ולפי דעתי אפילו אנשים בני ביתה מוציאה אם אין בעלה בעיר או אין לה בעל, ואין מורין כן
Ha-aguda Shavuot 3
Women discharge the obligations of women and children in kiddush, and in my opinion she even discharges the obligations of the men of her household if her husband is out of town, or if she does not have a husband, and we do not publicize this ruling.
7. Available here. See Rabbi Dr. Aryeh Frimer, “Women in Communal Leadership Positions“. Rav Ya’akov Emden suggests something along these lines to explain why women do not discharge men’s obligation in megilla, even in private. See also Benei Banim II:10, available here, and the discussion in Drs Frimer “Women, keri’at Ha-Torah and Aliyot” available here.
מור וקציעה סימן תרפט
משום דמצותה לאהדורי בתר עשרה אפילו בזמנה לפרסומי ניסא משו”ה [=משום הכי] אפילו ליחיד אין הללו מוציאין משום לא פלוג.
Mor U-ketzia 689
Because the mitzva is to make an effort to get ten [men for a minyan] even [when the megilla is read] at its [ideal] time, in order to publicize the miracle, therefore even for an individual they [women] do not discharge [men’s obligations] because of lo pelug [the principle that we try to keep halachic practice uniform].
10.
We discuss the nature of women’s obligation in megilla here.
ט”ז על שולחן ערוך אורח חיים רעא: ב
ומוציאות את האנשים כו’. – אף על גב דבסי’ תרפ”ט פסק בש”ע [=בשלחן ערוך] כבה”ג [=כבהאי גוונא] דאין נשים מוציאות אנשים במקרא מגילה אף ע”ג [=על גב] שהם חייבות במקרא מגילה לא דמי לכאן דבמגילה יש דיעות דאין לנשים לברך על מקרא מגילה אלא על משמע מגילה כמ”ש [=כמו שכתב] שם ב”י [=בית יוסף] ע”כ [על כן] בודאי לא נכון שלכתחלה יוציאו האנשים משא”כ [=משאין כן] כאן הכל מודים שאין חילוק כלל בין אנשים לנשים ע”כ [על כן] שפיר מוציאות אותם ורש”ל ומו”ח [=ומורי חמי] ז”ל פסקו גם כאן דאין מוציאות כמו במגילה ואין זה מוכרח כלל:
Taz OC 271:2
ט”ז על שולחן ערוך אורח חיים רעא: ב
ומוציאות את האנשים כו’. – אף על גב דבסי’ תרפ”ט פסק בש”ע [=בשלחן ערוך] כבה”ג [=כבהאי גוונא] דאין נשים מוציאות אנשים במקרא מגילה אף ע”ג [=על גב] שהם חייבות במקרא מגילה לא דמי לכאן דבמגילה יש דיעות דאין לנשים לברך על מקרא מגילה אלא על משמע מגילה כמ”ש [=כמו שכתב] שם ב”י [=בית יוסף] ע”כ [על כן] בודאי לא נכון שלכתחלה יוציאו האנשים משא”כ [=משאין כן] כאן הכל מודים שאין חילוק כלל בין אנשים לנשים ע”כ [על כן] שפיר מוציאות אותם ורש”ל ומו”ח [=ומורי חמי] ז”ל פסקו גם כאן דאין מוציאות כמו במגילה ואין זה מוכרח כלל:
Taz OC 271:2
And they discharge men’s obligations… – Even though Shulchan Aruch rules in Siman 489 that in such cases women do not discharge men’s obligations in megilla reading, although they [women] are obligated in megilla reading, it is not similar to this case. For regarding megilla, there are opinions that women do not recite the beracha “upon reading the megilla” but “upon hearing the megilla” as is written there in the Beit Yosef. Therefore, it is certainly incorrect for women to discharge men’s obligations le’chat’chila. That is not the case here, where everyone agrees that there is no distinction at all between men and women. Therefore, women can properly discharge their [men’s] obligations. And Maharshal and my teacher and father-in-law [Bach] ruled that here also women do not discharge [men’s obligations] as with megilla, and this is not at all obvious.
ב”ח אורח חיים סימן רעא
ולפע”ד [=ולפי עניות דעתי] נראה עיקר להחמיר בקידוש כמו במגילה שאין הנשים מוציאות לאנשים…
Bach OC 271
And in my humble opinion, it seems that the primary halacha is to be stringent with kiddush as with megilla, that women do not discharge men’s obligations.
מגן אברהם סימן תרפט :ה
אינם מוציאות – ול”ד לנ”ח [= ולא דמי לנרות חנוכה] דשאני מגיל[ה] דהוי כמו קריאת התור[ה] (סמ”ג) פי[רוש] ופסול[ות] מפני כבוד הצבור
Magen Avraham 689:5
They [women] do not discharge [men’s obligation in megilla]- It is not like Chanuka candles because megilla is different since it is like Torah reading, meaning they are unfit [to discharge men’s obligations] because of kevod ha-tzibbur.
רב דוד אויערבאך, הליכות ביתה טו:י
אשה יכולה להוציא את האיש בקידוש הואיל וגם היא חייבת מן-התורה בקידוש כמו האיש. אך לכתחילה אין להורות כן מלבד בשעת הדחק…ומכל מקום יש להחמיר לכתחילה שלא תוציא אנשים שאינם מבני ביתה.
Rav David Auerbach, Halichot Beitah 15:10
A woman can discharge a man’s obligation in kiddush since she, too, is obligated on a Torah level in kiddush like a man. But ideally one should not rule this way except in pressing circumstances…and in any case one should ideally be stringent that she not discharge the obligations of men who are not of her household.
Sources
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Can vs. Should
רש”י ערכין ג.
לאתויי נשים – שחייבות במקרא מגילה וכשרות לקרותה ולהוציא זכרים ידי חובתם.
Rashi Arachim 3a s.v. le-atuyai nashim
For they are obligated in reading megilla and fit to read it and to discharge men’s obligations.
ספר כלבו סימן לא
ואשה היודעת לקדש מקדשת ואם לאו מקדשין לה, וביאר הר”ש ז”ל ואפילו להוציא אחרים ידי חובתם שאינן יודעין לקדש
Sefer Kol Bo 31
A woman who knows how to recite kiddush recites kiddush, and if she does not know how, others recite kiddush for her. Rash explained that that [she can recite kiddush] even to discharge the obligations of others who do not know how to recite kiddush.
תלמוד בבלי ברכות כ:
…ואשה מברכת לבעלה, אבל אמרו חכמים: תבא מארה לאדם שאשתו ובניו מברכין לו.
Berachot 20b
A woman recites [birkat ha-mazon] for her husband. But the sages said: Let a curse come upon a person whose wife and sons bless for him.
תשובות הגאונים החדשות – עמנואל (אופק) סימן קפט
כשאמרו חכמים תבא מאירה למי שפשע ולא למד, שפעם שהוא אוכל ואין שם בנו שמברך לו נמצא בטל מן הברכה, אבל מי שהוא למד ופעמים שהוא זקן או חולה ונותן רשות לבנו או לאחד מבני ביתו לברך הרשות בידו, ש’שלוחו של אדם כמותו’ ואין לו מארה…
Responsa of the Ge'onim, Imanuel 189
When the sages say ‘a curse should befall him,’ [it refers] to someone who was negligent and did not learn. For sometimes he eats when his son is not there to recite birkat ha-mazon for him, and he winds up not reciting the beracha [at all]! But someone who did learn and at times when he is old or sick authorizes his son or a member of his household to recite a beracha, he may do so, for ‘a person’s agent is like himself,’ and he does not deserve a curse…
האגודה מסכת סוכה פרק ג
פר”י [=פירש ר”י] נשים אין מוציאין אנשים דאכלו שיעור דאורייתא וכן אין מוציאין אנשים ממגילה אף על פי שהן חייבות כאנשים וכן לענין קידוש היום אף על פי שהן חייבות כדאמרינן פרק מי שמתו [כ’ ע”ב]. אבל נראה לי דנשים מוציאות נשים בין לברכת מזון בין לקידוש ומגילה…
Ha-aguda Sukka 3
Ri explained: Women do not discharge the obligation of men who ate the amount [of food to be obligated in birkat ha-mazon] on a Torah level, and so too they do not discharge the obligation of men in megilla, even though they are obligated [in megilla] like men. So too with regard to kiddush, even though they are obligated, as we say in the second chapter of Berachot (20b). But it seems to me that women discharge women’s obligations whether in birkat ha-mazon or kiddush or megilla…
Reservations
ספר אהל מועד שער קידוש והבדלה דרך א
נשים חייבות בקידוש היום לפיכך אשה מוציאה לבעלה אלא שמגונה הוא.
Ohel Mo'ed Sha'ar Kiddush and Havdala 1
Women are obligated in kiddush; therefore, a woman can discharge her husband’s obligation, but this is unseemly.
תוספות סוכה לח: ד”ה באמת
ובתוספתא קתני גבי ברכת המזון דאין אשה ועבד וקטן מוציאין את הרבים ידי חובתן … אין מוציאות…משום דרבים זילא בהו מלתא דהרי מגילה דנשים חייבות בה ופירש בה”ג דאין נשים מוציאות את הרבים ידי חובתן במגילה.
Tosafot Sukka 38a, s.v. be'emet
In the Tosefta it teaches regarding birkat ha-mazon that “a woman, a bondsman, and a minor do not discharge the obligation of a group [including men]”…Women do not discharge [the obligation of a group of men]… because it is rabbim [lit. many], the matter is undignified for them. For regarding megilla, in which women are obligated, Behag explained that women do not discharge the obligation of the rabbim in megilla.
אליה רבה סימן רעא ג
… שלא להוציא אנשים שאינם בני בית הזה, דהא כתבו תוס’ שם הכי גבי ברכת המזון דאין מוציאה רבים ידי חובתן… אנשים אחרים, דזילו בהו מילתא
Eliya Rabba 271:3
[A woman] should not discharge the obligation of men who are not members of that household, for thus Tosafot wrote there regarding birkat ha-mazon, that she does not discharge the obligation of the rabbim… [Rabbim means] other men, for the matter is undignified for them.
משנה ברורה רעא : ד
ומוציאות את האנשים… ומ”מ [=ומכל מקום] יש להחמיר לכתחלה שלא תוציא אשה אנשים שאינם מבני ביתה דזילא מילתא [א”ר ודה”ח]:
Mishna Berura 271:4
They [women] discharge men’s obligations…in any case, one should ideally be stringent that a woman not discharge the obligation of men who are not from her household, for the matter is undignified.
ערוך השלחן רעא:ה
ויש רוצים לומר שאינן מוציאות אנשים כמו במגילה לקמן סימן תרפט [רש”ל וב”ח] ואינו עיקר, דבשם כיון דברבים הוא זילא מילתא כמו שכתבו התוספות בסוכה, מה שאין כן בקידוש, וכן כתבו מפרשי השולחן ערוך [הט”ז והמג”א סק”ב[
Aruch Ha-shulchan 271:5
There are those who wish to say that women do not discharge men’s obligations as with megilla, and this is not the fundamental halacha. For there [in the case of megilla], since it is in public, the matter is undignified, as Tosafot wrote in Sukka. This is not the case regarding kiddush, and so wrote the commentators to Shulchan Aruch [Magen Avraham and Taz].
גנזי המלך על הרמב”ם א:א
דאין שייך לומר זילא מילתא דאישה תוציא רבים אלא היכא דמצותן ברבים…
Ginzei Hamelech on Rambam Megilla 1:1
For it is not relevant to say it is undignified for a woman to discharge the obligation of the many except where the mitzva is communal.
Rabbi Dr. Aryeh Frimer, 'Women in Communal Leadership Positions.'
As in the previous case, there were those who were in favor of allowing women to make Kiddush for the shul Shabbat morning, while others were adamantly against it. Rav Aharon [Lichtenstein] felt that here too there were poskim on both sides of the issue, but he feels that there is substantial room to be lenient…In contradistinction to keriat haTorah and megilla, which are inherently public mitsvot requiring a minyan [at least le-khathilla in the case of megilla], Kiddush is inherently a private mitsva. Hence there is no kevod ha-tsibbur or zila milta… Rav Aharon would personally prefer if women were not involved… [because of the stringent positions]; however, he would not be critical or withdraw his involvement in a shul which was lenient.
Broyde, Michael, 'Further on Women as Prayer Leaders,' Judaism, 42:4 (1993), fn. 12
Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik recounted, in a response to a halakhah l’ma’aseh question, in a public lecture at Yeshiva University on November 6, 1984, that a woman can — without any hesitation — recite kiddush even for a large group of people (men and women) in any circumstance, and that this was completely permissible (mutar le’hathila), since no minyan/quorum is required for this act and therefore the group is not considered a zibbur that need be concerned with its honor.
In Practice
שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות שבת סימן רעא:ב
נשים חייבות בקידוש … ומוציאות את האנשים הואיל וחייבות מן התורה כמותם.
Shulchan Aruch OC 271:2
Women are obligated in kiddush…and they discharge men’s obligation since they are obligated on a Torah level like them.
שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות מגילה ופורים סימן תרפט
וי”א [=ויש אומרים] שהנשים ה אינם מוציאות את האנשים
Shulchan Aruch OC 689
There are those who say that women do not discharge men’s obligation [in megilla].
Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, 'Women in Leadership,' p. 34
In this connection [women’s public roles] serious and responsible posekim, impeccably committed and with catholicity of Torah knowledge, should, I believe, give greater weight than, in recent generations, has been assigned to the dispensation of la’asot nahat ruah le-nashim, cited in the Gemara and in Shulhan Arukh as the basis for permitting what might otherwise have been proscribed.
Rachel Sharansky Danziger, “Reclaiming Our Mothers’ Religion,” The Times of Israel, December 11, 2014
As we struggle to redefine our place in Judaism, regardless of our bid for greater communal involvement and new roles, let’s not neglect the powerful heritage of our mothers. Let’s not accept the devaluation of their religion. …. Let’s reclaim the body and the family as a powerful arena of growth.
Q&A
Sometimes a quick exchange communicates more effectively, and more personally, than an article. Sometimes, just seeing that others share our questions can make us feel more connected.
Our posted questions and answers are an opportunity to learn from each other. To ask a question of your own, click here!
Hashkafic Q&A
How should we relate to 'shouldn't's when the halacha isn't 'no'?
For some readers, arguments rooted in tradition, that women should not discharge men’s obligations even when technically permissible, may resonate deeply. Certain patterns of Jewish life, such as having men responsible for public ritual roles and women’s religious roles being more domestic in orientation, have been customary for millennia. That precedent is not dismissed lightly.
A person accustomed to playing a certain role, whether as reciter or listener, may be attached to it and wish to keep it, especially if it echoes the traditional practice of parents and grandparents. Even a woman who sometimes wishes to, say, recite kiddush for her family might find herself balking should her husband request to light the Shabbat candles.
Rachel Sharansky Danziger writes that women seeking to venture into new modes of practice should neither too quickly or easily abandon the traditional paths of our mothers nor look condescendingly upon the practice of previous generations:
Rachel Sharansky Danziger, “Reclaiming Our Mothers’ Religion,” The Times of Israel, December 11, 2014
As we struggle to redefine our place in Judaism, regardless of our bid for greater communal involvement and new roles, let’s not neglect the powerful heritage of our mothers. Let’s not accept the devaluation of their religion. …. Let’s reclaim the body and the family as a powerful arena of growth.
For others, it has become increasingly difficult to identify with reasoning that restricts women in any way beyond what the letter of the law would dictate. Women have taken on more public roles in non-ritual areas of life and have gained scholarly Torah knowledge, and often a desire to take the lead in more forms of avodat Hashem accompanies such changes, from a positive place of connection to Torah and mitzvot.
In the case of discharging obligations when the level of obligation is the same, Chazal did not make a specific decree to deter women, and there is a range of views among early halachic authorities. That leaves room to respond affirmatively to these desires in some contexts.
What practice suits which context is a complex issue that by its nature can vary in different communities. Adressing it depends on the values that guide us and how much relative weight we assign them. We need to ask: Is there inherent spiritual value in a woman’s discharging a man’s obligation here? What is it, who stands to benefit, and in what cases does it most clearly apply?
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