Contraception III: Other Factors & Delay

Thus far, we have learned that contraception can be halachically permitted when there are concerns for mental or physical health, or to allow for spacing between births. We’ve also seen an approach to la-erev (the injunction not to desist from having children) that allows for significant leeway to use contraception after pirya ve-rivya has been fulfilled. This still leaves room for many questions.

Are there grounds for couples to use contraception after fulfilling pirya ve-rivya if they follow a more stringent approach to la-erev? Or if they follow a more lenient approach, but seek guidance in weighing, as Rambam put it, their ko’ach to expand their family?

Can such grounds also apply to couples who have not yet fulfilled pirya ve-rivya—those who have one child, or have several children all of one gender, or even those who have yet to have children at all? How does Halacha view delaying fulfillment of pirya ve-rivya?

Aside from physical and mental health considerations and questions of spacing, potential factors that can impact the permissibility of using contraception typically fall under four main categories:

• Chinuch (educational or childrearing concerns)
• Shalom bayit (peace in the home—domestic harmony)
• Parnasa (finances)
• Ha-osek ba-mitzva (intense occupation with another mitzva).

We’ll address each category separately, but in many cases, more than one of these factors might be at play. Sometimes, when no single factor is determinative, a combination of factors might be.

We then explore the question of delaying fulfillment of positive mitzvot in general, and pirya ve-rivya in particular, to understand how the halachic charge to perform a mitzva promptly can be balanced against other compelling factors.

In our next piece, we’ll address contraception at the beginning of marriage and a rabbi’s role in any of the various decisions discussed in this series.

In our previous piece, we introduced a conceptual perspective attributed to Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, according to whichpirya ve-rivya includes raising children, not just producing them. Could that extend to raising and educating children toward mitzva observance, an endeavor often referred to as chinuch?

Rav Yeshaya Ha-levi Horovitz highlights the link between pirya ve-rivya and chinuch in his prayer for one’s offspring, which he recommends reciting before Rosh Chodesh Sivan, the month in which the Torah was given and we were called God’s children:

If the deeper purpose of pirya ve-rivya is not merely to have children to settle the world, but to have children to settle the world as servants of God, then perhaps considerations of prioritizing the chinuch of one’s existing children could sometimes serve as a basis for permitting contraception.

This might be the conceptual basis for an argument that Maharshal makes in the sixteenth century, discussing a case where a family’s previous children did not turn out as their parents had hoped. He maintains that a well-founded concern that one’s future children will not follow a righteous path is comparable to great pain with childbirth, and can justify taking a sterilizing potion:

This response is somewhat puzzling. Each child is an individual with free will, and it’s not clear why past chinuch failures should rule out future efforts. If anything, the verse in Kohelet suggests that one should continue to have children precisely because it is unclear which children will “be fit.” Why should this mother’s worry carry so much halachic weight?

In the twentieth century, Rav Betzalel Stern suggested an alternative explanation for Maharshal’s ruling: that being forced to confront fears built on past chinuch experience would itself be a source of pain for the mother. That is to say, a mother’s potential emotional pain—not impaired mental health, but pain—as she doubts her capability to raise children to follow the Torah, could be considered tantamount to physical pain. (His argument references a Talmudic passage in Berachot that we saw in the first piece in this series.)

Rav Stern adds that a woman’s not being directly commanded in pirya ve-rivya leaves room for more flexibility in making decisions about contraception. This applies whether she anticipates extreme physical pain with childbirth or long-term emotional pain with chinuch challenges.

Looking back at Maharshal’s ruling, on a simple reading, it seems that the woman has given up on her children, and it’s not clear why. This case differs from our earlier discussion of a woman who knows that a new pregnancy will disrupt providing basic care to her young children. That case, or a case in which a woman knows that chinuch she is actively working on with her present children will inevitably be seriously compromised by having another child, could be even stronger grounds for using contraception.

When having another child will force a couple to compromise on chinuch plans or arrangements for their existing children that they see as critical, especially if the loss is liable to cause long-term fear and pain to the mother, that might be a basis for using a contraceptive method that raises fewer halachic questions than a sterilizing potion. (We’ll discuss methods in later installments of this series.)

This should be distinguished from the standard challenges of child-rearing, tza’ar gidul banim, that any parent experiences.

Chinuch concerns may be broadly construed to take into account a range of basic conditions for raising children to a life of Torah and mitzvot, but they don’t include the challenges that always accompany having children. Sometimes, as with questions of school tuition, chinuch concerns may give additional weight to financial considerations, which we discuss below. In practice, if a couple have not yet fulfilled pirya ve-rivya, this factor is usually applicable only in cases where the issues are clear and pronounced.

Bringing home a new child is a blessing, and a new baby’s arrival can sometimes strengthen family ties and functioning. However, a new baby may also create a number of stressors that can prove especially challenging for families with less stable or more volatile relationship dynamics.

Shalom bayit, peace in the home, is a great halachic value. The Talmud teaches that God’s name is erased as part of the sota ordeal (described in Bemidbar 5) because of the importance of restoring a couple’s shalom bayit:

A baraita permits a man to choose chalitza over levirate marriage (yibum) when there is likelihood that the marriage would lead to conflict, as when there is a great disparity in age between the man and the woman:

Fifteenth-century halachic authority Terumat Ha-deshen takes this passage as proof that a man who has fulfilled pirya ve-rivya, and is now remarrying, is permitted to choose a bride who cannot bear children, when he is concerned that marrying another woman will lead to conflict in his home:

Rema rules in accordance with Terumat Ha-deshen on this point:

Beit Shemuel suggests that permission for a man to marry a non-fertile woman so as to avoid conflict could be extended even to cases where this would mean not fulfilling the mitzva of pirya ve-rivya:

Now that there are contraceptive methods available that are not necessarily in tension with specific prohibitions, it is possible that using such a contraceptive method would be analogous to simply marrying someone who cannot have children.

Along these lines, Rav Aharon Lichtenstein suggests that Rema’s embrace of Terumat Ha-deshen’s ruling provides a precedent for using contraception when there are serious concerns about conflict between the couple, certainly when they have already fulfilled the mitzva of pirya ve-rivya:¹

Rav Lichtenstein seems inclined to consider conflict between a couple as a contributing but not a decisive factor in permitting contraception when pirya ve-rivya has not yet been fulfilled. However, he also expresses uncertainty regarding the definition of ketata for these purposes, and seems to be considering conflict here as centering around the question of contraception.

What of marital or familial conflicts that are more extreme? In practice, contraception is widely considered permissible when there is a couple or family relationship crisis, perhaps because a relationship in crisis might be seen in some sense as a mental health concern.

Rav Eliezer Melamed rules this way as part of his discussion of contraception for newlywed couples, who have not yet fulfilled pirya ve-rivya:²

Though Rav Melamed raises this in the context of newlyweds getting their relationship started, it is hard to see why it would be any less permissible for a more veteran couple. Working to prevent divorce, or to minimize its potential collateral damage, are important halachic considerations in decisions about family planning.

What about less extreme scenarios? In response to a question by Rav Shlomo Aviner, Rav Avraham David Auerbach suggests that even just a generally tense marital relationship can sometimes provide grounds for using contraception:

While a couple should not take the decision to use contraception lightly, they also should not take conflict between the two of them lightly. A couple should seek counseling if they have ongoing challenges with shalom bayit. The quality of their relationship will have profound and ongoing implications for each of them as well as for any children that they produce.

When Husband & Wife Disagree

Whenever possible, a couple should make decisions about family planning together, or at least be open with each other about any steps taken that could prevent conception. In some cases, for example, a couple may need to contend with the wife’s choice to use a contraceptive when that would not have been the husband’s preference. In some particularly sensitive cases of conflict between spouses, however, a woman may feel a need to use contraception without her husband’s knowledge or agreement—for example, if a woman is halachically permitted to use contraception for health reasons or because the marriage is struggling, while the husband rejects the possibility of using contraception.

Marital situations can be very delicate. A woman who finds herself considering hiding a decision to use contraceptives from her husband would usually benefit from consulting with a trusted mentor or therapist, as well as a halachic authority, for help navigating the different options.

Still, the Talmudic passage about drinking a kos shel ikkarin, a sterilizing root potion (quoted in our last piece, as well), seems to support the possibility of a woman using contraception without her husband’s agreement, at least after pirya ve-rivya has been fulfilled. Yehudit disguises herself prior to asking her husband about the halachot of contraception. When he later learns that she has sterilized herself, he responds wistfully, without questioning or criticizing the halachic validity of her actions:

Chatam Sofer argues that Yehudit’s actions were halachically acceptable only because the edict of Rabbeinu Gershom, prohibiting polygamy, had not yet taken effect. Once the edict was adopted, a woman would assume a halachic commitment to fulfill her husband’s obligation to procreate upon marrying him.

Chatam Sofer maintains that, with the edict in place, a woman could forgo seeking her husband’s agreement only when a halachic authority had permitted her to use contraception and only if pregnancy or childbirth would entail great pain for her.

Several modern contraceptives resemble the kos shel ikarin in rendering a woman unable to conceive—but, because their effects are temporary and fully reversible, there may be more room for leniency. (We explore this more here.)

For example, in the case of a woman who has received a halachic ruling permitting use of a contraceptive that does not raise concerns regarding wasting seed (in this case, an IUD) for a defined period of time—Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein permits her to do so without her husband’s knowledge:

Rav Zilberstein’s case is of a woman postpartum whose husband had not yet fulfilled pirya ve-rivya. He justifies his ruling by comparison to a man’s expected conduct with mitzvat ona , his halachic commitment to his wife to have relations, when he has a medical difficulty. It is possible that this ruling could be applied to other situations in which a woman is halachically permitted to use contraceptives on a temporary basis, for comparable physical or mental health reasons.

Rav Moshe Feinstein addresses a case where a husband knows that his wife is using a contraceptive against his will and despite his best efforts to appease her. In that case, even if she uses a contraceptive that raises concerns of wasting seed (in this case, the Talmudic moch), Rav Moshe nevertheless permits her husband to remain married to her and to continue to have intercourse with her.

Rav Feinstein concludes this responsum by emphasizing that this situation is far from ideal, and that this halacha should not be abused or shared with those who would abuse it. This remark reminds us that situations in which the couple cannot come to an agreement on contraception, and one spouse forces their will on the other, are far from ideal.

The economic effects of having children are variable. In the short term, raising children is unquestionably a costly endeavor. In the long term, depending on societal factors, offspring may be able to contribute to a family’s economic resources, and even support parents in old age.

The Talmud already reflects some ambivalence about the economic prospects of having children, with males seen as an asset in the long term, and females seen as a net drain on finances:

Our sages also take economic factors into account in defining the onot (minimum intervals) at which a couple has intercourse, which depend on a man’s profession.

When professional or economic needs limit intercourse between husband and wife, they limit opportunities to conceive as well. However, having a profession that limits opportunities to conceive is not identical to practicing contraception, especially in the long term.

Financing Mitzvot

Whether to take economic factors into account in making decisions about contraception relates to a much broader question: To what extent is a person expected to devote their financial resources to observing positive mitzvot?

The Talmud considers this question:

Early authorities infer from the Talmud’s initial supposition that Halacha places an upper limit on how much of their financial resources people are required to spend on a fulfilling a given mitzva,³ and this is how Rema rules in practice:

It is difficult to weigh how this might be applied to pirya ve-rivya. Though both are positive Torah-level commandments, can having a child be meaningfully said to be comparable to purchasing and waving a lulav? On the other hand, perhaps the limits suggested by this halacha should be easier to apply when the outcome is temporary use of contraception rather than completely missing a chance to fulfill the mitzva.

More practically, how exactly should the costs of having a child be calculated? Would we take into account only the cost of pregnancy and postpartum care, or also of income loss during maternity leave, and perhaps thereafter? Does the overall cost of raising children come into play, and how could this be calculated? Additionally, financial situations can quickly change—to what extent is that under our control or under God’s?

Ra’avad identifies the most fundamental question in limiting spending required for mitzva observance—how could we possibly put a specific price on any mitzva?

Ra’avad concludes that, though fulfilling a positive mitzva is invaluable, people should not keep mitzvot in a way that impoverishes them. By asking a fundamental question, he helps uncover an underlying logic to this halacha. Overspending to fulfill a mitzva might impoverish someone, and we are not commanded to impoverish ourselves. This logic is more readily applicable to our discussion of pirya ve-rivya. One might argue that the question of applying economic factors is not a matter of specific costs exceeding a certain level, but rather one of whether a family’s livelihood will be significantly compromised by having a child.

This connects to a broader philosophical question: To what extent should we see our sustenance as depending upon our personal efforts, hishtadlut, and to what extent should we simply rely on God’s beneficence.⁴

If, as Ra’avad states, Halacha gives weight to concerns for becoming impoverished, then it would seem that we are not expected to rely entirely on God’s beneficence. This hashkafic question, however remains unresolved. Sefer Chasidim, for example, completely rejects the validity of basing childbearing decisions on economic factors, which he views as reflecting a lack of faith:

Halachic Debate

In practice, whether to take economic factors into account also remains a matter of halachic debate in which hashkafic positions seem to take center stage.

I. Finances not a consideration In the late twentieth century, for example, Rav Eliezer Waldenberg rejects financial factors as a consideration in the halachic permissibility of contraception, based on his perspective on faith:

Rav Waldenberg is open about the hashkafic underpinnings of his ruling. Unfortunately, he does not address here whether he rejects application of Rema’s ruling regarding expenditures for positive mitzvot to the case of pirya ve-rivya, or whether this ruling only addresses less extreme financial cases.

Even more recently, Rav Ya’akov Ariel, in a discussion of spacing births, asserts that financial considerations are not usually a halachic factor:⁵

Note, however, that Rav Ariel states here that this is “usually” the case, implying that there are some situations in which financial considerations could be a basis for permitting contraception. We will see later that this leaves room for applying halachic discussion of spending limits for mitzvot to contraception.

Additionally, even for those who follow rabbinic views that do not ordinarily take finances into account, the interplay of finances with other factors can affect halachic rulings. In this quote, a poster in an online frum women’s forum shares that this was her experience:⁶

II. A consideration after fulfillment of pirya ve-rivya Aruch Ha-shulchan cites economic concerns as a valid reason to cease having children after fulfilling pirya ve-rivya:

Aruch Ha-shulchan’s financial litmus test seems to be whether someone can afford to support additional children.

Nishmat Avraham (cited in our previous piece) grouped financial considerations together with convenience in cases of la-erev, which seems to allow for a wide range of financial concerns to be considered legitimate. Rav Moshe Feinstein takes a sort of middle ground, making a somewhat vague mention of an “economic reason,” but categorizing it as a “necessary reason”:

According to many halachic authorities, there is a basis for applying economic considerations to contraceptive decisions after pirya ve-rivya has been fulfilled, without a clear standard for economic significance. Whether financial considerations are halachically relevant before pirya ve-rivya has been fulfilled is more contentious.

III. A consideration when impact is substantial Surprisingly, considering the ruling quoted above, Rav Yaakov Ariel applies Rema’s ruling about financial loss and mitzvot to contraception. He does this in a responsum about a woman who already has one child and is seeking to use contraception until she completes her course of study. He argues that disrupting a pre-professional course of study is halachically considered akin to a great financial loss.⁷

Rav Ariel suggests that there is even more room for a woman, who is not directly obligated in pirya ve-rivya, to take her professional studies into account in making a halachic decision about pirya ve-rivya than there is for a man.

As we saw above, Rav Ariel ordinarily does not take financial considerations into account. He clearly does not mean for this to be a casual decision. However, when there is a significant long-term impact on someone’s financial and professional future that would cause great distress, he leaves room for contraceptive use, even when a couple have not yet fulfilled pirya ve-rivya, assuming that the couple will pursue it at their earliest opportunity once that issue has been mitigated.

Similarly, in a presentation to medical students, Rav Lichtenstein asks whether the potential impact of having children at a given time on one’s ability to pursue a chosen profession is a valid halachic consideration in pursuing contraception, even before a couple has children at all.⁸ Like Rav Ariel, he seems to take it as a given that Rema’s ruling on mitzva expenditures applies to contraception:

Rav Lichtenstein concludes that pursuing one’s profession of choice, at least one as noble as medicine, should not be dismissed as irrelevant in decisions about contraception. Choosing a profession or course of study is not merely a financial decision, though it may have financial consequences that can lead to questions about contraception. (Rav Ariel appears to recognize this as well.)

Rav Lichtenstein seems to assume that in most cases the question of profession or finances can justify a delay in fulfilling the mitzva, as the intention to ultimately fulfill the mitzva is not in question. In contrast, many halachic authorities, even those who might in some cases take economic factors into account, question applying this type of consideration at the beginning of marriage.

Later on in this piece, we will see Chazon Ish argue that great financial loss could provide grounds for delaying fulfillment of a mitzvat aseh, which could potentially add weight to taking significant, known financial loss into account in decisions about contraception.

The Talmud teaches us that a person who is busy performing one mitzva can be released from performing another mitzva.

In practice, this principle is usually applied only when a person is so busy with one mitzva that it would be extremely burdensome for them to perform a different one at the same time:

In a discussion of whether a man’s devotion to learning Torah can justify his pushing off marriage, and thus fulfilling pirya ve-rivya, Rambam refers to this principle:

Later in this piece, we discuss what it means for Rambam to call not marrying, and thus not procreating promptly, an abrogation of a positive mitzva obligation (bitul mitzvat aseh). In practice, it is common to delay marriage beyond age twenty, and this is widely considered to be halachically permissible. (In our next piece, we’ll analyze the implications for the question of contraception at the beginning of marriage. We discuss the mitzva to marry here.)

Rambam suggests that the financial responsibility that a man assumes upon marriage would ordinarily impinge on the time and attention he could devote to Torah study, so that it might not be possible to optimally fulfill the mitzva of Torah study simultaneously with the obligations of marriage and mitzva of pirya ve-rivya. In practice, yeshiva students often push off marriage somewhat when they are immersed in their studies, but do not typically delay having children once they are married.

Rambam seems to assume that engagement in other mitzvot could similarly provide grounds to push off marriage, and thus pirya ve-rivya. Indeed, a little later on in this piece, we will see that Chazon Ish seems to make allowance for this principle as providing grounds for delay in fulfilling a positive mitzva.

Is there another occupation that might be so all-encompassing and lacking of remuneration that this halacha might apply to it? Rav Aharon Lichtenstein ventures that perhaps being a medical student would be comparable. Medical school provides no remuneration and is very demanding, while the ultimate goal of such study is to heal—a mitzva.⁹

This halachic approach rests on a few assumptions: that in cases where it is permissible to delay having children by pushing off marriage, it is also permissible to do so by using contraception; that preparing to practice medicine constitutes occupation with a mitzva; and that it is not feasible without an excessive burden for a man to study medicine and to have children at the same time. Even if one were to grant the first two assumptions, it is unclear to what extent the final assumption applies in today’s medical school landscape.

We have firsthand reports of Rav Lichtenstein relying on ha-osek ba-mitzva patur min ha-mitzva to permit contraceptive use in practice, even at the beginning of marriage, and orally extending this permission to both intense medical study and Torah study,¹⁰ for either spouse.

It remains unclear to what other mitzvot this principle might apply—especially when it is the woman who is occupied in another mitzva, given that she is not directly obligated in the positive mitzva of pirya ve-rivya to start with.

An important test-case for Rav Lichtenstein’s approach to Halacha and contraception could be Israeli Army Service or a woman’s National Service, which are considered mitzvot in Israel’s Religious Zionist community. However, we have not seen his approach, much less a more detailed discussion of its application, treated extensively in halachic literature.

Rav Yaakov Ariel makes a similar argument to Rav Lichtenstein’s, though he applied it in practice only after a couple had at least one child.¹¹

Rav Ariel here makes reference to our next topic of discussion: When is it permitted to delay fulfillment of a mitzva?

The other factors we have discussed are clearly relevant to couples making decisions about contraception after they have fulfilled pirya ve-rivya. Are they also relevant to couples who have not yet fulfilled pirya ve-rivya? Given that the mitzva of pirya ve-rivya has no set deadline for fulfillment, is there a halachic imperative not to delay it if a couple plans to fulfill the mitzva at a later point?

Answers to this question largely depend on differing perspectives regarding how Halacha views delay in fulfilling positive mitzvot in general.

Ordinarily, when someone is obligated in a positive commandment, they should not deliberately delay or avoid performing it. There are a few halachic formulations of this idea, with two main messages:

I. Not delaying mitzvot. This is learned by comparison to not tarrying while preparing matza:

The midrash is based on the linguistic similarity between the words “matzot” and “mitzvot,” which are spelled identically in the Torah.

Alternatively, the concept can be derived from the requirement that a brother who is available to do so perform levirate marriage (yibum) or release his sister-in-law (chalitza) immediately, rather than waiting for another brother to take action:

II. Zealously performing mitzvot at the earliest opportunity ( ). This formulation is based on the model of Avraham Avinu, who arose early in the morning for the akeida. It is exemplified by the widespread practice of performing a berit mila during the morning of the eighth day whenever possible, rather than waiting until later in the day.

All other things being equal, we should usually perform a mitzva at the earliest opportunity. Meiri, an early halachic authority, describes this as a way to avoid seeming reluctant to do a mitzva, as well as to follow the path of the Avot:

There is halachic debate regarding the exact halachic force of this and related principles. Note that Meiri also suggests that the principle of zerizin makdimin (the zealous are early) is not strictly obligatory. He gives reasons without using the language of obligation. A few centuries later, Rav Yaakov Reischer asserts that being zealous to perform a mitzva early is a rabbinic obligation.

Avraham set off for the akeida early in the morning, demonstrating complete readiness to obey an extraordinarily difficult command. When there is no compelling reason for delay, we generally seek to emulate his zeal by performing mitzvot promptly and eagerly.

Beyond questions of delay and of zeal, there is also halachic discussion of whether delaying performing positive mitzvot, mitzvot aseh, is tantamount to abrogating them, and whether this would apply to pirya ve-rivya.

A mishna lays out different types of sins and how to atone for them. One such sin is abrogating a mitzvat aseh.

When a person is obligated in a positive mitzva and does not fulfill it, this is called a bitul aseh, an abrogation of a positive mitzva. As Rambam notes, this can be done intentionally or unwittingly.

Transgressing a positive mitzva can also be either active or passive. For example, eating the Shabbat evening meal right away without stopping for kiddush, in direct contravention of the mitzva to recite kiddush, would be an active transgression of a positive mitzva. Simply not reciting birkat ha-mazon after eating would be a more passive transgression. Birkat ha-mazon needs to be recited while a person still feels sated from their meal, so a person who fails to recite it before that point has abrogated the mitzva.

Pirya ve-rivya, on the other hand, can be fulfilled at any point over a person’s life.¹² What is the status of someone who has not actively transgressed a mitzva, but has also not yet fulfilled it? Life is unpredictable, and the delay may mean that the mitzva will never be fulfilled. On the other hand, it is possible—even probable—that the delay will not ultimately get in the way of fulfilling the mitzva.

Applications for Pirya Ve-Rivya

Our discussion is perhaps crystallized by an ambiguity in a foundational mishna about pirya ve-rivya, which is quoted almost verbatim by Rambam and Shulchan Aruch:

What does the word “desist” (yevatel) mean here? Is this mishna saying that there is ordinarily no room to choose to delay fulfilling pirya ve-rivya, or that one simply cannot decide to desist from it until it is fulfilled? Rav Aharon Lichtenstein points out this ambiguity:

This leaves us with two main approaches to understanding whether delaying having children is a bitul aseh:

I. Delay is potentially a bitul aseh Looking back at the halacha we saw in our discussion of ha-osek ba-mitzva, but with more context, we see that Rambam seems to present the first possibility, that there is ordinarily no room to delay attempting to fulfill the mitzva. (This leaves asides the possible grounds for delay discussed here and here.)

Rambam writes that before pirya ve-rivya has been fulfilled, no opportunity to have relations at a set interval that might result in conception should be missed. He adds that the mitzvot of marrying and of pirya ve-rivya are intertwined. A man’s delaying marriage past the age of twenty, and therefore not fulfilling pirya ve-rivya, is considered a bitul aseh. Rambam seems to indicate that delaying marriage (as is now common) or practicing contraception before fulfilling pirya ve-rivya would ordinarily be considered a transgression.

How could a delay of a mitzva be considered equivalent to abrogating it, when a person can fulfill that mitzva later on? Maharit addresses this point:

According to Maharit, if a man who delayed fulfilling pirya ve-rivya ultimately fulfills it, he is retroactively considered only to have delayed it. But until the point that he fulfills the mitzva, he was indeed abrogating it.

The exception, as Rambam notes, would be the case we discussed earlier, where someone had another mitzva to perform, such as learning Torah, that would not allow for fulfillment of pirya ve-rivya.

II. Delay is not a bitul aseh In a question concerning whether a man without children can take an oath to delay marriage, perforce delaying procreation, Rashba suggests that the oath takes effect. The man is delaying performance of the mitzva, but is not abrogating it:

In much more recent times, Chazon Ish discussed the general issue of whether delaying performance of a mitzva without a set time constitutes a bitul aseh.¹³

Chazon Ish’s conclusion is not absolute, but he seems to consider delay in mitzva performance as something technically permissible for a mitzva with no set time, as long as one has a substantial reason for delay, which would include performing another mitzva (as Rambam noted), or a case of financial loss, and one intends to fulfill the mitzva at a later point in time. This discussion might have particular relevance in discussions of whether financial concerns warrant delay, or in applying ha-osek ba-mitzva patur min ha-mitzva to pirya ve-rivya.

Shulhan Aruch seems to reinforce this last point:

While Shulhan Aruch largely adopts Rambam’s ruling, he adds in that this is a matter that requires intervention specifically if the man delaying marriage “does not wish to marry.” A man who does not wish to marry has no intention of fulfilling pirya ve-rivya. The implication seems to be that the rabbinic court relates with a lighter hand to a man who delays marriage but does ultimately wish to marry and have children.

Delay for the Sake of Enhanced Fulfillment

There can be very significant and legitimate reasons not to perform a mitzva at the first possible opportunity, or to delay it for longer. In some cases, it has become widely accepted not to perform a mitzva as early as possible. For example, even those holding a berit mila in the morning typically do not call it for right after prayers at sunrise, and most people do not wake up daily to recite shacharit at sunrise either.

In the case of pirya ve-rivya, we have already established that physical or mental health concerns can allow for—and sometimes mandate—delay in fulfilling the mitzva even when no direct danger is present. We’ve also looked at some other factors that can be relevant in delaying the mitzva.

A situation that often arises with the mitzva of pirya ve-rivya is when different factors in a couple’s life would make it difficult for them to have a child now, but are not expected to interfere or might even enhance performance, later on.

Does the imperative to perform a mitzva at the earliest opportunity apply even when a mitzva will be fulfilled in a more ideal (mehudar) fashion if someone deliberately waits until later on to fulfill it?

For example, Terumat Ha-deshen argues that the blessing over the new moon, kiddush levana, need not be performed at the very first opportunity each month. Rather, it ordinarily can and even should be delayed until Motzaei Shabbat, a time considered preferable for performing it. The one caveat is that Motzaei Shabbat should be early enough in the month that there will still be opportunities the next few nights to recite it, if the Saturday night sky is cloudy:

Rema rules like Terumat Ha-deshen.¹⁴ According to this school of thought, a mitzva can be deliberately delayed for the sake of fulfilling it in a more ideal fashion, but only when there is good reason to think that the opportunity to fulfill it will not be lost altogether.

It’s hard to know how to apply this criterion to pirya ve-rivya, which has no set time limit. When a couple delays pirya ve-rivya with the intent of fulfilling it in a better fashion later on, there is no guarantee that they will be able to. True, with regard to kiddush levana, one cannot be absolutely certain that the sky won’t be cloudy throughout every remaining night, but in most climates there is good reason to expect an interlude of clear skies somewhere during that time span. Pirya ve-rivya is more tenuous. The future can bring unexpected developments, and, after a certain point, fertility naturally decreases with age.¹⁵

Still, sometimes a couple find themselves in circumstances that would make it difficult for them to have a child at present, and they don’t expect these circumstances to apply in the future. Perhaps they can choose to delay pirya ve-rivya, relying on the odds that they will succeed in fulfilling it later.

Some authorities suggest that the halacha in such cases depends on the expected duration of the delay, while others reject length of delay as a key halachic consideration. Shevut Yaakov, for example, cites an opinion that leaves more room for delaying mitzva fulfillment when the delay is short. He himself, however, maintains that even a long delay is acceptable when the mitzva will clearly be performed in a superior fashion at a later time.

In practice, it is often easier halachically to delay procreation for a short amount of time than a longer amount, because there is more reason to be confident in such a case that the delay will not impede fulfillment of the mitzva.

Multiple Children of Same Gender

The question of whether it is permissible to delay fulfilling pirya ve-rivya is also relevant after a couple have had several children, all of the same gender. Since the couple have not yet fulfilled the mitzva of pirya ve-rivya, the halachic issues usually raised by delay still apply to them. This is the case even though a couple with multiple children of only one gender have contributed to shevet (settling the world), and even though they have made a good faith attempt to fulfill the mitzva promptly.

However, these couples have knowledge gained from experience about the impact of having children, and the challenges inherent to raising a growing family, that gives added weight to concerns that they might raise. When they seek to use contraception beyond the usual allowances for spacing, it is often because they are contending with one or a combination of the factors that we have discussed that may make it permissible to use contraception, such as shalom bayit or chinuch or finances. (Eventually, this may also come to include health concerns related to age.)

Ultimately, some couples with several children, or even with a very large family, will not be able to fulfill pirya ve-rivya. Depending on their individual circumstances, there may still be a valid halachic basis for them to use contraception, even for extended periods of time.

Concluding Thought

Delaying fulfillment of pirya ve-rivya, as by practicing contraception, would at least depend on there being a strong reason for delay—if not for health reasons, then ideally for fulfilling another mitzva, or perhaps for eventual enhanced fulfillment of pirya ve-rivya itself. Any such delay would best be accompanied by express intent to fulfill the mitzva of pirya ve-rivya at a later point in time. Even when there is strong reason for delay and intent to fulfill this mitzva later, permissibility of using contraception could be subject to debate, depending on the reason.

We have seen a wide range of approaches to what factors matter more or less in weighing conception or contraception. In this heartfelt post on an internet forum, a woman shares her personal take on integrating a positive religious outlook on having children with a commitment to maintaining her health and with other factors we’ve discussed here:¹⁶

In our next piece, we discuss contraception at the beginning of marriage and a Rabbi’s role in decisions about contraception.