Questions and Answers
Sometimes a quick exchange communicates more effectively, and more personally, than an article. Sometimes, just seeing that others share our questions can make us feel more connected.
Our posted questions and answers are an opportunity to learn from each other.
Keep in mind that each questioner’s situation may be unique, in ways that affect the halacha. Even the tone of a question can affect the tone of an answer.
Click here to ask a question of your own!
Has gender bias affected Halacha?
Torah law transcends human judgment and knowledge.
Since our sages’ teachings represent a received tradition of Torah She-be’al Peh, transmitted orally from generation to generation, the Torah’s credibility on these laws effectively becomes theirs.
Sometimes, however, interpretations of Jewish law offered by our sages may not seem to match up with the plain meaning of the Torah. At other times, sages have viewpoints that are in dispute. And sometimes these interpretations or disputed viewpoints take a perspective on gender that may not sit well with us.
Most people of the ancient and medieval worlds regarded women as men’s inferiors. Should we be concerned that gender bias has affected Halachic teachings from those times?
Rav Aharon Lichtenstein addresses the question of potential biases, conscious and unconscious, in his essay, “The Human and Social Factor in Halakha.”
Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, 'The Human and Social Factor in Halakha'
Certainly, they [our sages] had predilections and attitudes. However, our faith in them inspires us with confidence that the halakhic process was governed by halakhic factors, that halakhic decisions rested on halakhic grounds. We have neither the right nor the desire to suggest that their judgment was diverted or warped by extraneous factors….We follow in their footsteps not only out of deference to the formal and technical authority of the ultimate arbiter but because we recognize and are overawed by their greatness. … Hence, their attitudes, no mere intrusive graft but an organic outgrowth of the gavra rabba in them, can indeed provide the proper infrastructure for certain halakhot. Hazal’s factual perceptions are, relatively speaking, more historically conditioned. Their reading of human nature, in its permanent metaphysical aspect, retains its full force; but observations of given sociological tendencies may be more relative and of lesser normative status. … Hence, in certain areas, cautious reappraisal may very well be in order. There is, however, nothing in this process to undermine the halakhic order or to challenge its architects….Even if one were to grant that some halakhot were grounded in attitudes, at least partially ascribed to various influences, and if one were to acknowledge license to confront the attitudes, it hardly follows that the halakhot in question can be dismissed cavalierly.
Rav Lichtenstein teaches that we must trust that our sages have no intent to interpret Torah in line with a particular agenda or bias foreign to Torah. Even when they are innovative, or when their transmission of tradition is unclear, our sages are first and foremost attempting to interpret and uphold the Torah and its values. Sometimes their “factual perceptions are, relatively speaking, more historically conditioned,” and that means that “in certain areas, cautious reappraisal may very well be in order.” That doesn’t suffice to undermine the halachic order or dismiss halachot that may trouble us.
Like us, our sages were human, living in specific places and times. Unlike us, our sages have a unique stature, coupled with a Divine mandate to establish Halacha.
When he describes our sages’ halachic role, Ramban explains how this mandate works:
רמב”ן דברים יז:יא
וענינו אפילו תחשוב בלבך שהם טועים והדבר פשוט בעיניך כאשר אתה יודע בין ימינך לשמאלך, תעשה כמצותם…כי על הדעת שלהם הוא נותן לנו התורה, אפילו יהיה בעיניך כמחליף הימין בשמאל, וכל שכן שיש לך לחשוב שהם אומרים על ימין שהוא ימין, כי רוח השם על משרתי מקדשו ולא יעזוב את חסידיו, לעולם נשמרו מן הטעות ומן המכשול.
Ramban on the Torah, Devarim 17:11
Even if you think in your heart that they [the sages of the Sanhedrin] are in error, and the matter is as clear to you as knowing your right hand from your left, do as they command… For according to their knowledge does He give us the Torah, even if it should be in your eyes as one who switches left for right. How much more so that you should think that they call right what is right, for the spirit of God is on the servants of His sanctuary and He does not abandon his followers. They are ever protected from mistake and from stumbling block.
Ramban anticipates that a person might sometimes think the Sanhedrin’s halachic rulings are mistaken. Still he assures us that we should assume that their right is right, and not only because God has given them authority. Why? “The spirit of God” guides them. The idea is that God watches over Halacha. Indeed, our greatest halachic authorities often distinguish themselves by helping us see how the spirit of God has guided halachic discussion.
Not all halachic positions become accepted as Halacha. When a halachic ruling that is considered authoritative seems difficult to us, we should humbly trust that, over time, we will come to recognize the Divine in the halacha, and that when “cautious reappraisal may very well be in order,” the authorities of our generation will undertake it as Halacha allows.
What can we do with our questions about women and mitzvot?
When our sages discuss the genders or when Halacha distinguishes between them, it can sometimes ring unconvincing or discordant to the modern ear.
What can we do about that? Seven things:
I. Ask Honestly We should honestly acknowledge these issues when they arise. We can say that something is challenging for us to hear or to identify with, without disparaging its source or undermining its validity.
II. Look Deeper We should explore them thoroughly and with an open mind, in faith that Halacha can stand up to scrutiny. Careful study can help us find interpretations that bring us closer to our sages’ perspectives or reach conclusions about how to think about these issues.
Too often, ignorance amplifies difficulties or even creates them. Knowledge can help us hone in on the real issues we need to address, and develop perspective on them. Many seemingly modern questions have actually been raised and addressed in the past, often in surprising ways.
III. Challenge Ourselves At the same time, we should recognize that we bring our own biases, conscious and unconscious, to our learning. Ways of thinking shift from generation to generation. Our perspective on gender and definitions of bias inevitably reflect the time we live in. Serious learning often pushes us to reconsider our initial assumptions or to pursue new trains of thought. Keeping that in mind can help our study maintain a respectful tone.
IV. Respect our Sages It is also important to remember that we lack the tradition and erudition of our sages. The earlier and more authoritative the source, the greater the humility with which we should approach it.
V. Classify the Discussion We should keep in mind that Jewish tradition is multi-vocal, so there is some freedom to prefer certain strands of thought in homiletics or theology to others. There is less freedom in Halacha, where we are often bound by precedent and where authority is more decisive, but rejected halachic opinions are not authoritative.
VI. Turn to Authorities Once we know a topic well, we can communicate effectively with halachic authorities. Study gives us a deeper understanding of what they say, and a greater ability to express our thoughts to them in halachic terms.
VII. Persist What if learning and discussion fail to resolve our questions or leave us with new ones? Sometimes, we have to live with tough questions because we are committed to Halacha. However, “She’elat chacham chatzi teshuva.” “The question of a wise person is [itself] half[way to] an answer.” If we persist, continuing to learn and discuss the issues, we can actively help new answers emerge.
How does this work in practice? Let’s take women’s learning Torah as an example.
In Learning Torah II, we saw Rabbi Eliezer’s statement that “Whoever teaches his daughter Torah is akin to teaching her nonsense.” How could Torah possibly lead someone astray? Why should this apply to women?
(I) We openly asked the question of why Rabbi Eliezer says this, acknowledging that it can be hard to fathom. (II) Further exploration of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement led us to suggest that it is more a reflection of his rigid and zealous stance on Torah transmission than of a particular attitude toward women. (III) We came to this idea by taking modern attitudes about women seriously as we explored our question, without assuming that they are infallible or superior to Rabbi Eliezer’s. (IV) We approached Rabbi Eliezer with respect and humility without denying the challenge his statement poses.
(V) In exploring the halacha of women’s learning Torah, one of the central points of discussion became whether Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is a binding halachic prohibition. By the end of Learning Torah IV, describing current halachic rulings and their connection to the past, we saw much evidence of God’s spirit guiding Halacha and (VI) were in position to ask any remaining questions from a point of appreciation and understanding. (VII) As part of our commitment to Halacha, we continue to ask and explore unresolved questions.
Can there be difference without discrimination?
We can define feminism as the theory of equality of the sexes. While the most recent trend is to question binary notions of gender altogether, earlier feminist discourse may prove useful to us for clarifying what it means to treat men and women similarly or differently.
In the late twentieth century, equality feminists sought gender parity by rejecting gender distinctions across the board, and by pushing for gender-neutral theories and policies. Difference feminists, in contrast, held that men and women have equal status, but that equality does not indicate sameness. They argued that equality could be expressed by men and women filling differing roles.
Equality feminism, in insisting on universal gender-neutral legislation, cannot be reconciled with Torah’s frequently gender-specific laws, though it can be reconciled with the many areas in which Torah does not differentiate between genders.4 Difference feminism, on the other hand, might be compatible with Halacha as a whole, harkening back to the double account of creation in which we are both equal and distinct.5
Late Israeli legal scholar and Supreme Court justice Menachem Elon put these issues in legal terms:6
פרופסור מנחם אלון, מעמד האישה, עמ’ 40.
לעניין מושג השוויון מן הראוי להזכיר, בפתיחתם של דברים, עיקרון גדול בתורת המשפט, שלפיו קיים הבדל מהותי בין “הפליה” שהיא פסולה לבין “הבחנה” שהיא מותרת, היינו שיש להתייחס ביחס שווה לכל אדם ואדם, אלא אם וכאשר קיימים ביניהם הבדלים של ממש, שהם הסדלים אמיתיים ורלוונטיים לנושא מסויים. אימתי ההבדלים בין גבר ואישה הם “אמיתיים” ורלוונטיים”, המצדיקים את ה”הפליה” ועושים אותה ל”הבחנה”?
Prof. Menachem Elon, The Status of Woman Translated by Shoshana Zolty
As far as equality is concerned, I would like to point out that there is a major principle in law which distinguishes “discrimination,” which is invalid, from “distinction,” which is valid, such that one must treat every person equally unless there are material differences between them which are real and relevant to the issue. The critical question is, of course: when are the differences between men and women “real” and “relevant” so as to justify “discrimination” and make it into “distinction”?”
Even today, we lack a definitive, overarching consensus on what constitutes ‘real and relevant’ difference between the genders. In the absence of one, we should assume that gender differences in Halacha belong to the realm of distinction, not discrimination.
Is a wife considered to be in her husband's domain?
This question arises, for example, when a married woman is released from some aspects of honoring parents and the reason given is that the married woman is in her husband’s domain. The assumption that a woman is in her husband’s domain in a way that could limit her activities may be uncomfortable for the modern reader. This construction of marriage is not merely sociological, however; it has a halachic basis.
For example, though the wife retains independent ownership of properties that were hers prior to marriage, from marriage onward, property is joint and largely controlled by the husband, by rabbinic decree.
The husband’s rights to the wife’s property are tied to his obligations to her. These include the Torah-level obligations to provide her food, clothes, and shelter, which the Rambam refers to as a type of subjugation of husband to wife.10 There are also halachically acceptable mechanisms by which a married couple may agree to administer their property differently, allowing the wife control.
Jewish marriage does place different types of obligations on each spouse. However, couples have the freedom to work within Halacha to define how their marriages function.
In practice, a married daughter often takes the lead among siblings in caring for elderly parents, sometimes at the expense of her own family and pursuits. This halacha, albeit working within a hierarchical view of marriage, also may protect a woman from becoming overextended. Sometimes hierarchy can achieve important halachic or social goals.
Why should women today be held responsible for Chava's sin? Are men responsible for Adam's?
The Torah presents Adam and Chava as archetypes. They establish norms for humanity and their actions reverberate through time. For example, after Chava’s creation, Adam recognizes her as “flesh of my flesh,” and the Torah tells us that this is the basis for the institution of marriage.6Additionally, God’s statements to Adam and Chava in the aftermath of their sins also apply to humanity as a whole. Man still toils for bread, and women still experience pain in childbirth.
Since Chava is an archetype for women, women have the opportunity to rectify her sin. What about Adam’s sin, and men? According to another midrash, God created Avraham Avinu after Adam so that Avraham can rectify Adam’s misdeeds.
בראשית רבה (וילנא) פרשת בראשית פרשה יד
א”ר לוי האדם הגדול בענקים, זה אברהם, למה קורא אותו גדול שהיה ראוי להבראות קודם לאדם הראשון, אלא אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא שמא יקלקל ואין מי שיבא לתקן תחתיו, אלא הרי אני בורא את האדם תחלה שאם יקלקל יבא אברהם ויתקן תחתיו,
Bereishit Rabba, Bereishit 14
Rabbi Levi said: “The man who is great among giants” – this refers to Avraham. Why does it call him “great”? Because he was worthy to be created before Adam, but the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Perhaps [Adam] will sin and there will not be anyone to come and rectify [matters] in his place. Rather, behold, I am creating Adam first, so that if he sins, Avraham will come and rectify [matters] in his place.
The Zohar expands on this idea:
זוהר חדש כרך ב (מגילות) מגילת רות דף מ עמוד א
דאברהם תקן מה דעבד אדם. וכן יצחק ויעקב וצדיקייא.
Zohar Chadash II Rut 40a
For Avraham rectified what Adam did. So too [did] Yitzchak and Ya’akov and the righteous.
Not only Avraham, but all the Avot and the righteous rectify Adam’s deed.
For women, rectification comes through the three mitzvot. Do men have any comparable mitzva? Avraham is the first to receive the mitzva of berit mila, circumcision. Abarbanel links this command to Avraham’s role as a rectification for Adam:7
אברבנאל בראשית פרק יז
שצוה הקדוש ברוך הוא את אברהם במצות המילה כדי לתקן את אשר עוות אדם הראשון כי הוא באכלו מעץ הדעת נטה לתאות המשגל יותר מהראוי כמו שפירשתי שם ואברהם צווה במצוה כדי להרחיק אותה נטיה מותרית שעשה אדם אביו
Abarbanel Bereishit 17
For the Holy One commanded Avraham in the mitzva of mila in order to rectify that which Adam made wrong, for he in his eating of the tree of knowledge leaned toward sexual desire more than is fitting…Avraham was commanded in the mitzva in order to distance this excessive tendency that Adam his forefather acted on.
Much as women perform the three mitzvot to rectify Chana’s sin, perhaps men undergo berit mila to rectify Adam’s.
Much halachic discussion assumes that a woman is domestic. What if a woman does not want to be associated with the home?
Many of us (women and men) have conflicting feelings about this association between women and the home. How much of a role do social norms play in constructing women’s and men’s responsibility for the home? Is domesticity essentially feminine? Don’t many women flourish outside the home? Shouldn’t men take on increasing responsibility for home life?
In practice, Halacha leaves room for a wide variety of approaches to shaping home life. Even so, women’s priority in the three mitzvot recognizes the great influence women often wield at home. The mitzvot translate that influence into halachic terms of mitzva and merit, with broad spiritual implications.
Home, and the relationships that we have to each other and to God within it, dramatically affects our experience of Torah. In many realms in Halacha, men take center stage; in this central realm, women do.
POSITIVE TIME-BOUND MITZVOT
Why does the exemption from positive time-bound mitzvot loom so large?
Here are two thoughts:
I. Most of the positive non-time-bound mitzvot create the Jewish character and general approach to life, the Jewish gestalt. In contrast, positive time-bound mitzvot are rituals. Three of them are central mitzvot of major holidays.
Although positive non-time-bound mitzvot are more numerous and arguably more fundamental to Jewish life than many of the rituals, the latter (especially when connected to objects or holidays) draw our attention.
For example, viduy, confession of sin as part of the process of repentance, is a significant mitzva. Both men and women are required to perform viduy. But it is the shofar on Rosh Ha-shanah, from which women are exempt on a Torah level, that has come to symbolize teshuva.
When women’s exemptions fall largely in the area of ritual, they tend to stand out disproportionately because of their symbolic value and because of the significance we ascribe to the holidays.
II. Many of the positive time-bound rituals stand out in the context of prayer in the synagogue. When Jewish communities are decentralized and dislocated and the Judaism of the home and society takes second place to institutional Judaism, synagogues take on greater, perhaps outsized, importance.
The more a community’s Jewish life emphasizes synagogue and ritual over holistic Judaism based in the home and the Jewish street, the more time-bound positive commandments appear central and the more central commands, such as believing in God, move to the periphery of religious attention. Perhaps for this reason, there is less communal discussion of this exemption in Israel, where the social and national experience overshadow the synagogue.1
Of course positive time-bound commandments are important, and the exemption from them matters, but they are not the only cornerstones of Jewish religious life.
Are women more religiously enthusiastic than men?
There is no absolute way to prove or disprove essential gender difference in religious enthusiasm. A recent sociological study of American Jews did find disparity between the genders, with women and girls significantly more engaged, specifically among non-Orthodox denominations in America.9 The same study, however, attributes gender differences to American sociological norms, and not to innate religiosity.10
Sylvia Barack Fishman and Daniel Parmer, Matrilineal ASCENT/ Patrilineal DESCENT, p. 1, 69
…Today American Jewish boys and men have fewer connections to Jews and Judaism than girls and women in almost every venue and in every age…Gender makes less of a difference among Orthodox Jews: the social capital of men and women within Orthodoxy is equal…American males are less attached to Jewish life not because men are innately “less religious” than women in some essential psychological way, but because American culture and society value religious activities and behaviors for women but devalue them for men. Moreover, those aspects of religion that men are typically more attracted to—namely religious activities—are not regarded as religious by the Christian-shaped society that values religious belief over religious behavior.
The authors of the study dismiss the idea that men’s lesser religious enthusiasm suggests that they are “innately ‘less religious.'” Still, they acknowledge that “religious activities,” like observing positive time-bound mitzvot, are “aspects of religion that men are typically more attracted to,” and that the Orthodox communities that emphasize them for men have more gender balance overall. There is room to interpret this data in a way that supports Rav Hirsch’s position.
Anecdotally, many women are hesitant to lay claim to a religious advantage rooted in gender, but quick to embrace the idea that women’s spirituality and approach to religion take a different tone than men’s.
Do time-bound mitzvot really take up that much time?
Many positive time-bound commandments do not take much time to fulfill. If a woman can perform a time-bound mitzva quickly, why should it create tension in her home? For example, putting on tzitzit in the morning can be accomplished in seconds.
Abudarham might answer that some of these mitzvot, such as laying tefillin, do take up more time. Perhaps the rule relates to the whole class of mitzvot in order to prevent confusion. We make exceptions only when warranted by the nature of the mitzva, not based on how much time it takes.
Why should anyone question voluntary mitzva performance?
Mitzva literally means commandment. What does it mean to perform a command in which one is not commanded? To do God’s bidding unbidden?
The Ran raises the concern that when we perform a mitzva without being commanded, we risk missing the essential point of the mitzva.
דרשות הר”ן הדרוש השביעי
מי שאינו מצווה ועושה לא יגדל שכרו, כי אפשר שאין רצון השם יתברך בו ובמינו אחרי אשר לא צווה בו…אפשר כי יש במצות טעמים שנתיחדה מהם המצוה במי שמצווה ועושה. …שאפשר שלא תושלם כונת המצוה וסודה במי שאינו מצווה בה, כאשר תושלם במי שצוהו השם יתברך.
Derashot Ha-Ran 7
One who is not commanded and performs, his reward will not be great, for it is possible that God does not desire [performance of that mitzva by] him and his sort, since He did not command him… Mitzvot may have reasons whereby the mitzva is specifically intended for the one who is commanded and performs… for it is possible that the intention and inner nature of the mitzva will not be fulfilled through one who is not commanded and performs as it is fulfilled by one whom God commanded.
Ran points out that God determines the meaning of each mitzva, who is obligated in it, and who is exempt. A mitzva’s deeper significance may be linked to the class of people who are commanded in it. If God exempted me, that very exemption may indicate that my voluntary performance would not have the same religious meaning as a commanded performance.
The significance of voluntary performance of a mitzva might be fundamentally different from the meaning of the mitzva when performed by one who is obligated.
Should we be doing this?
This being what we do here on this site, learning Torah, directly from sources, including the Talmud and halachic codes.
This question does not speak to some women, for whom Torah study holds little appeal or interest. These women may wonder instead why a woman would want to study Torah at all.
For others, probably most of you here, the question itself is problematic. It can be hard to imagine why anyone would limit a woman’s access to Torah study. After all, men do not have to entertain questions about the propriety or importance of their Torah learning. And nowadays women have access to education in all other fields.
But a closer look at many of our communities reveals ambivalence towards women’s learning.
Deep uncertainty about women’s learning appears in many guises: The father who learns every Shabbat with his sons, but not with his daughters. The school that teaches Mishna to boys and not to girls. The family friends who give the bar mitzva boy religious books and the bat mitzva girl jewelry. The parents who send their sons to learn in Israel, but keep their daughters close to home. The dating prospect who won’t go out with a ‘girl who learns.’ The Rabbi who declares certain seminaries are off limits because of their curricula. Communal initiatives for women to devote time to acts of chessed, loving-kindness, (or to less lofty pursuits,) but not to study. The couples who make great efforts so that the husband can learn daily, while the wife finds no time to learn Torah herself. The local batei midrash (houses of study) that women never enter and often are entirely closed to women.
משלי פרק ג:יח
עֵץ חַיִּים הִיא לַמַּחֲזִיקִים בָּהּ וְתֹמְכֶיהָ מְאֻשָּׁר
It is a tree of life to those who grasp it and its supporters are happy.
While it’s clear that Torah is “a tree of life,” it is less clear what role learning plays in a woman’s “holding fast to it.”
Can anyone grasp Torah without studying it? Do resistance, ambivalence, or indifference to women’s Torah learning have halachic roots? How is the recent growth of frameworks for women’s study rooted in Halacha?
To begin to address these questions, we need to trace the halachic roots of differing approaches to women’s Torah study from the beginning.
Does bitul Torah (not wasting time away from Torah) apply to women?
Halacha requires men to prioritize Torah study over frivolous pursuits, because men have an obligation in the mitzva of talmud Torah. A man should not casually waste time he could spend learning (i.e., engage in bitul Torah).
What about women? In the absence of the obligation of talmud Torah, is free time a free-for-all?
Rav Ya’akov Ariel, a National-Religious Israeli halachic authority, writes that bitul Torah does, in a sense, apply to women.
רב יעקב אריאל “גדר ביטול תורה גם לנשים”
יום של ביטול תורה הוא חור באישיותה של האישה, ויש להתייחס אליו במידה מסוימת כ”ביטול תורה,” אף שאינו “ביטול תורה” במשמעות המקורית של המושג. אין כאן ביטול בידע התורני, אך יש כאן ביטול באישיותה הרוחנית של האישה….
Rav Ya'akov Ariel, 'The Safeguard of Bitul Torah Applies also to Women'
A day of bitul Torah [wasting time one could spend learning] is a hole in the character of a woman, and one should relate to it, to some extent, like [the halachic category of] bitul Torah, even though it is not bitul Torah in its original sense. There is no bitul of [obligatory] Torah knowledge, but there is bitul regarding the spiritual character of the woman.
To Rav Ariel, a day without Torah is a blow to anyone’s character. Women, too, have “spiritual character” and should be wary of bitul Torah.
Women don’t have a free ticket to watch hours of television or mindlessly surf the internet. What does exemption from the mitzva of talmud Torah mean then? That women have more flexibility than men in deciding how to study Torah and how much Torah to study.
Why don't more women study Torah, especially Oral Torah?
Even in communities that view women’s study of Oral Torah as permissible, most women do not pursue it.
Why not? Here are some common contributing factors:
1. The wider community’s ambivalence to women’s Torah study, especially Talmud study, can undermine it. It can be difficult to make the effort to study without external validation.
2. Many women lack female role models who balance serious study with other religious commitments. Role models provide inspiration and a sense of what is possible.
3. Many communities do not offer attractive or accessible frameworks for women’s talmud Torah. Without opportunities, women won’t learn. Talmud study, in particular, demands a high level of training.
4. Many women (and men) are most attracted to Torah study that connects directly to matters of faith or to practical Halacha. Scholars who teach primary texts often focus on more arcane subjects or intricate styles of study. That may discourage some women, especially women with less background in Torah study, from learning at all.
Communities can surmount these challenges by supporting women’s talmud Torah, welcoming female teachers, offering frameworks for women’s study, and encouraging a range of study topics and styles.
Possibilities for encouraging women’s Torah study abound: Fathers can learn every Shabbat with their daughters; schools can expand their Torah curriculum for girls; family friends can give the bat mitzva girl religious books; parents can send their daughters to learn in Israel; dating prospects can agree to meet a ‘girl who learns;’ Rabbis can be more accepting of more institutions of learning; communal initiatives for women can incorporate study; couples can make an effort to set aside time for the woman to learn; and local batei midrash can open their doors to women.
(For more suggestions specific to Talmud study, see here.)
How does a woman's Torah study affect others?
When a woman engages in formal Torah study, it clearly benefits her. How does that affect the people around her?
The Talmud teaches that a woman’s merit for Torah study is indirect:
סוטה דף כא.
רבינא אמר: … באגרא דמקרין ומתניין בנייהו ונטרן להו לגברייהו עד דאתו מבי מדרשא מי לא פלגאן בהדייהו
Ravina said: …Through … reading [verses] and repeating [mishnayot to] their sons and watching out for their husbands until they come from the bet midrash, do they not share the reward [of learning Torah] with them?
Ravina lives before women study Torah texts formally. According to him, women receive reward for Torah study by helping husbands and sons to study. Shulchan Aruch agrees.
Rav Schneerson points out that, in our generation, women can also facilitate children’s and husbands’ study by teaching them.
רב מנחם מ. שניאורסון ,”שותפות בלימוד”
והבנים מספרים לאמותיהם על לימודים, הן במקרא והן במשנה, וגם בגמרא…והאמהות מוסיפות להסביר ולבאר להם את לימודם, ועל דרך זה בנוגע לבעליהן…שמביעות דעתן וסברתן וכו’.
Rav Menachem M. Schneerson, 'Partnership in Study'
The children tell their mothers about their studies, both in Scripture and in Mishnah, and also in Gemara…and the mothers contribute, explaining and clarifying for them what they have learned, and similarly regarding their husbands…that they express their opinions and reasoning, etc.
Here Rav Schneerson reinforces his idea that women’s talmud Torah is a net gain for everyone. A woman’s active involvement in discussing Torah with her family or friends enhances their learning and enriches their religious lives.
Women can share or teach Torah in broader contexts as well, and contribute to Torah and communal policy at a very high level.
Everyone stands to benefit when women learn Torah. Halacha recognizes this, too. For example, a woman can make a public siyum with the full status of a se’udat mitzva.
Women’s Torah study elevates the entire Jewish community.
Is becoming a scholar a purpose of women's Torah study?
Rosh Beit Midrash of Migdal Oz (and Rav Lichtenstein’s daughter) Esti Rosenberg, adviser to Deracheha, discusses an additional goal of study, becoming a scholar. She writes that midrashot confront the following question:
Rabbanit Esti Rosenberg, 'The World of Women's Torah Learning: Developments, Directives, and Objectives'
Is the dream and vision underlying women’s Torah learning to produce female Torah scholars who will be able to participate in scholarly Torah discussions at the highest level, or perhaps the primary goal is to raise ba’alei batiyot [laywomen] who are dedicated to and love the Torah?
As in the world of men’s Torah study, there is an inherent tension between fostering an elite cohort of scholars and meeting the religious needs of the general population. In line with most of the sources we have seen, most Torah institutions for women choose to prioritize developing love of Torah over high-level scholarship, while laying the groundwork for further study.
Some schools, Migdal Oz among them, also offer advanced learning opportunities for women. For these women, working to become scholars “at the highest level” is a form of avodat Hashem.
On prayer, how can there be so much divergence between halachic texts and common custom?
Halachic texts teach that women should pray Shemoneh Esrei at least twice a day, especially when child-rearing or other mitzvot do not interfere. And yet there is also a consensus that the custom of many women is to rely on limmud zechut to pray less—either only one Shemoneh Esrei a day or even a shorter personal prayer. How can that be?
Halacha is an interplay between textual tradition and custom. Some of us grew up with mothers who were careful to recite Shemoneh Esrei on a regular basis. Others grew up with mothers who were scrupulous in their religious observance, but did not open the prayerbook much. Some of these women might have lacked the literacy needed to open the books, or may have learned to pray from mothers who did not read Hebrew.
Women who have the ability to satisfy the simple meaning of the Mishna and Talmud and recite Shemoneh Esrei should absolutely do so. But many women who are committed to Torah observance also find other paths to prayer, especially if they are raising young children, and halachic authorities recognize this and seek to defend it.
At heart, prayer is an audience with God. Jewish women have always engaged in prayer, whether through a running conversation with God or though recitation of Tehillim or techinot, personal prayers. Sometimes prayer can be an experience that is less formal and more naturally intertwined with daily life, and this lived form of prayer is also deeply meaningful and valuable, even though it has not been formalized.
Should women rely on justifications for praying less?
Between Magen Avraham’s explanation of Rambam, later authorities’ lenient rulings, especially for mothers, and the tendency of women who do pray not to do so in a public setting most weekdays, it can be hard to get a handle on a woman’s obligation to pray.
Anecdotally, there are religiously committed women who never miss a Shemoneh Esrei and others who hardly ever recite it, all of whom can adduce halachic support for what they do.
The most important thing may be, as Rav Sternbuch suggests, for a woman to understand what is at stake, and to make sure that she is maintaining a constant connection to God, even if it is less based on formal prayer.
Rachel Weinstein, translator for Deracheha, writes in a similar vein:11
רחל וינשטיין, “בקטנה,” אשירה, 18.5.2016
לפני כמה שנים גיליתי שיש היתרים לאישה שעסוקה בגידול ילדיה לא להתפלל. זה לא הסתדר עם החינוך שקיבלתי מבית ומן אולפנא. אבל מעבר לסתירה ולמחלוקת ההלכתית רציתי להתקשר לרבנים המתירים ולשאול בדמע – אז אני לא חייבת להתפלל. עכשיו מה? איך אני מביאה את הקב”ה אל תוך חיי היומיום שלי?… אם שנים לא מדברים איתו – קשה לחדש את הקשר. אבל אם כל יום מוסרים ד”ש [דרישת שלום], מדברים איתו אפילו קצת, בקטנה, ואולי אפילו בלי המון כוונה, כשיום אחד נתפנה להתפלל באמת – הערוץ פתוח. יש קו. אם ננתק את הקו…
Rachel Weinstein, 'Biktana,' Ashira.co.il
A few years ago, I discovered that there is halachic permission for a woman busy with raising her children not to pray. This did not jibe with the education I received at home and at school. But beyond the contradiction and the halachic debate, I wanted to contact the rabbis who permit it and ask them, in tears, “So, I don’t have to pray? Now what? How will I bring God into my daily life?” …If for years we don’t speak with Him, it is hard to reconnect. But if every day we [at least] send Him our regards, speak to Him even a bit, on a small scale, even if it’s without a lot of concentration, then when one day we have the free time to really pray—the channel is open. There’s a connection.
If a woman can make time to pray, that is wonderful. When children are involved, they can learn as they grow from watching her pray that she, too, has a spiritual life and commitments that they must learn to respect. Even a woman who does not pray formally on a regular basis should, at minimum, take care to check in with God.
Child-rearing itself is avodat Hashem, as are other mitzva-related obligations, and we should not forget that. A woman who prays less because of family responsibilities can focus on how those responsibilities themselves are the way in which she is serving Hashem at that time. Every woman is different and different life circumstances can call for different responses.
We can encourage women to pursue prayer and to view it as a powerful tool that enables us to connect to our Creator, while at the same time respecting each individual woman’s ability to assess what will work for her at any given stage of life.
A woman who is not able to pray Shemoneh Esrei because of other mitzva obligations should still appreciate the value of establishing a relationship with God through prayer, and remains obligated to connect to Him daily through personal expressions that include praise, request and thanks.
Practically, when is someone supposed to fit in the prayers and berachot recited upon awakening?
Sometimes it can seem daunting to find time for any prayer whatsoever. When is a woman, especially if she is busy with children, supposed to fit in moda ani, handwashing, Asher Yatzar, Elokai Neshama, birchot ha-Torah, and birchot ha-shachar?
Moda ani, because it doesn’t include the name of God, really can—and should—be recited as soon as we first wake up. Netilat yadayim and Asher Yatzar can wait until a woman first makes it to the bathroom, but are easily said right afterwards. Washing hands before feeding children is especially desirable, because the Talmud suggests that a ru’ach ra’a on the hands is of particular concern prior to feeding children.15 (Though some say this ru’ach ra’a does not apply nowadays.16)
Finding time for Elokai Neshama, birchot ha-Torah and birchot ha-shachar can be trickier, especially if a woman has a limited amount of time for prayer.
The best idea is to learn them by heart (or to print all of them on a small card and keep it close to hand). Neither takes that long to say, and a woman can recite them in the middle of her morning routine whenever she has a few moments to spare. This is usually more practical than holding them off until she has time to really daven. For these purposes, she does not need to recite all three passages that normally follow birchot ha-Torah. She can just say birkat kohanim, or, if there’s no time and she’s not sure when exactly she’ll have the chance to pray, just the first verse of Shema.
If there are young children around, she can recite the berachot aloud. This way, the children can understand she is praying and also learn the prayers from her, and eventually they may start to recite them with her rather than interrupt.
Must women pray in male language?
In our discussion of modeh ani, we saw that women have the option of saying “moda” in feminine form. Here we see a debate as to whether women may recite “she-lo asani goya” and “she-lo asani eved.” In general, do women have to pray in masculine language?
With a prayer like “moda ani,” where only the vocalization changes, but not the letters or words, it is hard to imagine there being an issue. As we see in birchot ha-shachar, changing words from masculine to feminine forms when praying in the first person is a bit more contentious, though it should generally be permissible when the only shift in meaning is the grammatical gender shift.
Why, then, doesn’t this question come up more?
For most prayers, this issue is irrelevant, because the Talmud teaches us that prayer should be phrased in the plural, not the singular:
אמר אביי: לעולם לישתף איניש נפשיה בהדי צבורא
Abbaye said: A person should always include himself together with the community.
We pray as part of a “we,” not as solitary “I”s. We pray in the context of our community and our people. Beyond that, when we pray in the plural, looking out not only for ourselves, our prayer has a greater likelihood of being heard.
Hebrew grammar’s first person plural includes males and females in the same verb forms. Even in the first person singular, the forms differ only for adjectives and participles. For this reason, most of our prayers are not specifically male to start with.
Often, prayers that seem to be in singular are actually chapters of or quotations from Tehillim, as in Pesukei De-zimra. There, we specifically recite scriptural verses, on the assumption that David ha-Melech’s expression of prayer can speak for all of us and teach all of us about God, humanity, and prayer. Changing his words would be missing part of the point of quoting him.
The fact that Tehillim are sometimes in masculine singular has not gotten in the way of reciting Tehillim being a particularly popular custom among women, even outside the context of formal prayer. At the same time, women often frame recitation of Tehillim with supplicatory prayers, which may be in the feminine, and that combination can be satisfying.
What is the basis for the se'udat amen?
In recent years, it has become increasingly popular for groups of women to gather together for a se’udat amen, an amen feast. At these events, different foods are served in careful order so that each attendee can recite a maximum amount of berachot and so that everyone present can respond “amen” to each beracha. The minimum goal is often to reach one hundred “amen”s.
Where does this come from? There is the talmudic passage praising one who says “amen” more than the one who recites the beracha. There is also another passage that ascribes special power to saying “amen.”
אמר ריש לקיש כל העונה אמן בכל כחו פותחין לו שערי ג”ע [גן עדן] שנאמר פתחו שערים ויבא גוי צדיק שומר אמונים אל תיקרי שומר אמונים אלא שאומרים אמן.
Reish Lakish said: Whoever responds ‘amen’ with all his might, the gates of Gan Eden open for him, as it is said “Open the gates and the righteous nation will come who is shomer emunim [a keeper of the faith]. Don’t read shomer emunim, rather she’omerim amen [who say ‘amen’].
Among Sefardi Jews, it is a common practice to provide a range of foods at a shiva or other memorial events, over which people can recite berachot and “amen” in order to open the gates of Gan Eden for the deceased. Modern women have adapted this practice to seek other types of salvation from God through reciting ‘amen’ en masse.
Perhaps on a strict halachic level, it would be better for the attendees to pray ma’ariv, but these events can be very meaningful for the women involved, since they create the opportunity to share and pray as a group.
Based in the home, and not in the synagogue, and couched as a voluntary assembly, rather than a daily obligation, the se’udat amen translates the idea of me’a berachot to a more feminine context.
Why are the identity berachot phrased in the negative?
For many, the identity berachot would be more palatable if recited in the positive, for example, “Who made me a Jew” as opposed to “Who did not make me a non-Jew.” Even though we are grateful for the mitzva opportunities associated with our identities, speaking in the negative seems insulting to those who do not share those opportunities.
So why are the berachot phrased in the negative?
Of the various explanations given, two seem most compelling:
I. Perhaps using the negative was just a common way to express identity in the time of our sages.4 These negative descriptions may not always have carried the same connotations they do now. Our current cultural paradigm may exacerbate discomfort with openly negating identification with other groups.
II. Perhaps the context for the Talmud’s discussion of these three berachot gives a clue to their language. Shortly before the teaching about these three berachot, the Talmud records Rabbi Meir’s exhortation to make one hundred berachot per day.
היה רבי מאיר אומר חייב אדם לברך מאה ברכות בכל יום.
Rabbi Meir would say: A person must recite one hundred blessings every day.
Rabbi Meir’s project to maximize the berachot a person recites may influence the formulation of the three berachot in the negative. How? If a man were to praise God “for making me a Jew,” recited in masculine singular, that could render the berachot about being free and a man redundant.
Bach makes this argument:
ב”ח אורח חיים סימן מו
דאם היה מברך ‘שעשני ישראל’ שוב לא היה יכול לברך ‘שעשני בן חורין’ ו’שעשני איש’ דלשון ‘שעשני ישראל’ שכבר בירך משמעו בן חורין ומשמעו נמי איש ישראל ולא אשה דאשה נקראת ישראלית וא”כ [ואם כן] לא היה מברך שלש ברכות אלא ברכה אחת ואין זה כוונתינו לקצר אלא להאריך בהודאות ולברך על כל חסד וחסד ברכה בפני עצמה.
Bach OC 46
For if he were to bless ‘Who made me a Yisra’el [an Israelite],’ he would no longer be able to bless ‘Who made me a free person’ and ‘Who made me a man.’ For the language of ‘Who made me an Israelite’ that he already blessed connotes a free person and also connotes an Israelite man and not a woman. For a woman is called a Yisra’elit. If so, he would not recite three berachot but a single beracha. It is not our intention to shorten [the series of berachot] but to prolong thanksgiving and to recite a beracha independently on each and every kindness.
On this reading, the negative formulation is simply a way to make the beracha more specific and leave room for three, differentiated berachot that add praise to God and bring men closer to the goal of reciting a hundred blessings per day.
Nevertheless, the discomfort with the formulation of these berachot may seem stronger than the suggested rationales.
How can we address she-lo asani isha?
The explanations for this blessing and its negative language do not change the fact that many women still find it difficult to hear and many men find it difficult to recite.
We are committed to Halacha, which explains both why just dropping the beracha is not an option and why it is important to have this discussion.
We have seen that, barring a new halachic consensus, or at least the support of a few major halachic authorities, the beracha cannot be omitted or altered. Some have advocated reciting just this beracha in a whisper,18 but this approach is controversial because it may serve only to draw negative attention to it.19
Here are some other ideas:
I. In line with Rav Ha-levi, communities can redouble efforts to make the precise meaning of this beracha clear out of sensitivity to those of us who are troubled by it. Prayer books can add an explanatory note about the proper meaning of the beracha, as well as a note about how important we consider proper intentionality, much as they do for other select lines of prayer.
More than that, there is no halachic barrier to making a statement between the various berachot of birchot ha-shachar. Our communities and prayer books could make it a standard to recite a short line that adds clarification after reciting this beracha.
For example, men and women could say “petura kirtzono mi-mitzvot achadot,” meaning: “exempt, in accordance with His will, from some mitzvot.” If this, or something like it, became common practice, it might help assuage ill feeling.
II. A synagogue can choose to follow the practice of the many shuls where the recitation of communal prayers aloud begins at a later stage of the prayer service, after these blessings.20 This is common practice in Israel. In this way, we can naturally avoid public recitation of a beracha that can cause discomfort.
III. Men can use the recitation of this beracha as a daily opportunity to heighten awareness of the privileges they have in their lives, to thank God for the religious opportunities afforded to them while simultaneously committing themselves to be more sensitive to those who lack them.
IV. Men and women can remember that a quantitative advantage in mitzva observance is only one lens through which to view gender distinction in Judaism.
A beracha recited in recognition of the exemption from some mitzvot (or even advantages in social status) does not detract from men’s and women’s spiritual equality. Contemporary writer Devorah (Heshelis) Fastag makes this point in her book, The Moon’s Lost Light.21
Devorah (Heshelis) Fastag, The Moon’s Lost Light
Men say the blessing for not having been created a woman because this is the aspect of truth which is seen by people. The woman’s role, which entails exemption or exclusion from certain mitzvos,…is, therefore, from our human view, less desirable. Although this is true in terms of this world, it does not reflect objective heavenly truth, for it does not show a person’s true spiritual worth…But blessings are said on what is felt in this world, and not on objective Heavenly truth.
IV. Women and men can continue to communicate with halachic authorities about these blessings, in the hopes that new and productive ideas will arise.
How should we understand She-asani Kirtzono?
If a woman chooses to, she can keep in mind gender distinction in mitzva obligation when reciting “She-asani kirtzono.”
But if she so chooses, she can also see the beracha as a sort of rejoinder to the man’s, as if to say, ‘Mitzva obligation is just one part of the picture. My reality as a woman is broader than that. God’s vision is broader than that, and I am grateful for my role in it.’29
Or she can tune out the context and rejoice in the beracha as an independent affirmation of her knowledge that her being exactly who she is is a manifestation of God’s will, as Erica Brown does so powerfully.
Dr. Erica Brown, 'According to His Will: The View from a Pew'
And I happen to love reciting birkot ha-shachar daily and take particular comfort in the expression she-asani kirtzono. If there is a more beautiful blessing that embodies God’s love for the individual, then I do not know of it. I find the blessing stunning. And, for this reason, I feel sorry for men who do not recite it….It is an affirmation of what every single person is, a unique and special creation and manifestation of God’s will.
How can we understand women's exemption from a mitzva as fundamental as Shema?
It can be hard to fathom how women can be exempt from Keri’at Shema. Although it is a time-bound commandment, it is also an absolutely fundamental expression of our faith in God.
Bach’s explanation of the relevant Talmudic passage is attractive for precisely this reason—it leaves women obligated in reciting the verse “Shema Yisrael” in order to accept the kingdom of heaven, while exempting women from the time-bound extended mitzva of Keri’at Shema as it is commonly understood. But not everyone follows Bach here.
Perhaps Rambam’s position best explains the reasoning for those who uphold exemption despite the importance of accepting ol malchut shamayim. We saw that in Sefer Ha-mitzvot he counts kabbalat ol malchut shamayim as a separate mitzva from Keri’at Shema. On this logic, women are fully obligated in the mitzva of accepting ol malchut shamayim. Women are only exempted from the distinct mitzva to recite Shema, which begins with a formal act of acceptance.
There is no question that women must live lives animated by belief in God’s Kingship. Formal verbal repetition of that acceptance day and night is not the only way to accomplish this.
TZITZIT AND TEFILLIN
Why should a woman's motivations to wear tzitzit be questioned? Don't we praise chumra?
In our current religious climate, assumption of chumra (halachic stringency) has become an increasingly mainstream path for seeking religious meaning. If anything, someone taking on chumrot often receives praise for it. Perhaps in consequence, our sensitivities to the dangers of yuhara, spiritual haughtiness (which is a halachic issue), whether in excess stringency or in disregard of traditional practice, have been dulled.
A woman looking to wear tzitzit may have difficulty relating to discussion of yuhara. She perceives her desire to wear tzitzit as a matter between herself and God, not other people. Especially if she normally wears shawls and scarfs to which she could affix tzitzit, she is not making an extra effort to put herself in a position in which she could voluntarily fulfil the mitzva.
However, an act that deviates from women’s prevailing practice for hundreds and hundreds of years may be defined as yuhara even if we do not question an individual woman’s motivation. It would likely take a large critical mass of women in supportive dialogue with rabbis for this to change.
How should we relate to association of women in tzitzit with political statements or with denominational politics?
As Rav Moshe Feinstein notes in a responsum, a woman’s wearing of tzitzit, especially a full tallit, has come to be associated with non-Orthodox denominations and with protest against Halacha. Indeed, it is not easy to dissociate women wearing tzitzit from recent denominational history. Most significantly, this association seems to be what allows for unbridled protest in many rabbinic quarters.
When a woman who may not observe Shabbat wears tzitzit, there is strong concern for yuhara, spiritual haughtiness, which is a halachic issue. Given that her overall religious practice is not in compliance with Halacha, it is more difficult to assume that she seeks to wear a garment with tzitzit without any intent to challenge traditional understandings of Halacha.
Making a statement through mitzva observance that seems to challenge the halachic order is unlikely to find rabbinic support.
On the other hand, if wearing tzitzit becomes more common among women who are Orthodox and careful to observe mitzvot in general, these associations could weaken over time.
Eshet Halacha Malka Puterkovsky has made a heartfelt plea to rabbis on this point:
מלכה פיטרקובסקי, מהלכת בדרכה, עמ’ 152
שבנות ונשים…תרגשנה ותדענה שמעצבי ההלכה בדורנו רואים אותן ואת צורכיהן הרוחניים כפי שהן, ללא דעות קודמות או ייחוס כוונות שאינן לשם שמים, ומתוך כך ישאפו לתת מענה הלכתי אמיתי.
Malka Puterkovsky, Mehalechet Be-darkah, p. 152
That girls and women…should feel and know that the shapers of Halacha in our generation see them and their spiritual needs as they are, without prejudice or imputing to them intentions not for the sake of Heaven…
Why is interest in fulfilling the mitzva of tzitzit comparatively rare in the Orthodox community?
While some religiously-observant women may be interested in tzitzit, the majority are not. Why is this the case, especially when tzitzit is such a significant and beautiful mitzva?
The lack of interest most likely reflects deference to tradition, and to the mainstream halachic opinions discouraging women from wearing tzitzit.
Other factors might also be at play, though: An instinctive feeling that tzitzit is for men. Or that wearing tzitzit is a provocation. Or that it would add bulk to a woman’s look. Or that constructing a female set of tzitzit would take a lot of know-how and effort. Or that tzitzit should be worn every day, and that would be daunting to take on.
The Lubavitcher Rebbe suggested that women fulfill positive time-bound mitzvot through their husbands. Indeed, many women have a strong relationship to tzitzit, through the men in the family: whether ducking under a father’s tallit as a child and playing with the strings, buying one for a fiancé and standing under it at the chuppa, or thrilling as a bar mitzva boy wraps himself in a tallit for the first time.
Though, depending on her life circumstances, a woman may find some of these experiences resonate less with her, they do come from a world of Jewish women past and present. Some exceptional women have worn tzitzit. Still, for many women, the relationship with the mitzva will remain powerful, positive, and indirect in the foreseeable future.
Now that learning Torah from texts is more open to women, should the exemption from tefillin remain in place?
Women’s exemption from laying tefillin is based on the exemption of women from the formal mitzva of learning Torah, but women learn more Torah texts nowadays than ever before. Some modern rabbinic voices even tell us that text learning has become an obligatory form of avodat Hashem for women. (See more here.) Does this have any effect on women’s relationship to the mitzva of tefillin?
Although there are many reasons why a woman may be obligated to learn Torah, women’s exemption from the formal mitzva of Talmud Torah remains in place. It is that formal exemption that leads to the exemption from the mitzva of tefillin. For example, women have always been obligated in learning practical Halacha, which can be described as a form of learning Torah. That did not change the original formulation of exemption from tefillin. So too, increased imperatives for women to learn Torah and the real halachic significance of women fulfilling the mitzva of learning Torah through text study do not change the exemption from tefillin.
That being said, we might expect communities in which women’s text study is seen as an imperative to encourage women to fulfill the mitzva of tefillin voluntarily. Why don’t they?
As compelling as the idea may be for a woman who learns Torah to bind it to her flesh, there are other halachic factors at stake that militate against voluntary performance of the mitzva of tefillin. If there were no other halachic impediment, we imagine that many women would take an interest in fulfilling the mitzva of tefillin and many more religious women throughout history would have done so, creating a more substantial precedent than the single example of Michal. But those halachic impediments make and have made a difference to the majority of women who are most devoted to learning Torah.
Why might a woman seek a practical ruling to lay tefillin?
For some women, especially young women who attend minyan regularly in camp or school, watching male peers lay tefillin can trigger thoughts and feelings about what that experience is like and why women are excluded from it. A woman who takes care to recite Shema as part of prayer finds herself mentioning the significance of tefillin on a regular basis, and knows how significant voluntary mitzva performance can be. It is understandable, then, why a woman might have a sincere desire to wrap herself in tefillin as a physical expression of connection to God and Torah.
Although there are many women who do not feel this way and have no desire to lay tefillin, it is important to acknowledge with sensitivity and respect the women who have these feelings, and who may find the practical halachic rulings we discuss challenging.
May a woman rely on earlier opinions that permit women to lay tefillin?
In a letter explaining his decision to permit two of his female students to lay tefillin, high school principal Rav Tully Harcsztark wrote:22
Rabbi Tully Harcsztark, Letter to Parents, January, 2014
“While our community has adopted as normative the view that women refrain from this act, I see the range of rishonim who allow women to don tefillin as support to give space to that practice within our community… I permitted our two female students to daven with tefillin because I believe that we should not be afraid of different forms of avodat Ha-shem when there is halakhic argument to support it.”
This statement shows great sensitivity to the students and to making room for different approaches to halachic issues in the community. At the same time, the letter lacks reference to major rabbinic figures and halachic rulings of the past five hundred years. It marshals halachic backing for the decision solely from rishonim (early halachic decisors) and from the theoretical ability to construct a halachic argument in support of it.
In her essay on women and tefillin, Rabbanit Malka Puterkovsky explains why making a ruling of this sort isn’t tenable:
רבנית מלכה פיוטרקובסקי, “דין הנשים בהנחת תפילין,” מהלכת בדרכה, עמ’ 151
שאף שבתקופת ה”ראשונים” נמצאו פוסקים רבים שהתירו לנשים לקיים מצוות תפילין…הרי שאם נוצרה אחדות דעים בתקופת האחרונים, שאין ראוי לאישה להניח תפילין, בשל כלל הפסיקה המחייב: “הלכתא כבתראי”- יש לקבל הכרעה זו כפשוטה, הלכה למעשה, אלא אם ישנם נימוקים מהותיים שבכוחם לשנותה בזמננו.
Rabbanit Malka Puterkovsky, “The Halacha of Women and Laying Tefillin,” Mehalechet Be-darkah, p. 151
Although in the era of the ”rishonim” there were many halachic authorities who permitted women to fulfill the mitzva of tefillin…if a consensus formed in the era of the acharonim [later authorities] that it is not fitting for a woman to lay tefillin, [then] because of the binding halachic principle that “halacha is in accordance with the later authorities,” one must accept this decision straightforwardly in halachic practice, unless there are qualitative rationales with the power to change it in our time
Overturning centuries of halachic rulings and tradition demands great halachic authority. Rav Herschel Schachter, a prominent halachic authority and Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshiva University, has taken up this theme:23
רב צבי שכטר “כל העדה כולם קדושים”
מאי קסברי המתירים בזה,…וכידוע לכל, ככה היתה ההנהגה המקובלת מדורי דורות, ומי הוא זה שיהין ויתחצף להורות נגד פסק המקובל של רבינו הרמ”…וביטוי זה שאומרים כמה מהמתירים “שע”פ [=שעל פי] הלכה” פעולה מסויימת מותרת, ושהמחמירים רק רוצים לאסרה “מטעמים פוליטיים”, איננו נכון, שגם ענין זה של שינוי המסורה מהווה חלק-עצמי מן ההלכה…
Rav Herschel Schachter, 'The Entire Assembly is Holy'
What is the rationale of those who permit? …as everyone knows, thus was the received practice from past generations, and who is he that gives the go ahead and is brazen to rule against a received ruling of our Rabbi the Rema……And the expression used by some who permit “that according to halacha” a certain action is permissible, and that those who are stringent want to forbid it only for “political reasons,” is incorrect. For this matter of changing tradition also constitutes an integral part of halacha…
Rav Schachter argues that halachic consensus going back centuries clearly prohibits women from laying tefillin – and that even constructing a convincing lenient argument based on the practice of earlier generations does not suffice to permit it.
Even were guf naki clearly understood and clearly obsolete, even were other halachic concerns addressed, Rav Schachter would be loath to permit women to lay tefillin, in light of tradition. In the case of tefillin, generations of practice and a charged history override potential arguments for leniency.
Why do tefillin not appeal to more women when they are so central to men's religious lives?
Tefillin are typically not of central interest to women. Here are some possible explanations for why this is the case:
The exemption from the mitzva and protest of voluntary fulfillment creates distance from the mitzva. Most women not only do not lay tefillin, but rarely see them. Outside of a co-ed school or camp setting, the vast majority of observant women do not attend daily morning prayer services with any regularity. Many women, especially mothers of young children, struggle even to make time to pray, and laying tefillin takes more time. Women are exempt from reciting the paragraphs of Shema that relate to the mitzva of tefillin, which is the time when men must lay them. Tefillin are inaccessible. There is no way to feminize them, which presents a halachic, sociological, and psychological bar to women’s laying them. They are also expensive, and wrapping them properly requires training.
Still, despite all the above, a woman may have her own sense of need that diverges from other women’s, and she may ascribe great meaning to laying tefillin. That feeling should be acknowledged, even as we recognize the consensus that other halachic considerations override it here.
Why are women sometimes discouraged from counting the omer?
It is striking that women are sometimes taught not to count the omer, and that active encouragement is not more widespread.
Some of the discouragement may arise from a tendency in some communities to privilege Mishna Berura over Aruch Ha-shulchan, even though Mishna Berura merely quotes the opinion against women counting without explicitly agreeing to it. Some of it may be in response to the kabbalistic discussions of masculine and feminine. Some of it may be because, before the era of cellphone reminders, women who did not recite ma’ariv might really have been prone to forget it. Some of it may be a matter of tradition. And some of it may be because a woman unsure whether she will complete the count may not realize that this should not get in the way of counting without a beracha.
Especially taking into consideration that Ramban reportedly maintains it is an obligation for women, that Magen Avraham reports that women took it upon themselves as an obligation, and that concerns about reciting the beracha should not affect the act of counting, we would expect more women to be encouraged to count the omer.
In the selection below, Rebbitzen Chana Bracha Siegelbaum of Bat Ayin, who has personally relinquished fulfilling this mitzva for kabbalistic reasons, expresses the power she sees in the count and in the omer period, even when not counting:13
Rebbitzen Chana Bracha Siegelbaum, The Controversy of Women and Counting the Omer
Counting the Omer teaches us the concept of the ascending pattern, where one day builds upon the next. In effect, the whole point of the ritual is to collect days. By using a simple and short act of consciousness, we prevent our days from blurring into each other. We can make every day count….Each day of counting the Omer, from Pesach to Shavuot, we have the opportunity to add a new layer of refinement to our character. Counting the Omer is an elevating ripening process that culminates on Shavuot in our ability to receive the Torah and become complete. This time-period reflects the process of the building and flowering of the surrounding nature, here in Israel where we, like the fruits, are gradually ripening to become the perfect crop, ready to be picked on Shavuot as Hashem’s holy bride…I believe that the feminine focus during the Omer season is to meditate on the daily Sefirah combinations and internalize their messages…
How can communities make room for more women's learning on leil Shavuot?
Especially at the early end of the evening, communities can gear Torah study toward shiurim open to women and men or to dedicated women’s shiurim. If there is parallel programming for younger children and teens, that can also widen the numbers of women who will be able to participate. Communities can also make sure that there are spaces in which women can sit and learn with each other over the course of the night, and even prepare source sheets to facilitate such learning.
Sometimes married women with children in particular experience Shavuot as difficult, because husbands may sleep in for most of the day, limiting family time together and putting a heavier load on their wives. On Shavuot day, parents of the community, and the community as a whole, stand to benefit if the community pools resources to provide children’s programming or groups over the course of the day to add to the children’s experience of the day and to help ensure that staying up late does not come at the children’s or caretaker’s expense, and everyone should plan the holiday carefully in advance so as to maximize its potential.
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Could we read the basic sources on head-coveringin a way that would allow a woman not to cover her hair at all?
In recent history, predominantly under modern European influence, there have been entire communities of Torah-observant Jews in which the women have gone bareheaded. There are also many recent examples of pious, righteous women who have not covered their heads.
Building on the minority opinion that head-covering is not a Torah-level obligation, and on the complexity of the halachic sources regarding head-covering, some rabbis have responded to this situation by crafting a halachic justification for leaving the head-completely uncovered. Most prominent of these was Rav Yosef Messas, a Sefardi halachic authority of twentieth century Morocco and Israel.
In his responsum on the topic, Rav Messas explains that his position was designed to be melamed zechut, to create a favorable judgment, on the women of Morocco in the 1950’s, who did not cover their heads at all:
רב יוסף משאש אוצר המכתבים עמ’ ריא
איסור גלוי הראש לנשואות היה חמור אצלנו פה מחזק[ה], וכן בכל ערי המערב טרם בוא הצרפתים, ואך אחרי בואם במעט זמן, פרצו בנות ישראל גדר בזה…לא הועילה שום תוכחת…ועתה כל הנשים יוצאות בריש גלי פרועי שער…ובכן נתתי לבי ללמד עליהם זכות, כי אי אפשר להעלות על לב להחזיר הדבר כמאז…ובגשתי לחפש בדברי הפוסקי[ם] אשר לפני, מצאתי רק חומרא על חומרא ואסור על אסור…
Rav Yosef Messas, Collected Writings, p. 211
The prohibition of uncovering the head for married women was strict among us here from past practice, and thus in all cities of the Maghreb before the coming of the French, but within a short time of their coming, the daughters of Israel broke this boundary…no reproof was of use…and now all the women go out with head bare, hair uncovered…and therefore I put my mind to teaching about them favorably [le-lamed aleihen zechut], for it is impossible to conceive of returning the matter as it was…and in my approach to seek in the words of the halachic authorities that came before me, I found only stringency upon stringency and prohibition upon prohibition…
Rav Messas acknowledges that arguments to permit women not to cover their heads, his own included, go against the grain of all the major halachic authorities.
His main argument to justify the prevailing practice in his time is to understand head-covering as only a matter of custom. He then suggests that the custom is void once head-covering is dissociated from modesty, which is accomplished when all women in a particular region go with heads uncovered.
רב יוסף משאש אוצר המכתבים עמ’ ריא
אין האסור מצד עצם הדבר של גילוי שער, רק מצד מנהג בנות ישראל שנהגו לכסות ראשן, משום שחשבו בזמנם שיש בזה צניעות לאשה, והמגלה שערה נחשבת פורצת גדר הצניעות, ולזה הזהירה תורה לכל בת ישראל שלא תעשה הפך מנהג בנות ישראל בזה. וא”כ [=ואם כן] עתה שכל בנות ישראל הסכימה דעתן שאין להן בכסוי הראש שום צניעות…נעקר האסור מעיקרו ונעשה היתר.
Rav Yosef Messas, Collected Writings, p. 211
The prohibition is not from the uncovered hair itself, but rather from the custom of the daughters of Israel who were accustomed to cover their heads, because they thought at their time that this was modesty for a woman, and a woman who uncovered her hair was considered a breaker of the boundary of modesty, and for this reason the Torah warned all daughters of Israel not to do the opposite of the custom of the daughters of Israel in this. If so, now that all daughters of Israel agree that there is no modesty in covering the head…the prohibition has been fundamentally uprooted and has become permissible.
The idea that the obligation becomes moot as soon as common custom changes is highly debatable, especially if we view the obligation of head-covering as more than dat Yehudit. Modern halachic authorities overwhelmingly reject Rav Messas’s idea. Additionally, in many of our communities, at least some women still practice head- covering and do associate it with modesty, which undermines his argument.
A recent article (and upcoming book) by American Rabbi Michael Broyde similarly seeks to justify not covering one’s head. Rabbi Broyde cites rabbis who have made arguments parallel to Rav Messas’s, and suggests readings of other halachic authorities that might potentially line up with those arguments. Rabbi Broyde himself acknowledges that these arguments go against halachic consensus. [See more here.]
Rabbi Michael Broyde, 'Hair Covering and Jewish Law: A Response,' p. 91
The consensus of the Ahronim [late halachic authorities] for the last few centuries has surely been that there is an objective Torah obligation upon married women to cover their hair.
He adds that his article is meant to provide grounds to judge a woman who does not cover her head favorably, not to suggest that a woman should not cover her head.
In an article explaining why she does cover her head, Dr. Meirav Tubul Kahana writes that the weight of halachic consensus is actually the most important factor shaping her personal commitment:
הרבנית ד”ר מירב (טובול) כהנא, “ובסופו של דבר – הכנעה.” עולם קטן
ובסופם של דברים, אחרי כל הדיון והבירור בדבר עניינו של כיסוי הראש, ערכו וחשיבותו, צריך גם לומר בפשטות ובהכנעה שכך הורתה לנו תורה שבעל-פה שיסודו של כיסוי הראש הוא דאורייתא. כמה קשה לאמן את שריר ההכנעה בפני דברים שאינם מובנים וברורים לנו. לקיים בפשטות כי כך ציווה ריבונו של עולם. במיוחד בדור שלנו, חושב ומשכיל מצד אחד, מתחבר ומרגיש מהצד השני – מה שאינו מובן או שאיננו “מרגישים” אותו נשאר מחוץ לתחום. אכן, חובה עלינו להעמיק, לברר, לחקור ולהבין; חשיבות גדולה יש להתחברות למצוות ולקיומן בשמחה. אך ראש וסוף לכל קיומן של המצוות הוא בבחינת לעשות רצון קונו…
Rabbanit Dr. Meirav (Tubul) Kahana, 'At the End of the Day – Submission,' from Olam Katan, May 2019
At the end of the day, after all the discussion and clarification of the matter of head-covering, its value and significance, we also need to say simply and with submission that thus the Oral Torah taught us, that the basis of head-covering is a Torah-level obligation. It is so difficult to exercise the muscle of submission regarding matters that are not understood and clear to us. To simply fulfill them because so commanded the Creator of the world. Especially in our generation, thinking and enlightened on the one hand, connecting and feeling on the other — what isn’t understood or what we don’t “feel” remains out of bounds. Indeed, we must look deeply, clarify, investigate and understand; there is great importance in connecting with mitzvot and to fulfilling them in joy. But the beginning and end of all mitzva fulfilment is the aspect of doing the will of one’s Creator…
Why should we dwell on the significance of head-covering? Isn't Halacha enough?
The main and most significant reason for a married woman to cover her head is because Halacha requires it. When a woman covers her head after marriage, she is showing her willingness and readiness to submit to Halacha, even if she does not find additional meaning in this specific act.
Discussing possible rationales behind head-covering and its potential significance can be important, though, because many women find it difficult to observe this mitzva. A woman may feel that her head-covering is uncomfortable or that it makes her less attractive. A head-covering also may openly identify a woman as a religious Jew, making a public statement to others, a statement that the woman herself cannot fully control and with which she may not feel comfortable.
Even a woman committed to this mitzva may appreciate learning about what it means to others in ways that might enrich her own observance. Exploring these explanations shouldn’t take the place of learning the Halacha, but it can complement it.
The first part of this series establishes that there is a strong halachic basis for covering one’s head, a mitzva, regardless of what meanings one might assign to it. Changing conceptions of head-covering don’t undermine the mitzva. Rather, they challenge us to consider what elements of older ideas may retain relevance, and to seek out alternative ideas that can enhance observance.
How should we relate to perceptions about head-covering that no longer seem to apply?
Many modern societies no longer associate women’s head-covering with dignity or even modesty. Female dignitaries appear bareheaded at even the most formal events. In many circles, sheitels nearly indistinguishable from natural hair are often considered more dignified, or professional, than hats or scarves.
Why, then, should these Talmudic discussions resonate with us? If the Talmudic understanding of head-covering seems out of date, what does that say to us about the mitzva?
These are good, important questions. In general, even when the reason behind a mitzva seems no longer relevant, the mitzva remains in full force. In this case, though, while norms of head-covering have changed a great deal over the past century, they have not changed entirely. The Queen of England still arrives at affairs in hats, and the rest of the royal family often follows suit. Even outside Jewish circles, there is a residual sense that head-covering, like a particularly elegant hat, can sometimes add to or reflect a person’s dignity, whether or not it is essential to it. To this day, some people perceive women’s head-covering as something that dignifies the wearer.
The Talmudic discussions teach us both that respecting women’s dignity can be a primary frame of reference for how to relate to head-covering and that our sages’ approach to this Halacha reflected respect for women.
Why should head covering function as a sign of marital status?
Head-covering could be an effective way for a woman to remind herself and others that she is unavailable. This is especially the case given the severity of the halachic prohibition of a man and woman having relations when she is married to another.
The Zohar expresses these ideas in expounding upon the sota passage.
זוהר במדבר נשא קכה:
ר’ חזקיה פתח (תהלים קכח) אשתך כגפן פוריה וגו’ מה גפן לא מקבל עליה אלא מדידיה כך אתתא דישראל קיימא בהאי גוונא דלא מקבלא עלה אלא ההוא בר זוגה, …ועל דא כגפן פוריה בירכתי ביתך… פוק חמי כמה פגימו גרים ההוא שערא דאתתא …
Zohar III Naso p. 125b
Rabbi Chizkiya opened, “Your wife is like a fruitful grapevine…” (Tehillim 128:3). Just as a grapevine does not receive [grafts] other than its own, so a woman of Israel is like this, that she does not receive anyone but her spouse…. For [she is] “like a fruitful grapevine in the recesses of your house”…Go out and see how many injuries his hair of a woman [exposed to others] causes…
In the continuation of this passage, Rav Chizkiya enumerates the negative consequences of a married woman’s hair being seen by others.
This source supports the popular intuition that hair becomes a special part of the marriage relationship, which is honored through its covering.
Rabbanit Chana Henkin has suggested that the obligation to cover hair applies only upon marriage in order to counterbalance the uncovering and intimacy that occurs within marriage. This explanation may also help explain why modesty concerns with hair take effect only upon marriage:
רבנית חנה הנקין, “מועדון עובדות השם”
כאשר איש ואשה נישאים, נופלות מחיצות הצניעות שביניהם. זהו ביטוי לדבקותם יחד של בני הזוג בבחינת “והיו לבשר אחד”. מעתה, שני בני הזוג יעמדו יחד באותו צד של מחיצת הצניעות אשר תפריד ביניהם לבין שאר בני אדם. ובאותו זמן שההלכה מקדשת את הקשר הפיזי בין בני הזוג, היא יוצרת מחיצה מיוחדת סביב הזוג. אותה ההלכה שמרשה לאשה לגלות טפח מחייבת אותה לכסות טפח. אומרת ההלכה לאשה: הדברים שהיו אסורים, כעת הם מותרים, אך גילוי הראש ברבים– שהיה מותר – הופך לאיסור. בכך נוצר איזון ונשמרת הקדושה בסיטואציה החדשה והרגישה.
Rabbanit Chana Henkin, 'Mo'adon Ovdot Hashem,' Me'al U-me-ever
When a man and woman marry, the barriers of modesty between them fall. This is an expression of the bonding of the couple together as “they became one flesh.” From now on, the members of the couple will stand together on the same side of the barrier of modesty that separates them and other people. At the same time that Halacha sanctifies the physical connection between the couple, it creates a special barrier around the couple. The same halacha that allows the woman to reveal a handbreadth[to her husband], obligates her to cover a handbreadth [with regard to everyone else]. Halacha says to the woman: things that were forbidden are now permitted. But revealing the head in public – which was permitted – becomes forbidden. Thus a balance is created and holiness is preserved in this new and sensitive situation.
Why should a woman’s marital status affect whether her hair is considered erva?
Ra’avyah is the source of this distinction:
ראבי”ה חלק א – מסכת ברכות סימן עו
וכל הדברים [שהזכרנו למעלה] לערוה דווקא בדבר שאין רגילות להגלות, אבל בתולה הרגילה בגילוי שער לא חיישינן, דליכא הרהור
Ra'avyah I Berachot 76
All the matters [that we mentioned above] as erva refer to something they do not normally reveal. But we are not concerned about a virgin who normally reveals her hair, since there are no improper thoughts [from it].
A married woman’s hair was typically covered because of the obligation learned from the sota. Our sages extend the laws of erva to typically-covered part of the body when they are revealed.
According to Ra’avyah (and Rosh, Tur, and Shulchan Aruch who follow him),2 men are used to seeing the hair of unmarried women, which is typically uncovered. Because it is familiar, it does not arouse improper thoughts and is not considered erva.
To Ra’avyah, if a man sees a woman’s hair, and doesn’t know whether she is married, is it erva? No, unless it actively has an effect on him. Men often have some familiarity with the women they tend to see when reciting Keri’at Shema, and women with uncovered heads were presumed to be unmarried, so that their hair would not be considered typically-covered. Regardless, Ra’avyah’s distinction becomes a formal halachic definition, applied whether or not a specific man is aware of the marital status of the woman he sees.
Some types of erva are absolute, their status unchanging in any circumstance. Others are contingent on other factors. Ra’avyah and those who follow him view hair’s erva status as contingent on other factors: whether men are habituated to seeing it and the very obligation to cover it.
The question of which of these factors is dominant is central to a related halachic discussion. Halachic authorities disagree on whether married women’s hair retains its erva status in places where is common for married women to go bareheaded in public, in contravention of Halacha. Aruch Ha-shulchan says it is not considered erva, because the erva status of hair is contingent on its being typically-covered.3 Mishna Berura, on the other hand, says it is considered erva, because the obligation of head-covering makes the erva status of married women’s hair absolute.4
Are there any strictures on a single woman going with her head uncovered?
Magen Avraham suggests that there is a stricture on unmarried women’s hair, out of concern for modesty, though not a full requirement to keep it covered:
מגן אברהם סימן עה:ג
…שסותרות קליעות שערן והולכות בשוק דזה אסור אפי’ [=אפילו] בפנויה ע”כ [על כן] קרא לא איירי בפנויה רק שמדת צניעות היא לבתולות שלא לילך כן:
Magen Avraham 75:3
One can say that the uncovering of [a single woman’s head] that he [Shulchan Aruch] wrote of in Even ha-Ezer is that they undo the braids of their hair and go in the marketplace. For this is prohibited even for a single woman… The verse [about the sota] doesn’t deal with a single woman. It is only an attribute of modesty for virgins that they not go thus [with hair unfastened].
Magen Avraham resolves the apparent contradiction in the Shulchan Aruch in a unique fashion. He maintains that the Torah-level obligation to cover hair applies only to married women, which is why the Shulchan Aruch excludes unmarried women from the discussion of what men may see when reciting Shema. However, unmarried women are still included fully in the personal obligation to be modest. Magen Avraham believes that, due to modesty concerns, single women should wear their hair fastened, as in a braid. Upon marriage, the Torah-level obligation of head-covering takes effect, including additional modesty strictures.
Though Magen Avraham’s is a minority opinion, there are Chassidic communities in which unmarried girls and women wear their hair braided. Out of modesty, unmarried women in many communities take care not to wear hair long and loose, or in very teased, showy styles.
Why doesn't head-covering come off automatically when marriage is over?
When a woman is married, she is subject to a more demanding definition of modesty and dignity than prior to her marriage. Once her dignity has become associated with head-covering, the shift is not fully reversible. It is important to remember that, while head-covering can signal marital status, it is not the reason for the obligation in head-covering.
The end of a marriage, whether through death or divorce, is generally a time of emotional turmoil. After the initial transition to the new reality, a woman may go through a process of redefining, rediscovering, or reclaiming her identity. Because head-covering is so central to a woman’s self-presentation and is so closely linked with marriage, this will often include thoughts about how and whether she wishes to continue covering.
A woman in this situation may sincerely prefer to continue head-covering. She may enjoy covering her hair. She may feel that head-covering confers dignity or social status within the community. She may find that it offers continuity, helping her maintain a coherent identity as she transitions to post-married life. She may see head-covering as a high halachic ideal that she strives to meet.
In the words of Shaine Spolter:
A woman may have mixed feelings, but be more comfortable continuing to cover due to communal expectations – especially if she has children and other mothers in the community cover their heads.
Alternatively, a woman may find that continuing to cover is emotionally painful. She may never have enjoyed covering her hair. She may experience head-covering as a constant reminder of trauma experienced in the marriage, or when it ended. Or she may feel that head-covering no longer fits her sense of who she is.
Is it permissible to cover just with a headband, or a strip of scarf framing the front and back of the head?
Especially in Israel, the practice of wearing only a very narrow headband or thin strip of scarf encircling the head has become popular. A woman with this type of covering is relying on the minority opinion that covering is not obligatory beyond common custom, and is interpreting custom very leniently. This type of justification for this practice is sometimes attributed to Rav Rabinovitch, who has made oral remarks that this might become permissible if it were to become common practice.
However, as we have seen, the prevalent view among halachic authorities is that there is a Torah-level obligation in head-covering, as well as a dat Yehudit obligation. A lenient view of fulfilling just the Torah-level obligation is that at least the majority of the head should be covered. Anything less risks violating Torah law.
How, then, has the practice to cover less taken off? A woman may be unaware of the halachic significance of covering the majority of the head. She may have the misconception that there is nothing more to the obligation of head-covering than signifying that she is married, or may view head-covering through more of a social than religious lens, as a way to identify with the halachically observant community.
Indeed, although wearing only a headband does not satisfy the obligation of head-covering as widely understood, it is preferable to leaving the head fully uncovered, because it does accomplish those social goals. For many women, especially those new to observance, this type of gesture toward head-covering is itself a significant effort.
Why is it accepted for a woman to wear a wig that is nicer than her hair?
Modesty should be a consideration in choosing a head covering. That being said, different women and communities have different conceptions of modesty. When it comes to satisfying the technical obligation to cover the head, wigs are often very effective. In some communities, wigs have become the gold standard of head-covering for precisely this reason. How well wigs reflect a woman’s sense of modesty is a more subjective question. Rav Ovadya Yosef prohibits wigs due to concern in this area, while others do not find the average wig to be lacking in modesty.
Often when choosing a head-covering, and not only with wigs, a woman may experience tension between feeling positive about how she looks and the quality of coverage she thinks Halacha demands. The mitzva of head- covering, with its effects on self-image and self-expression, can be challenging. It is important to find ways to make it accessible to as many women as possible, and to respect the more lenient voices in different directions that enable a woman to keep Halacha while also feeling satisfied with how she presents herself. For many women, wigs present a halachically- acceptable opportunity to maintain modesty and dignity in a way that feels positive.
In general, the option to use a wig for head-covering is important in situations where an obvious head-covering could be problematic, as in certain professional settings. Today, with the rise of multiculturalism, many people proudly wear distinctive religious garb. In a society where our Muslim sisters do not hesitate to wear a hijab, perhaps Jewish women should feel more comfortable wearing an obvious hair-covering. On the other hand, there has also been a backlash against multiculturalism, even extending to physical attacks against clearly identifiable Jews and other minorities. In societies where this is a concern, using a wig might be advisable.
How should a woman cover her head— and hair?
While some authorities consider it obligatory for a woman to cover all of her hair, and others consider it praiseworthy, there are still others who permit leaving some hair uncovered, even deliberately. Their opinions range from a few fly-away hairs, to hair at the temples or a fringe, to two etzba’ot, to a tefach. Other opinions permit uncovering even more.
Deciding how to cover one’s hair and how much to cover involves halachic, personal, and communal elements. A woman should seek to make a decision that both has halachic support and allows her to perform the mitzva in a way that is comfortable for her (or at least does not cause her resentment). The challenge is to find a way to fulfill the obligation in head-covering that is consistent with one’s overall approach to halachic decision-making, and at the same time feels right on the head.
Even after learning through the range of opinions in the sources and taking personal feelings into account, it is critical also to consider communal factors. Because each individual woman’s head-covering is part of her public presentation, it often becomes a statement of personal and religious commitments and communal affiliation. For better or worse, all head-covering choices come with associations in the observant community, and those affect personal decisions and halachic discussion.
Many women take pride in head-covering as an opportunity to make a statement about religious commitments and to demonstrate belonging to a given community. For precisely the same reason, though, many other women can find this mitzva especially difficult, especially when personal preference does not align with community norms.
Psychologist Khaya Eisenberg explains how challenging it can be for her to choose between a snood, which she prefers, and a wig, which is her community’s norm:
Khaya Eisenberg, 'Halachah, Society, and the Snood,” in Hide & Seek, ed. Lynne Schreiber (Jerusalem: Urim Publications, 2006), pp. 102-3
A snood may be less socially acceptable, but it is no less modest…. I am fulfilling the law….I find a shaitel bothersome to put on and wear, but it’s always a safe bet for fitting in in any situation…Perhaps pretenses and social conformity are valuable motivating forces for adhering to Halachah.
In making these decisions, it can be helpful to talk out concerns with a mentor. The decision-making process is itself of great importance. Over a lifetime, a woman may find that she revisits her decision, more than once.
A woman’s head-covering should make a statement that she feels honors Halacha, her community, and herself.
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