Contraception V: Hashchatat Zera & Contraceptives

In the first installments of this series, we discussed circumstances in which contraceptive use is halachically permissible. Now, we can turn our attention to the permissibility of specific contraceptive methods. In this piece, we look at the prohibition of hashchatat zera (wasting or ruining seed) and a related Talmudic passage on contraception. We then discuss modern methods of contraception for which this prohibition is potentially relevant—barrier methods and spermicides—and conclude with a discussion of abstention as a contraceptive method.

In our next piece, we’ll discuss the prohibition of sterilization (sirus), and its implications for contraceptive methods that permanently or temporarily impair fertility. We’ll conclude by looking at different approaches to deciding which methods are halachically preferable, and at choosing a method in light of Halacha.

As we saw in the opening piece in this series, Yehuda’s second son, Onan, married Tamar, his deceased elder brother’s widow, but avoided procreating with her.

Rashi explains that Onan attempted the ‘withdrawal method’ of contraception:¹

This contraceptive method, though only about 80% effective,² has been in practice since ancient times. While the verses make Onan’s behavior clear, his brother Er’s sin is more opaque. The Talmud contends that Er’s sinful action was the same as Onan’s, though Er’s motivation differed.

Whether in evasion of fraternal responsibility or in pursuit of enhanced pleasure, both brothers’ motivations seem selfish. The continuation of the story highlights Tamar’s eagerness to conceive, and thus puts the brothers in an even more negative light.

In order to learn from this narrative, we should attempt to clarify whether the brothers’ sin was in the specific contraceptive method they used or in the very practice of contraception itself. This question has broader implications because the Talmud links their sin to the prohibition of hotza’at zera le-vatala, spilling zera (semen) in vain:

The prohibition of hotza’at zera le-vatala is not clearly stated in the Torah. Early halachic authorities suggest different derivations, with somewhat different halachic implications.

I. Corollary of Pirya Ve-rivya According to Tosafot, hotza’at zera le-vatala is a corollary of peru u-rvu, and thus at issue specifically for those commanded to procreate.

This statement may imply that contraception through spilling zera—and perhaps other forms of contraception—is not prohibited when the command to procreate has already been satisfied. (Or, as in male fertility testing or treatments, when the zera is discharged not le-vatala, in vain, but for the very purpose of procreation.³)

Rabbeinu Tam spells out another implication of seeing the prohibition of hotza’at zera as a corollary to the mitzva of pirya ve-rivya: Women, who are not obligated in the mitzva, would thus not be subject to the prohibition. Rabbeinu Tam uses the term hashchatat zera (wasting or ruining seed), which is often used interchangeably with hotza’at zera le-vatala but leaves room for a more expansive understanding of the prohibition, not restricted to the act of a man releasing his own semen in vain.

Some authorities, however, rule that this position still leaves room for a woman to be prohibited from hashchata of her husband’s zera, even if she has no analogous prohibition for her own oocytes:

II. Broader Culpability An alternative perspective connects hotza’at zera le-vatala to a desire to avoid procreating, but extends culpability for it beyond those commanded in pirya ve-rivya. The Torah reports that “all flesh” engaged in ruinous behavior that precipitated the flood, and according to one rabbinic tradition, this ruin involved hotza’at zera le-vatala:

The use of the language “hishchit,” or ruined, in this midrash helps explain why the prohibition of hotza’at zera le-vatala is often characterized as part of the broader prohibition of hashchatat zera, wasting or ruining zera. Earlier, we raised the question of whether a woman’s exemption from prohibition might still leave constraints on a woman’s handling of semen. According to another school of thought, women have no exemption from this prohibition. Rather, the prohibition applies directly to women, perhaps even extending to treatment of the ovum.

Ramban, for instance, concludes that if “all flesh” is considered culpable for hashchatat zera in the generation of the Flood, then even those not directly obligated in the mitzva of pirya ve-rivya, like women, would be directly subject to the prohibition, whatever its precise contours:

If that is the case, then perhaps specifically contraception entailing hashchatat zera is at issue, regardless of whether peru u-rvu has been fulfilled, and other contraceptive methods would be permissible when they do not conflict with fulfilling peru u-rvu.

In the nineteenth century, Rav Ya’akov Ettlinger suggests that hashchatat zera falls under the broader prohibition of bal tashchit, not being wasteful:

In other words, the prohibition of hashchatat zera can be understood as a specific concern about actively wasting or ruining semen, an imperative to treat zera as valuable in its own right, as opposed to a more widespread concern about contraception in general.

If Conception Isn’t Possible

Sexual intercourse is not considered a violation of hotza’at zera le-vatala even if it takes place when a couple are unable to conceive. For instance, a baraita details presumed effects of relations at different stages of pregnancy, and makes no suggestion that there would be any halachic restraint or concern for zera le-vatala at that time.

Tosafot state more clearly that being able to conceive is not a precondition for permissible marital relations.

The specific concern of hashchatat zera applies if zera is wasted or destroyed or if something interferes with the normal course of sexual relations, sometimes referred to as derech tashmish. See, for example, Rosh, who addresses a case where a woman has an anatomical blockage that prevents ejaculation from taking place internally:

Rosh specifically contrasts this situation with that of a woman who is infertile, in which case relations are permitted. Thus, the concern is not regarding sexual relations when a couple couldn’t conceive. In the nineteenth century, Ben Ish Chai provides a rationale for this:

According to Ben Ish Chai, God charges us with treating sperm in a specific way, but this is not reducible to attempting conception. On some views, even anal relations would be permissible for a married couple on an occasional basis.⁴

We’ve seen that the prohibition of hashchatat zera is not necessarily a corollary of pirya ve-rivya, and that relations between husband and wife are permissible even when they cannot conceive.

It follows that this prohibition need not rule out contraceptive methods that do not entail “wasting” zera. We’ll discuss such methods in our next piece. First, though, we’ll discuss both Talmudic and contemporary contraceptives that do potentially involve hashchatat zera.

A contraceptive method available in Talmudic times that raised questions of hashchatat zera was the moch. A moch was a type of cotton wadding that a woman would insert vaginally to prevent conception:

A moch could potentially be inserted either before intercourse to impede the flow of semen into her body or afterwards to remove semen from it.

As we saw in our discussion of contraception and danger to health, the Talmud discusses the moch when it takes up the case of three women for whom a new pregnancy was considered uniquely dangerous: an eleven-year old (in an era when marriage of minors was not unheard of), a pregnant woman (believed to be at risk of miscarriage from relations if carrying twins),⁵ and a breastfeeding mother:

There are so many ways to interpret this passage that it is difficult to draw decisive halachic conclusions from it. Here are three of the main interpretations:

I. Prohibition During Intercourse On a simple reading of Rashi, the moch in question was inserted before sexual relations, for use during intercourse.

Tosafot explain that Rashi’s use of the term “permitted” to describe Rabbi Meir’s position implies that he would permit only these three women to use a moch and prohibit other women from using one. It would follow that the sages prohibited all other women from using a moch.

II. Permission After Intercourse In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam says it is only permitted to insert the moch after relations, to clean out semen. Inserting it beforehand would be forbidden because intercourse and ejaculation would not take place in its usual way. He maintains that the sages allowed all women, including the three for whom pregnancy would be dangerous, to choose whether or not to use the moch after intercourse, whereas Rabbi Meir required these three women to insert it:

III. Permission During Intercourse Some early authorities cite Rashi that the moch is inserted prior to sexual relations for use during intercourse, while embracing the view of Rabbeinu Tam that the sages permit all women to use the moch, but disagree with Rabbi Meir about requiring it in the Talmud’s three special cases. Here, for example, is fourteenth century commentator Rav Yosef ibn Chabib:

In the sixteenth century, Maharshal rules clearly that one should indeed mix and match Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam’s interpretations in this way. He adds that, in his view, women are not subject to the prohibition of hashchatat zera. Addressing the question of intercourse taking place in its usual way, Maharshal argues that the moch does not interfere, since the two bodies are in contact and taking pleasure from each other.

For a Woman

Though he typically would permit use of a moch during relations only in cases of danger, Rav Moshe Feinstein suggests that having relations with a moch in place would not actually raise direct questions of hashchatat zera for a woman. At the point of insertion, it is not certain that the husband will have relations with her. During relations, Rav Moshe considers her passive in contrast to her husband and the moch:

Rav Moshe does not condone women freely using a moch during relations; he simply does not consider a woman liable in such a case for hashchatat zera. He also does not relate here to whether there is an aspect of hashchatat zera in a woman removing a moch from her body.

In Cases of Danger

The Talmudic passage on the moch discusses a method of contraception that raises halachic concerns of hashchatat zera, whether removing semen or interfering with the normal course of relations, and weighs its use in cases of unique danger.

Though there are notable dissenters,⁶ when other methods of contraception were scarce, it became accepted halacha to permit use of a moch during intercourse in cases of concern for potential risk to life, rather than force a couple into long-term abstinence or divorce. (See more in our discussion here.) For example, here is Chazon Ish’s ruling to this effect:

Our discussion of the moch lays the groundwork for learning about modern barrier methods of contraception. As their name suggests, barrier contraceptives physically block sperm from entering the cervix, so that it cannot reach the fallopian tubes where fertilization could take place. Barrier contraceptives are often used in conjunction with spermicide, which increases their efficacy and extends it for a few hours. (We discuss spermicides below.) Major barrier methods of contraception include the diaphragm and cervical cap, the contraceptive sponge, and condoms.

The halachic permissibility of using barrier methods as a form of contraception depends on what lessons we draw from the discussion of the Talmudic moch.

The Diaphragm and Cervical Cap

The diaphragm and cervical cap are typically made of flexible latex, and sit behind a woman’s pelvic bone to cover the opening of the cervix; the cervical cap obtrudes slightly less than the diaphragm. The diaphragm is about 87% effective after first childbirth,⁷ the cervical cap about 78%.⁸

An early contraceptive device known as a pessary, which would cap the cervix (and was often held in place by an arm extending into the uterus), bears similarity to these modern devices. In nineteenth-century Galicia, Maharsham weighed the halachic status of a rubber pessary:

Though he was ultimately conservative about applying this ruling, Maharsham rules here that the pessary is not comparable to the moch because intercourse takes place in its usual manner. Therefore, the halacha regarding its use should be more lenient than that regarding use of a moch.

Other halachic authorities do not make such a clear distinction between barrier devices. For example, writing about seventy years ago, Rav Moshe Feinstein argues that the diaphragm and moch work similarly and are subject to comparable halachic analysis:

Rav Moshe does not consider the difference in position between the moch and more deeply inserted devices such as the diaphragm and cervical cap to be a key halachic factor. He also rejects the idea that a wholly internal barrier would constitute a halachic impediment [chatzitza] within the vaginal canal in a way that would affect the status of intercourse using these methods.

The dispute as to whether the diaphragm and similar devices are halachically comparable to a moch or whether they can be more easily permitted persists to more recent times. Some halachic authorities, including Rav Mordechai Eliyahu, consider the diaphragm (and the sponge—see below) to be hashchatat zera, and thus no better than the moch, especially since after relations the semen may be removed along with the barrier:

Others, like Rav Yehuda H. Henkin—in a 1977 responsum following the ruling of his esteemed grandfather Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin—draw on an argument similar to Maharsham’s to rule that the moch is distinct from the diaphragm or cervical cap, because the diaphragm and cervical cap do not fill the vaginal canal and are not felt in a way that interferes with intercourse:

There are reports that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach was swayed by this argument as well.⁹ Rav Nahum Rabinovitch embraced it.¹⁰

The halachic status of the diaphragm remains subject to debate. Some authorities permit its use only in cases of danger. Others consider it a first-line option of contraception, especially when hormones might lead to chronic spotting or are not a viable option.

The Contraceptive Sponge

A contraceptive sponge, usually treated with spermicide, is approximately 80% effective in women who have given birth and 88% effective in women who have not.¹² The sponge fills the upper part of the vaginal canal, so it more closely resembles a moch than the diaphragm does. Rav Dr. Mordechai Halperin explains:¹³

As we’ve seen above, some halachic authorities, including Rav Mordechai Eliyahu, equate both the sponge and the diaphragm with the moch. Rav Yehuda Henkin maintains that, although the sponge is treated more stringently than the diaphragm, the lower vagina is still not filled by the sponge, and this allows for skin-to-skin contact. Therefore, he would permit its use in pressing situations, even where he would not have permitted use of amoch.¹⁴

The classic use case for a sponge with spermicide would be where a short-term contraceptive with greater efficacy than spermicide alone is needed immediately (sooner than a diaphragm could be procured or fitted). However, it is less clear that the sponge would be permitted when the one-size-fits-most diaphragm is readily available.

Condoms

The condom is a thin sheath of latex or a similar material placed over the penis just before intercourse to block sperm from entering the vagina.¹⁵ Used in conjunction with spermicide, condoms are about 87% effective.¹⁶

Condoms resemble the moch in being felt during intercourse and in directly receiving sperm. They are potentially subject to more halachic leniency than the moch, because they are thin and do not take up space within the vaginal canal. On the other hand, condoms are potentially viewed more stringently than the moch because they completely encase the man’s member, leaving no direct skin contact and blocking the release of semen into the vagina.

Based, on this last point, Maharsham argues that condoms should be treated more stringently than a moch and can only be permitted in cases of direct risk to life:

On the other hand, Rav Chayim Ozer Grodzinski rules in the 1930s that condoms can be permitted in a case of danger because it is doubtful whether they present as great a halachic impediment to relations as a moch:

According to Rav Chayyim Ozer, relations with a condom are clearly more the proper way of relations than relations with a moch and intuitively seem no worse than anal relations. Once anal intercourse is recognized as a form of intercourse, such that some halachic authorities permit it even with ejaculation, wouldn’t relations with a condom also be considered an act of relations, at most a rabbinic prohibition? A rabbinic prohibition could be overridden by danger and the importance of fulfilling mitzvat ona.

Currently, the most prominent halachic approach allows for using a condom to prevent pregnancy specifically in cases of danger where no other option is available.¹⁷

In an article that inspired some controversy, Rav Saul David Botschko, of France and now Israel, has argued for a more lenient approach to condom use when other methods are ruled out, based in part on the possibility of embracing Maharshal’s ruling that a moch could be permitted more widely for use during intercourse and part on logic that parallels Rav Chaim Ozer’s.¹⁸

Another modern contraceptive method that has raised questions about hashchatat zera is spermicide. Spermicides, chemical compounds inserted vaginally as gels, foams, films, or suppositories to immobilize sperm, are roughly 79% effective¹⁹—though some varieties claim higher efficacy—and last for about three hours. Some halachic authorities have concluded that using spermicides violates the prohibition of hashchatat zera, taking the view that a woman is culpable for hashchatat zera as well as a man. For example, in a 1976 responsum, Rav Eliezer Waldenberg was reluctant to permit their use for this reason:

Despite the time that elapses between the insertion of spermicide and its effect on the sperm, Rav Waldenberg views use of spermicide as a direct act of hashchatat zera, for which both husband and wife would be liable.

In contrast, Rav Kook, in a 1933 responsum, argues that an early spermicidal powder does not interfere with relations and is not hashchatat zera. He adds that the powder acts only indirectly on the semen and is not necessarily effective in destroying sperm:

The view that spermicidal action is indirect, even more so if combined with the view seen earlier that a woman is not culpable for haschatat zera, could also potentially provide grounds for permitting use of spermicide.

In 1952, Rav Moshe Feinstein ruled that spermicide is a halachically permissible contraceptive option, without voicing concern for hashchatat zera.²⁰ More recently, writing in the 1980s, Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv argued that spermicides do not present a concern of hashchatat zera for a different reason, because they are only effective if left in place undisturbed for a few hours, so destruction occurs after relations:

In practice, use of spermicide is widely permitted in a range of cases. However, its relatively low efficacy means that it is rarely a first-line contraceptive unless it is combined with other contraceptive methods, typically barrier methods that recall the moch.

Given the halachic preference for methods that do not raise concerns of violating a prohibition, is abstention permissible as a contraceptive method? While it raises no concerns about hashchatat zera (or sterilization), abstention does potentially conflict with the mitzva of ona, of having marital relations at regular intervals. (Learn more about the halachot of marital intimacy here.)

Indeed, if abstention raised no halachic concerns, it is hard to see how use of the moch would ever be permitted. In the nineteenth century, Rav Avraham Sofer makes this point, suggesting that when using a moch is permitted, a major consideration is allowing for fulfillment of the mitzva of ona:

As we saw above, there is a halachic consensus to permit even condoms in situations where pregnancy would be dangerous and all other contraceptive methods are precluded. (We’ll see in our next piece that this consensus extends to tubal ligation in similarly extreme circumstances.) Even though these methods are difficult to permit, they are considered preferable to long-term abstinence. This reflects the centrality of sexual relations as a key element of marriage, which we discuss here.

Still, when very effective, very short-term contraception is required, abstention may be the preferred option, both halachically and medically.

Closer to our time, Rav Moshe Feinstein discusses abstention around the time in a woman’s cycle that she could potentially conceive. He notes that this is in tension with the mitzva of ona, but permits it as a form of contraception subject to a couple’s discretion when pirya ve-rivya has already been fulfilled and another pregnancy or child would be difficult.

In a later responsum, he limits permission to abstain to cases in which it will not have a negative effect on the couple or lead the husband to improper sexual fantasizing:

Fertility Awareness Method

A more structured approach to the method of intermittent abstention described by Rav Moshe is known as the Fertility Awareness Method (FAM). A woman using FAM tracks physical signs such as basal body temperature, cervical position, and cervical secretions to identify her fertility window, during which the couple abstain. On its own, FAM is about 77% effective.²¹

For a couple who observe the laws of nidda, and thus typically need to refrain from sexual relations for at least eleven or twelve days each cycle, abstaining at fertile times can be a strain on the relationship. Therefore, halachically observant couples who practice the Fertility Awareness Method often do so in conjunction with use of barrier methods or spermicides during the fertile window, and must relate to the halachot governing those methods.

In our next piece, we complete our exploration of contraceptive methods, this time with reference to the prohibition of sirus (sterilization), and then conclude our series on contraception with a discussion of which methods are preferred.