Learning Torah II: Obligation

Where does exemption from the mitzva of talmud Torah leave women?

There is no dispute that women are exempt from the Torah-level mitzva of talmud Torah.¹ The Mishna discusses the implications of the exemption.

Surprisingly, the context of the discussion in this mishna is a claim made about a suspected sota (lit., straying woman; see Bemidbar 5:11-31). A sota is a player in a halachic tragedy: A husband suspects his wife of an illicit relationship with another man. He has an official injunction issued against her being alone with the other man. She nevertheless secludes herself with the other man– and there are witnesses to prove it. The husband chooses to pursue a claim against her all the way to the Temple. There, in a shaming ordeal, God’s own name is written on a scroll and then that scroll is ground into water. The woman is forced to drink it in order to restore faith with her husband. If guilty of adultery, the woman and her illicit partner die a death administered by God.

As precarious as her situation is, the mishna considers the possibility that even a guilty sota might be more than a sinner. She may have merits working in her favor, like Torah study. When a woman in this situation has other merits, those merits can hold off her Divine punishment for years:

Is there any obligation for women to learn Torah?

I. Ben Azzai’s Position Ben Azzai learns that a man must teach his daughter Torah “from here.” Why does he connect women’s talmud Torah to the sota ritual?

Through the merit of Torah learning, a sota (and possibly others) will not mistake delay in punishment for a lapse in the execution of Divine judgment.

In context, Ben Azzai teaches us that a woman’s learning Torah is significant specifically for the woman who has committed adultery and undergoes the sota ordeal. Can his reasoning have implications beyond this specific case?

We can, in fact, read Ben Azzai more broadly. If a woman’s Torah learning has positive effects even in this extreme and tragic case, her learning should be an asset in any life situation. Perhaps that’s why a father must teach his daughter Torah in general. Her learning Torah may even prevent her from becoming a sota to begin with.

Ben Azzai doesn’t challenge the Torah’s exemption of a father from the mitzva of teaching his daughter. He uses the case of the sota to argue for a different source of obligation. In his eyes, the Torah leaves room for encouraging and even obligating women’s Torah study.

II. Rabbi Eliezer’s Position Rabbi Eliezer disagrees. He does not phrase his objection to women’s Torah study in the halachic language of prohibition, but he strongly discourages it. A father’s teaching his daughter Torah causes more trouble than it prevents. He likens it to tiflut, which means nonsense (or lewdness, as opposed to piety, perishut).

What is this about? The Talmud provides an explanation:

According to the Talmud, cunning comes along with knowledge, and that is what concerns Rabbi Eliezer. Somehow cunning leads to tiflut. The suggestion seems to be that even Torah knowledge comes at the expense of innocence, and might lead a woman astray! This is the opposite of how we typically view the influence of Torah study.

Meiri, a medieval Provencal Talmudic commentator, uses analogy to explain Rabbi Eliezer a little differently. He compares a woman learning to a bell. A hollow bell produces a loud clang.² A woman is presumably a beginner, and beginner’s knowledge tends to be shallow. A false sense of mastery can be misleading, or even dangerous. That can lead to tiflut.

How strongly does Rabbi Eliezer discourage women’s study?

A story in the Talmud Yerushalmi teaches us how firmly Rabbi Eliezer held this opinion. In Rabbi Eliezer’s time, a Levi might form a relationship with a non-Levi, such that his family would personally receive all of the non-Levi’s tithings over the course of the year. The matron of the following story was such a “patron” of Rabbi Eliezer’s family, who were Kohanim (and followed the opinion that a Kohen can receive the levitical tithe, because he is also descended from Levi).

From other passages in rabbinic literature, we know that Rabbi Eliezer is a fiery character, particularly zealous about his vision of proper transmission of Torah from teacher to student. In this story, his zealousness comes out in full force.

Even at considerable personal cost, Rabbi Eliezer defies his son’s matron’s request. Rabbi Eliezer will not teach Torah to a woman under any circumstances.

For Rabbi Eliezer, women’s wisdom is restricted to “her spindle.” The spindle belongs outside the world of Torah learning, whether in the home realm, as spinning typically was, or as part of communal Jewish endeavor, like the original spinning for the mishkan, the desert tabernacle.

In the continuation of the story, Rabbi Eliezer answers the matron’s question for his students. He does not challenge her knowledge of Scripture or her question’s acuity. Rather, he flatly refuses to explain complex Torah matters to women. This is not mild opposition.

Although Halacha often does not follow Rabbi Eliezer’s rulings, his statement that a father should not teach his daughter Torah is widely accepted. Why? Presumably because later in the same mishna, in different terms, Rabbi Yehoshua seems to second Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion.³ 

If a woman can’t learn Torah, how is she supposed to know how to observe Halacha?

Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling that women should not learn Torah finds wide halachic acceptance. But it raises questions. Other sources imply that women did study Torah and may even be required to do so.

The Talmud records that in the time of King Chizkiya every boy, girl, man, and woman was expert in the laws of purity and impurity.¹¹ This seems to contradict Rabbi Eliezer’s opposition to women’s learning Torah.

Similarly, the Torah obligates women to attend the Torah reading of hakhel. Doesn’t this obligation contradict Rabbi Eliezer’s position? Here, the Talmud may help us resolve the contradiction.

Rabbi Elazar Ben Azarya breaks down the verse regarding hakhel into units that he then lines up with each other. The phrase “in order that they will learn” corresponds to “the men”, and “in order that they will hear” to “the women.” In hakhel, men “learn,” while women merely “listen.” What is the difference between listening and learning? Tosafot explain that it has to do with mitzva performance.

Rabbi Elazar says women must “hear” or “listen” to Torah in order to fulfill mitzvot. Women need not “learn” Torah for its own sake. Rabbi Elazar rejects the view that a father must teach his daughter Torah.¹² She needs to learn only what is practically necessary.

Rereading Rabbi Eliezer

Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer’s objection to women’s study still allows for learning Torah in order to observe mitzvot. That would make his viewpoint close to Rabbi Elazar’s and resolve the contradiction between his position and hakhel.

The early-thirteenth century pietistic work Sefer Chasidim makes exactly this argument:

According to Sefer Chasidim, there is an obligation for a father to teach his daughter Halacha. How else can she keep it? No one can observe Shabbat without at least some knowledge of it. Sefer Chasidim argues that Rabbi Eliezer meant to rule out only specific areas of study: the depths of Talmud study, philosophical speculation about mitzvot, and kabbala. Those would be off limits to women, while Halacha-oriented learning would not be.

If Rabbi Eliezer would concede that women must learn at least enough Torah to be able to fulfill Halacha, how should that be done?

Even if women must learn practical halachot, perhaps text study isn’t the proper method of study. As discussed in our introduction, there are two classic modes for transmitting Judaism, text study and learning through informal, imitative transmission (mimesis).

I. Informal Transmission  Maharil, great halachic authority of late-fourteenth to early-fifteenth century Ashkenaz, argues that women should learn Halacha chiefly through mimesis.

Maharil credits women with real halachic expertise. In his experience, that expertise has nothing to do with formal study. Formal study becomes important only when questions arise, and rabbis can address them.

Maharil’s opposition to women’s study is part of a general wariness he has about making study of Halacha available to the unlearned, men or women. He actively opposes the composition of halachic summary books in the vernacular.¹³

Why is Maharil so skeptical of text study by women? He doesn’t think summary texts teach Halacha well, and he doesn’t think it likely that women’s text study would get beyond summary texts.

II. Formal Study  Other halachic authorities disagree. A woman can perfect knowledge of practical mitzvot through formal study. For example, Rav Yitzchak of Corbeil, a major Tosafist who preceded Maharil by roughly a hundred years, wrote a brief halachic compendium called Sefer Mitzvot Katan, (literally, the Little Book of Mitzvot), known as Semak. Rav Yitzchak addresses his book to both women and men. His student, in an introduction to the work, explains why:

Rav Yitzchak writes about women’s obligations in his book because women’s mitzva performance has as much to gain from text study as does men’s. The introduction to Semak even compares women’s study of his work to men’s study of Talmud. By writing a halachic guide for men and women, Rav Yitzchak establishes that women should study halacha.

Interestingly, Maharil himself cites Rav Yitzchak’s approach in another responsum.¹⁴ Although Maharil personally disagrees with Rav Yitzchak, he acknowledges that his position on women’s Torah study is a valid halachic perspective.

Open Debate

In his glosses to the Shulchan Aruch, Rema rules that women are obligated to learn the laws applying to women:

Unfortunately, Rema does not resolve the debate between Maharil and Rav Yitzchak of Corbeil. He gives no indication of how women should approach learning these laws, through mimesis alone or also through text study.