Birkat Ha-mazon

The Torah repeatedly describes God’s bountiful provision of sustenance to the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael. A few passages in Devarim juxtapose the promise of eating to satiety in the land with a charge for us not to forget God. The most familiar one appears in keri’at Shema:¹

Another of these passages explicitly directs us to bless God when we eat and are satisfied.

In the wilderness, God provided for us with a daily portion of man (manna). Once we entered the Land, the man ceased and the Land itself became the vehicle through which God sustains us. It is easy enough to remember God when we are always in direct need, but much more challenging to remember the Divine roots of our well-being.

We might imagine that birkat ha-mazon is a food-centered beracha, simply parallel to the berachot recited before eating. Its name does literally mean the beracha of nourishment, and it is recited after a meal. However, birkat ha-mazon is not about food itself. Rather, it is about God the Sustainer, and the land God has put at our disposal that enables us to eat. We recite birkat ha-mazon specifically after eating because it is then, in the moments of satiety, that we are most liable to forget God.

In a sign of its religious significance, birkat ha-mazon is the only beracha obligatory on a Torah level according to most opinions.²

Let’s look at the parameters of the obligation, the content of the beracha, and finally the nature of women’s obligation.

Defining the Obligation

A close reading of the Torah’s language helps us define exactly when birkat ha-mazon is obligatory, after eating which foods and of what quantity. The verse right before the one obligating us in birkat ha-mazon refers specifically to bread.³ Based on this juxtaposition, we recite birkat ha-mazon after eating foods whose initial beracha is ha-motzi.

How much must one eat to be obligated in birkat ha-mazon? The Talmudic texts on this seem to be in conflict. A ke-zayit (the volume of an olive) is the standard halachic measure (shi’ur) for acts of eating. In one passage, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir debate how that measure relates to birkat ha-mazon.

Rabbi Meir maintains that the obligation to recite birkat ha-mazon takes effect only when one has both eaten and drunk the typical minimum measure for each, a ke-zayit and a revi’it. Rabbi Yehuda argues that drinking is unnecessary, but one is obligated only after eating more than that, enough to be satisfied. The Talmud suggests a ke-beitza as a relevant measure. A simple reading of the derivations from the verse implies that these measures apply on a Torah level.

On the other hand, another Talmudic passage, written as though in the voice of God, suggests that the measures mentioned here are rabbinic stringencies. In that case the derivation from the words of the Torah would be a mnemonic device devised by the sages:⁴

Some halachic authorities, like Rabbeinu Yona, take the textual derivations advanced by Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir at face value, so that satiety is an objective measure, and therefore only one who eats a ke-beitza (egg’s volume) or more is obligated in birkat ha-mazon on a Torah level.⁵

Others, including Rambam, rule that “and you will be satisfied” (ve-savata) is a subjective measure, so that the Torah-level obligation to recite birkat ha-mazon depends on whether one personally feels sated after eating, and not on some objective, universal scale.⁶

In the spirit of the language “are exacting with themselves,” Rambam adds that reciting birkat ha-mazon after eating to a smaller measure than subjective satiety is a rabbinic obligation.

Rabbinic discussions also help us define what we say. How did we get from the concise Biblical imperative to “bless God over the good land He has given you,” to the long text of birkat ha-mazon as we know it? The Talmud explains the origins of the text in two distinct ways.

First, it presents birkat ha-mazon as a series of historical enactments:

On this account, God’s provision of the man precipitates praising God as a sustainer. The shift to agricultural production upon entering the land leads to praising God for the land which provides sustenance. David and Shlomo together include mention of Yerushalayim and then Beit Ha-mikdash as central to our spiritual aspirations. A miracle in the midst of a catastrophic defeat— the preservation of the corpses of those killed by the Romans at Beitar and the opportunity to bury them — leads us to thank God for what is good, even at difficult times.

A little later, however, the Talmud provides a different account, citing two possibilities for deriving each beracha of birkat ha-mazon directly from Biblical verses:

These two distinct accounts of the derivation of birkat ha-mazon don’t fit neatly together. How can we then say that later figures, such as David and Shelomo enacted berachot if they were already commanded by the Torah?

Halachic authorities present two primary approaches to resolving this difficulty.

I. Emphasizing the Textual Derivation On this reading, the obligation to recite each of the first three berachot is indeed derived from the Torah. Later enactments only formulate precise language for the concluding line of each beracha. (The text of the body of each beracha remains variable, and to this day differs among different communities.) Rashba articulates this view:

Even though he considers the themes of the berachot to be derived from the Torah, Rashba takes it as a given that their language has gone through historical shifts. For example, he argues that the beracha for Yerushalayim before and after the Temple’s destruction must have changed.

II. Emphasizing the historical account According to this view, the essential Torah mitzva is simply to recite a single beracha of some sort after eating. Over time, a series of berachot including specific ideas and language were enacted. Ramban explains:

Ramban sees the ideas of the berachot, such as boneh Yerushalayim, as established by each historical figure. The exact language remains flexible in accordance with the times. On this view, the Talmud’s derivation of distinct berachot from the verse must be merely an asmachta, a mnemonic device.

Meaning

What are the berachot about? In her doctoral dissertation,⁷ Dr. Keshet Shoval delineates and connects the thematic strands of birkat ha-mazon.

While the first blessing is universal in nature, praising God for sustaining all living creatures, the second is more particularistic, a blessing of thanks to God for the gift of the Land that was granted specifically to am Yisrael by dint of our commitment to God. The themes of Divine sustenance and the Land are intertwined in the Torah, yet distinguished in birkat ha-mazon.

The third beracha is a request that Yerushalayim be rebuilt, enabling us to reach the culmination of the Divine plan in the Land, carried out in part through the restoration of the Davidic dynasty. The fourth beracha, ha-tov ve-hameitiv, is rabbinic, its role in the progression less clear. This beracha perhaps expresses our recognition that even sustenance might not find us in a happy state, and that we praise God nevertheless.

Taken as a whole, birkat ha-mazon extends far beyond gratitude for the specific food that we have eaten.

Essential Components

The Talmud instructs us to mention a few specific, particularistic points in birkat ha-mazon. Most notably, the second beracha, birkat ha-aretz, should include mention of the land, berit and Torah, and the third beracha should mention the Davidic dynasty.

The Talmud later indicates that berit here refers to berit mila, circumcision.⁸ Why introduce berit mila and Torah into the beracha of the land? The Talmud Yerushalmi addresses this question with regard to the importance of mentioning Torah:

Rashi presents a parallel explanation for the mention of berit, specifically berit mila:

As Rashi notes, in Bereishit, berit mila comes together with God’s promise of the Land to Avraham’s descendants.

God gives us the land as part of a berit in which we accept covenantal responsibility to keep the Torah. When we include mentions of berit and Torah in the beracha of the land, we acknowledge that our possession of the land is conditioned on keeping them.

As central as these concepts are, it is by no means clear that mentioning them is obligatory on a Torah level. As we’ve seen, the precise language of birkat ha-mazon is rabbinic in nature. This is the case even though the Yerushalmi suggested that one who omits their mention needs to repeat birkat ha-mazon.

Indeed, while Rav Yosef Karo rules in Shulchan Aruch that someone who has omitted mention of berit and Torah must recite birkat ha-mazon again,⁹ he notes that that ruling does not depend on considering their mention obligatory on a Torah level. It is simply in deference to the Yerushalmi:

How should one include these mentions? Siddur Rav Sa’adya Ga’on provides us with an early, distilled version of birkat ha-aretz, in which berit and Torah find expression without embellishment.

An expanded version of the text also makes an appearance in Ge’onic literature. It adds explicit thanks to God for “beritecha she-chatamta bi-vsareinu” and “Toratecha she-limadtanu“: “Your covenant that You sealed in our flesh” and “Your Torah that You taught us.” We will see that the language of the second beracha is particularly relevant to understanding women’s obligation in birkat ha-mazon.

Women’s obligation in birkat ha-mazon first appears in the mishna.

Parallel discussions of this mishna in the Talmud Yerushalmi and the Talmud Bavli seem to indicate that the mishna means that women are obligated on a Torah level in birkat ha-mazon. They reject the possibility that birkat ha-mazon would be a positive time-bound commandment from which women are exempt. (Elsewhere, we discuss women and Shema, tefillin, and prayer.)

We might have thought birkat ha-mazon is time-bound because it follows full meals, which come at regular times (at least when God serves them).

An additional Talmudic passage further supports the view that birkat ha-mazon is obligatory for women. It presents a minority opinion in the name of Rav that omitting berit and Torah and mention of the Davidic dynasty from birkat ha-aretz is acceptable, at least after the fact, because these mentions are exclusive of women:

Rav seems to make a few assumptions: First, and most relevant to this point of discussion, that women are fully obligated in birkat ha-mazonon a Torah level. Second, that this should affect how we view the parameters of the obligatory text. Rav maintains that a text that fulfills the obligation for some groups must be able to fulfill the obligation for anyone, at least after the fact.¹⁰

We’ll come back to the next two assumptions— that a woman cannot be obligated to mention berit mila and Torah as part of her birkat ha-mazon, and that berit and Torah are not relevant for women— a little later.¹¹

At this stage, we’ve seen that a simple reading of the mishna, the Yerushalmi, and two passages in the Talmud Bavli leads to the conclusion that women are fully obligated in birkat ha-mazon.

Surprisingly, a last Talmudic passage questions whether women’s obligation in birkat ha-mazon is Biblical or rabbinic.

In the continuation of the passage (which we’ll discuss below), the Talmud explores a potential practical ramification of this question, whether a woman could discharge a man’s obligation in birkat ha-mazon. But it does not provide a clear resolution to its question about the level of obligation and never explains what motivates it.

Why should a woman’s level of obligation be in question to begin with? As we see in Rashi, the position that a woman has a Torah-level obligation is simple and straightforward to defend.

If we focus on the beginning of the verse, there is no indication of a gender-based distinction. Women are as likely to eat and be satisfied as anyone else, and have the same capacity to recite a beracha. Rashi also invokes the Talmud’s likeliest argument for such a distinction, the possibility that the mitzva would be considered time-bound.

On what basis, then, might we view women as exempt from birkat ha-mazon on a Torah level and obligated only rabbinically? Rashi and Tosafot each venture an explanation:

I. The land Rashi suggests that the possibility of women’s exemption on a Torah level derives from God’s gift of the land of Israel to the Jewish people. This makes sense because the gift of the Land is central to birkat ha-mazon‘s . The initial allotment of the land was by family, with each family defined by its patriarch:

Still, why should this affect women’s Torah-level obligation in birkat ha-mazon? Rashi suggests that the position that views women’s obligation as rabbinic emphasizes the end of the verse that presents the obligation of birkat ha-mazon, about the land:

Rashi seems to assume that a woman cannot thank God for a personal gift of land “that He gave to you ” (second person, singular) when it was not initially given to women. Even the daughters of Tzelofchad did not receive their own portions of the land, but shares of their father’s.

Rashi’s explanation likely draws inspiration from the halachic discussion of bikkurim, first fruits. Bikkurim actually entail two distinct Torah-level mitzvot: bringing the bikkurim as an offering to Beit Ha-mikdash and reciting “mikra bikkurim,” a declaration to accompany the offering. Mikra bikkurim begins with a few verses that summarize the exodus (familiar to most of us from the Pesach Haggada) and concludes with the following:

Mikra bikkurim is intimately tied to our gratitude to God for the land, and highlights the path to receiving it.¹² As on leil ha-seder, mikra bikkurim is recited in any generation as though the reciter was personally redeemed and granted a portion of the land of Israel.

The mishna teaches us that women are obligated to bring bikkurim but exempt from reciting mikra bikkurim. The stated reason is because mikra bikkurim entails thanking God for the gift of the land, which he “gave to me.”

When presenting herself as a member of the Jewish people at the time of entering the Land, a woman cannot claim to have directly, personally received a portion of it. This is likely why the mishna does not highlight the part of the verse saying that God “gave us this land,” which is more general, as problematic for a woman to recite.

Perhaps for this reason, the mishna does not list women among those exempt from the adjacent mitzva of reciting viduy ma’aser, which declares that we have dealt with our ma’aser properly, and which includes only collective mention of the gift of the land.¹³

Tosafot poke a hole in Rashi’s suggestion that women are exempted on Torah level because of how the land was apportioned. They note that Rashi’s answer seems to overlook Kohanim and Levi’im. They also were not given portions of the land. Yet the Talmud raises no question about their Torah-level obligation in birkat ha-mazon (whereas it does take up this question with regard to viduy ma’aser):

One could respond, though, as Rabbi Yosei did regarding viduy ma’aser: the Kohanim and Levi’im received the Levite cities.¹⁴

Other aspects of Rashi’s suggestion remain unclear. The mishna regarding birkat ha-mazon makes no mention of an exemption parallel to that from mikra bikkurim, and the situations are not fully analogous. One who recites birkat ha-mazon only refers to the gift of the land in first person plural.

Furthermore, “the good land that He has given you” may not refer to the specific inheritance of land allotments. God promised the Land to Avraham and all his descendants – male and female – and women take full part in receiving the land as a heritage from our forefathers. Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchick makes this argument, drawing on an idea initially developed by his father, Rav Moshe Soloveitchick:¹⁵

II. Berit and Torah A second possible explanation for questioning women’s Torah-level obligation relates to the mentions of berit mila and Torah in the second beracha.

We saw above that Rav, in the Talmud, assumed both that women are obligated on a Torah level in birkat ha-mazon and that a woman could not possibly be obligated to give thanks for the mitzvot of learning Torah and circumcision, given her exemption from them. These assumptions lead Rav to the conclusion, rejected in practice, that berit and Torah are not obligatory, at least not after the fact, for anyone to recite.

There is a Ge’onic view that shares similar assumptions but arrives at a different conclusion. According to this view, a woman is fully obligated in birkat ha-mazon on a Torah level, but since she would not recite the expanded language of berit and Torah, she cannot discharge a man’s obligation.

In an attempt to explain why a woman’s level of obligation in birkat ha-mazon could be called into question, Tosafot take this argument a step further. They suggest that the challenge of a woman reciting berit and Torah might also affect her level of obligation in birkat ha-mazon:

According to this argument, women can’t give thanks for circumcision and Torah in birkat ha-mazon, at least not as mitzvot personally given. Tosafot may mean that, even were a woman to find a way to give thanks for them, her doing so would not be able to fulfill the obligation for another, since she is not directly obligated in these mitzvot.

On this reading, inability to mention them in fulfillment of obligation, could mean that women cannot be obligated in birkat ha-mazon on a Torah level.¹⁶

Tosafot’s suggestion diverges from the assumption of Rav and the Ge’onim that women have a Torah-level obligation in birkat ha-mazon. Though we reject Rav’s final position as practical halacha, Tosafot’s taking some of his assumptions to reach a halachic position in the opposite direction requires further study.

In short, neither explanation for why women’s Torah-level obligation would be called into question is airtight.

Women Reciting Berit and Torah

Before returning to the question of women’s obligation, let’s explore the assumption that women are not obligated to mention berit and Torah in birkat ha-mazon, because of exemptions from mitzvot concerning them.

In Shulchan Aruch, Rav Yosef Karo, does not express any hesitation about women mentioning berit and Torah. Rema, on the other hand, rules that women in practice should not recite berit and Torah.

Rema likely has in mind the extended lines referring to these concepts, because they get more personally specific, expressing personal gratitude for circumcision and being taught Torah. Rema’s ruling leaves room for women to skip over these lines.

Even so, Mishna Berura (below) says it is common custom for women to mention both berit and Torah in birkat ha-aretz, even reciting the expanded lines.

Halachic authorities typically justify a woman reciting both berit and Torah by suggesting that she directs her intention in reciting the words in one of three directions, referring to either her husband, her people, or herself:

I. Her Husband Beit Yosef writes that a woman expresses gratitude for berit mila because a man and wife are as one flesh.

This argument could easily extend to a husband’s Torah study. Beit Yosef doesn’t explain what this should mean for an unmarried woman.

II. Her People Meiri writes that a woman recites berit and Torah, having in mind gratitude for them as significant to the whole Jewish people, of which she is a part.

Meiri seems to maintain that women are obligated to mention berit and Torah, a view which has not been widely accepted as halacha.¹⁷ Mishna Berura employs a similar argument, however, to support women reciting them as a matter of custom, notwithstanding Rema’s objection.

Since these rituals are relevant and meaningful to all Jews, and the land belongs to our people as a whole in their merit, a woman can rightly express gratitude for them, taking “us” in a broad sense to mean the Jewish people as a whole. Mishna Berura adds that women also have a degree of obligation in Torah study.

III. Herself Magen Avraham cites birkot ha-Torah as proof that the Torah is given to women, and cites a Talmudic passage to the effect that a woman’s lack of a foreskin may be seen as an inherent circumcision.

On this last reading, both Torah and the covenant are directly relevant to women, and she thus can express personal gratitude for them for them.

Each of these three arguments challenges the suggestion that a woman couldn’t include these lines in her birkat ha-mazon or that we could not obligate women to recite them.

Let’s return to the question of women’s obligation. Although we’ve seen Rashi and Tosafot explain why women’s Torah-level obligation might be in doubt, neither indicates how they themselves rule on the question. A number of other early halachic authorities, however, maintain that women are in fact fully obligated in birkat ha-mazon on a Torah level.¹⁸

Unlike the vast majority of early authorities, Rabbeinu Yona rules definitively that women are not obligated on a Torah level. Unfortunately, he does not explain his rationale.¹⁹

Others, including Rambam and Rosh (below), write that the matter is unresolved:

Following this view, Shulchan Aruch considers the matter of a woman’s Torah obligation to be in doubt.

Everyone agrees that women are obligated in birkat ha-mazon at least on a rabbinic level. Leaving this issue as a matter of doubt has practical ramifications in just a few scenarios: when a woman is unsure whether she recited birkat ha-mazon, when a man might wish to rely on a woman to discharge his obligation, or when a woman might have left out an addition to birkat ha-mazon. It also has some relevance to the laws of zimmun. Let’s look now at practical rulings for the first three scenarios:

I. Doubt if Recited What should a woman do if she is unsure whether she has recited birkat ha-mazon after a meal? If she were clearly obligated on a Torah level, then she would repeat it, since we say “safek de-orayta le-chumra,” that we are stringent about cases of doubt regarding Torah-level halachot.

In the case of a woman, we have a sefek sefeika, a compound doubt, which Halacha often treats with leniency. For that reason, Rabbi Akiva Eiger rules leniently that a woman in this case need not recite birkat ha-mazon for what may be the second time:

Chayyei Adam, however, rejects this argument. A matter unresolved or in dispute is not necessarily a matter of doubt. He maintains that a woman who eats to satiety and is not sure if she recited birkat ha-mazon must then recite it.

Alternatively, we might say about both this case and the previous one, of a woman discharging another’s Torah-level obligation, that there is such a preponderance of early authorities who view women as obligated on a Torah level that we should rely on them. This is the view of Rav Chayyim ben Attar:

Mishna Berura writes in his Bei’ur Halacha that a woman uncertain about whether she recited birkat ha-mazon can rely on the opinions that she is obligated on a Torah level in these cases:

II. Discharging a Man’s Obligation A person can discharge another’s halachic obligation only when their own obligation is equal to or greater than that of the person whose obligation is being discharged. So, if a woman is only obligated on a rabbinic level in birkat ha-mazon, then she can only discharge rabbinic-level obligations in birkat ha-mazon, e.g. a man’s when he eats to less than satiety.²⁰

The Talmud explores women discharging men’s obligations as part of its unresolved attempt to clarify the nature of a woman’s obligation.

We have seen that Shulchan Aruch rules that a woman’s Torah-level obligation is in doubt. It follows that a woman should not recite birkat ha-mazon for a man if he has eaten to satiety and is thus certainly obligated on a Torah level.²¹

Another possible reason for this is the Ge’onic argument that a woman’s omission of berit and Torah would affect her ability to discharge a man’s obligation. After the fact, though, if a woman has recited birkat ha-mazon for a man, we do consider her to have fulfilled his obligation, at least if she mentioned berit and Torah.²²

III. Additions Omitted A final practical question is what a woman should do if she omits the paragraphs ya’aleh ve-yavo or retzeh on days when they are added to birkat ha-mazon. In these cases, the rule of thumb is to repeat birkat ha-mazon when the sanctity of the day makes the meal itself obligatory.

The obligatory meals for this purpose are the main meals of Yom Tov and Shabbat, with the exception of se’uda shelishit, on which omission of ya’aleh ve-yavo or retzeh leads to repeating birkat ha-mazon.²³

Women are obligated in the Shabbat meals, so it follows that women should repeat retzeh if omitted following the first two Shabbat meals. Women’s obligation in Yom Tov meals – and thus, whether she needs to repeat birkat ha-mazon if she forgot ya’aleh ve-yavo – is subject to dispute. Here, though, the view of Rabbi Akiva Eiger has become prominent. He maintains that, while women are obligated in simchat Yom Tov, women are exempt from oneg Yom Tov because it is positive and time-bound. Since in his view the obligation to eat bread on Yom Tov derives from oneg Yom Tov, women need not repeat birkat ha-mazon after omitting ya’aleh ve-yavo. The exception is leil ha-seder, when a woman is obligated to eat matza:

Other halachic authorities, including Kaf Ha-chayyim, maintain that a woman never need repeat birkat ha-mazon upon omitting an addition, because a woman’s obligation to recite birkat ha-mazon might be rabbinic:

There is no clear consensus on this point. Since repeating birkat ha-mazon when not necessary raises questions of beracha le-vatala, a beracha in vain, it is best for a woman in this situation to try and discharge her obligation by hearing someone else recite birkat ha-mazon when possible.

Concluding Thoughts

We have compelling arguments to view women as obligated on a Torah level or to view that obligation as a matter in doubt. Though we also have plausible arguments in the other direction, few halachic authorities rule decisively that a woman is obligated only rabbinically. The sides of this doubt are not equal.

The practical ramifications of this debate are limited, and (with the exception of zimmun) don’t arise all that often. Since there is no question that a woman is obligated to recite birkat ha-mazon, her experience of reciting it is no different than it would be were she indisputably obligated on a Torah level. The questions arise specifically regarding whether she recites or omits mention of berit mila and Torah, the meaning that she finds relating to them and to the land, and whether she may discharge a man’s obligation in it.

Sensitive both to this halacha and to how it might have felt for his wife, Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, a leading halachic decisor in twentieth-century America, reportedly created an intimate ritual at the end of their birkat ha-mazon.²⁴

Within the bounds of Halacha, Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin found a way for his wife to maximize her spiritual satisfaction, and made an active and ongoing commitment to facilitate it.