Discharging Another’s Obligations

We can fulfill certain mitzvot with the help of other people. For example, one person can separate challa for another or give tzedaka on another’s behalf. A shochet can slaughter an animal for others to eat, and a mohel can circumcise a baby boy at his father’s behest.

Yet we have to fulfill some other mitzvot personally, like eating matza or shaking a lulav. Which mitzvot do we need to perform ourselves, and which ones can be performed through someone else?

Or Zarua suggests that we can distinguish between mitzvot that are result-oriented, where what matters is the outcome (like separating challa), and those that are process-oriented, where the action itself is significant (like shaking a lulav).

In a result-oriented mitzva, a third party can achieve the same result as the person for whom they are acting. In a process-oriented mitzva, the action itself is the mitzva, and relying on someone else’s action would remove the person from the essential mitzva process. For this reason, one person cannot stand in for another in process-oriented mitzvot.

Although Or Zarua uses the term ‘shaliach,’ a halachic agent, it is by no means clear that he means to require formal shelichut in every instance, if at all. Rashba, for example, teaches that formal agency is unnecessary in at least some cases, such as tevilat keilim (immersing vessels), where who performs the action does not affect the result:

This is not to say that Or Zarua’s principle always holds true or that all result-oriented mitzvot are a free-for-all. Sometimes halachic parameters specific to a given mitzva determine who can perform it, which naturally affects who can perform it for another. For example, a minor needs adult supervision when immersing vessels. A man, who himself is circumcised, is preferred as a mohel.

On the whole, though, gender does not make a difference. Women and men can help each other discharge many mitzvot.

People routinely discharge each other’s obligations in mitzvot that entail verbal recitation, like making kiddush or reading megilla. Surely these are more about process than result. How can one person discharge another’s obligation in verbal mitzvot?

The classic answer invokes yet another Talmudic principle:

Shafan, a scribe, recited the scroll aloud to King Yoshiyahu. Yet the prophetess Chulda referred to the scroll that the king recited. From here, we derive the principle that one who hears is equivalent to one who speaks. This applies during hallel, when the chazan begins the recitation of a verse and the congregation completes it, which establishes the principle of shomei’a ke-oneh: hearing is halachically significant.

What exactly does shomeia ke-oneh mean? That depends on how strongly we take the prefix “ke-,” like, and there are two main options:

I. Listening is just like speaking. I.e., a person who listens to another reciting a beracha is considered to have actually recited the beracha. Tosafot seem to understand shomei’a ke-oneh in this way.¹

II. Listening’s effect is similar to speaking’s. Listening is an alternate way to discharge an obligation that entails vocalization. One who listens to another person reciting a beracha has fulfilled the obligation, though not the same way as the one who recites it. Rashi seems to take this view.

Rashi writes that the shomei’a ke-oneh “did not respond.” This implies that he is not really an oneh, but he does discharge the obligation through his act of listening. ²

Caveats

Note that Rashi includes a caveat: to fulfill a mitzva via shomei’a ke-oneh, one must hear with intent. In his ruling on the matter, Rambam adds two additional caveats:

According to Rambam, one must hear the full beracha. Furthermore, the person reciting the beracha needs to be obligated in that beracha at least on the same level as the listener whose obligation is discharged. The classic source of this halacha is the mishna in Rosh Ha-shana:

If a person is not obligated in a given mitzva, his or her voluntary mitzva act can be considered a fulfillment of that mitzva. Yet it remains halachically distinct from the act of someone who is subject to the obligation. A person can discharge another’s obligation in any mitzva only if his or her obligation is on the same level as the other’s, or higher.

For example, Leah can recite kiddush for men and women because she is obligated in kiddush on a Torah level like them. She can recite it for her minor children, who have a lesser, rabbinic level of obligation for education. But if Leah’s son, Yehuda, is a minor, he may not recite kiddush for Leah, because he does not yet have a Torah-level obligation.

Women Discharging Obligations

Can a woman discharge a man’s obligation in a mitzva? If the determining factor is level of obligation, then she should be able to – as long as her level of obligation is equivalent to or higher than his. In the context of a debate about women’s level of obligation in birkat ha-mazon, the Talmud assumes that this is the case.

The Talmud suggests that if women are obligated in birkat hamazon on a Torah level, then a woman can discharge anyone else’s obligation, men’s included. If women are only obligated on a rabbinic level, then a woman cannot discharge a man’s Torah-level obligation, because she is not considered ‘obligated in the matter’ on a Torah level. We can infer that, when a woman’s obligation is on the same level as or higher than a man’s, she can discharge his obligation.

When should a person turn to someone else to discharge a verbal obligation?³ Shomei’a ke-oneh is an effective mechanism for allowing another person’s words to count on one’s behalf. But shouldn’t a person prefer to perform a mitzva herself or himself? The Talmud seems to teach precisely that:

According to Rambam, this principle applies to all mitzvot, and we learn from it that mitzva fulfillment is more complete when a person undertakes it on his or her own:

Even assuming that discharging another’s obligation does not require formal halachic agency, it seems preferable for each individual to take personal responsibility for performing mitzvot!⁴ There are two primary reasons why a person would nevertheless seek to discharge a mitzva obligation via another person:

I. Glorifying God The Tosefta teaches that when a group of people all perform the same mitzva together, one person should recite a beracha for everyone:

So, for example, while each person should recite his own berachot on laying his set of tefillin, only one person recites the beracha on a communal megilla reading, and those present listen to the “single mitzva” reading.⁵ Why? The Talmud invokes a verse from Mishlei to explain:

“Be-rov am hadrat melech” becomes the name for the halachic principle that according to which we glorify God when we join together to perform ritual acts.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach reportedly maintained that be-rov am hadrat melech applies to groups of women reciting berachot as well,⁶ based on the halachic discussion of women’s zimmun, three or more women reciting an invitation that groups together their recitation of birkat ha-mazon:

If there is a group performing a mitzva together, one woman can recite a beracha for everyone.

Note that Rav Shlomo Zalman singles out the case of a woman reciting a beracha for a group of women . He seems to assume that in a mixed group, a woman will not recite the beracha in fulfillment of be-rov am hadrat melech. (We look at the reason why here.)

II. Helping Each Other Sometimes a person needs help fulfilling a verbal mitzva. Not everyone has the knowledge or ability to perform mitzvot that include recitation. Rashi’s comment preceding the excerpt quoted above makes this clear:

For Rashi, a classic case of shomei’a ke-oneh is one in which the listener is otherwise unable to perform the mitzva.

Why should we help each other out in this type of situation? Ahavat Yisrael, the commandment to love our fellow Jew establishes that we should assist each other in general. But there is an additional principle at work here, known as areivut.

Areivut literally means guarantorship. For example, Rachel might guarantee Leah’s loan. In a broader sense, Rabbi Yehuda Ha-nasi teaches that all Jews became guarantors for each other at Sinai.

The Talmud teaches that this broader areivut extends to the realm of mitzvot, in that Jews are responsible, whenever possible, to prevent each other from sinning.⁷ Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona add that Jews are charged with the responsibility to help each other fulfill mitzvot based on areivut.

A person can discharge a verbal mitzva for others even if he has already discharged his own obligation. This principle, known as “yatza motzi,” is a classic application of areivut:

Even if Reuven has already recited kiddush, areivut permits him to recite it again for the sake of Shimon, to help enable Shimon to fulfill his obligation, much as a guarantor would pay off his loan for him!

Rabbi Akiva Eiger clarifies the applicability of areivut to women. He wrote in response to questions initially raised about Rosh’s position:⁸

This view, that women are included in all aspects of areivut including yatza motzi, is widely accepted by halachic authorities, as can be inferred for example by rulings of Magen Avraham,⁹ Mishna Berura,¹⁰ and Bach.¹¹

Aruch Ha-shulchan summarizes:

If others require our help to fulfill a verbal mitzva, we should help them because of areivut and ahavat Yisrael. Both apply to women.

Birchot Ha-nehenin

Much of this halachic discussion also applies to birchot ha-nehenin, the berachot we recite upon eating, drinking, smelling spices, etc. These berachot acknowledge God’s sovereignty over the world and take God’s leave for enjoying physical pleasures.¹³ A person can discharge these, too, for another, based on shomei’a ke-oneh (or, in some cases, on a special halacha of establishing a meal in a group, chabura).

In the case of birchot ha-nehenin, the principle of yatza motzi does not work. We ordinarily cannot recite birchot ha-nehenin them without taking pleasure ourselves, and areivut only kicks in when we need to help a fellow Jew fulfill an obligation, which most acts of eating are not.

Rachel can recite ha-motzi for Leah when they eat a weekday lunch together, because she too will partake of the bread. A person who is not eating bread, however, cannot recite ha-motzi for someone who is. Let’s say they eat that lunch with Ya’akov, Rachel’s husband. The fundamental halacha is that she can recite ha-motzi for him, too.

Based on what we have learned, there should be no bar to a woman discharging a man’s obligation whenever she is obligated on the same (or a higher) level. Next, we explore the halachic discussion around when a woman should put her ability to discharge a man’s obligations into practice.