Back to User’s Guide I: Oral Torah
How did our sages derive Halacha from the Torah? What interpretive tools did they use, and how did they work? How did our sages balance received tradition with halachic innovation?
Editor’s Note : In this series, Halacha: A User’s Guide, we take a step back from women and mitzvot to provide an accessible introduction to some of the main building blocks of Halacha. This piece presents one of many possible explanations of these issues.
In Brief
How did our sages interpret the meaning of the Torah’s laws?
Rabbi Moshe di Trani (Mabit) lists nine methods of rabbinic interpretation, including: careful reading, less obvious implications of textual details, textual superfluities, logical inferences from known halacha, textual juxtapositions, the “Thirteen Principles of Interpretation,” Divrei Kabbala—verses in the Prophets that clarify Torah law, Halacha Le-Moshe Mi-Sinai—transmitted by oral tradition alone, and oral traditions that can be connected back to the text after the fact.
Can the rationale behind a biblical law affect its application?
Yes, but only when the rationale for a given mitzva is clearly written or implied in the Torah.
What are the “Thirteen Principles” (the yud-gimmel middot)?
An early group of rules employed by the sages, for example:
- Kal va-chomer, drawing an inference from a more lenient case to a strict one.
- Gezeira Shava, deriving a law from one verse and applying it to another due to a similar word or word root in both.
- Binyan Av, inferring global principles from one verse or from two verses with something in common.
- Kelal u-frat u-chlal, when a verse states a general law, then gives specific examples of that law, and then repeats the law in a generic way, the law is applied only in cases similar to the examples mentioned.
- Davar Ha-lameid me-inyano, something learned from its context.
Are there limits to how these principles may be deployed?
- In Rashi’s view, most of the middot are bound by tradition, and otherwise would not be considered authoritative.
- In Tosafot’s view, most of the middot are logical tools that our sages can apply freely to interpret the text.
Do the tools of interpretation reveal previously unknown halachot? Or do they reinforce existing oral tradition?
Both may be in play. It is often unclear whether a given halacha is a product of an interpretation or just linked via interpretation to the biblical text.
In Depth
Rav Mordechai Friedman, Ilana Elzufon, Shayna Goldberg, Laurie Novick, eds.
Methods of Interpretation
How did our sages interpret the meaning of the Torah’s laws? What tools did they use to apply those laws to novel and varied situations? Previously, we discussed the need for and value of the Oral Torah, Torah She-be’al Peh, alongside Biblical texts, Torah She-bichtav. Now we’ll discuss how Torah She-be’al Peh works.
The Mishna discusses how different areas of halacha in the oral canon differ in their degree of connection to the written text of the Torah:
משנה חגיגה א:ח
היתר נדרים פורחין באויר ואין להם על מה שיסמכו הלכות שבת חגיגות והמעילות הרי הם כהררים התלויין בשערה שהן מקרא מועט והלכות מרובות הדינין והעבודות הטהרות והטומאות ועריות יש להן על מי שיסמכו הן הן גופי תורה:
Mishna Chagiga 1:8
The laws of releasing vows float in the air, and do not have anything [in the verses] upon which to rely. The laws of Shabbat, festival sacrifices, and misappropriation of sacred property, are like mountains hanging by a hair—they have few verses and many halachot. [Not explicitly written monetary] laws, sacrifices, [laws of] purity and impurity and forbidden relationships—they have something [in the verses] upon which to rely. These [and] these [categories] are essential to the Torah.
As the Mishna colorfully describes, the Torah presents some laws in great detail, while other Torah-level halachot have fewer texts to rely on, and thus require more analysis and extrapolation. Still other halachot are derived almost entirely within the interpretive frameworks of the Oral tradition, from very few words in the biblical text.
In the Tanya, Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi compares this interpretive process to the conception and birth of a child. Just as a woman receives seed and then produces a child, Torah She-be’al Peh takes the cryptic and relatively short biblical text that we’ve received and develops it into a body of halacha:
תניא, אגרת הקודש כט
כל מצות שבתורה בין מצוות עשה בין מצות לא תעשה אינן גלויות וידועות ומפורשות אלא על ידי תורה שבעל פה כמצות לא תעשה שנאמר בשבת לא תעשה מלאכה ולא פירש מה היא מלאכה ובתורה שבעל פה נתפרש שהן ל”ט מלאכות הידועות ולא טלטול אבנים וקורות כבידות וכיוצא בהן הן כל המצות בין מצוות עשה בין מצוות ל”ת [=לא תעשה] הן סתומות ולא מפורשות וגלויות וידועות אלא על ידי תורה שבעל פה ומשום הכי כתיב על תורה שבעל פה אל תטוש תורת אמך כמו שאיתא בזהר משום שעל דרך משל כמו שכל אברי הולד כלולים בטיפת האב בהעלם גדול והאם מוציאתו לידי גילוי בלידתה ולד שלם ברמ”ח אברים ושס”ה גידים ככה ממש כל רמ”ח מצוות עשה ושס”ה מצוות לא תעשה באים מההעלם אל הגילוי בתורה שבעל פה
Tanya, Iggeret Ha-kodesh 29
All the mitzvot in the Torah, both positive and negative, are not revealed and known and explicit except through the Oral Torah. Such as the negative mitzva stated with regard to Shabbat, “You shall not do any work,” which does not explain what is work [that is prohibited]. And in the Oral Torah, it explains that they are the thirty-nine defined [categories of creative] work [that are prohibited], and not [strenuous labor such as] carrying rocks and heavy beams. And all mitzvot, whether positive or negative, are similarly ambiguous and undefined, and are revealed and known only by means of the Oral Torah. Therefore, it is written about the Oral Torah, ‘do not spurn the teachings of your mother,’ as it is stated in the Zohar, because by way of analogy, it is like all body parts of a child are encapsulated in the drop [of semen] of the father in a greatly concealed manner, and the mother brings it into revelation by birthing a child complete with 248 limbs and 365 sinews; so too, exactly, all of the 248 positive mitzvot and the 365 negative mitzvot emerge from concealment into revelation through the Oral Torah.
What does that interpretive framework look like?
We find one particularly thorough taxonomy of rabbinic methodology in the work of Rabbi Moshe di Trani (known as Mabit). He lists nine methods of rabbinic interpretation, giving specific examples of laws derived through each one. We’ll look at them in two groups, starting with the first six methods, which are textual:
קרית ספר הקדמה א
דרכי לימוד הדינים מן התורה על כמה פנים. (א) הראשון מה שהוא כתוב בפירוש בתורה כיציאת עבד עברי בשביעית לחפשי… וכיוצא בהם דברים שנתפרשו בפי[רוש] בתורה והן כמשמען ואינם צריכין לקבלה (ב) השני מה שנלמד ממשמעות הפסוק כמו “[וּבַיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן מִקְרָא קֹדֶשׁ וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי מִקְרָא קֹדֶשׁ יִהְיֶה לָכֶם כָּל מְלָאכָה לֹא יֵעָשֶׂה בָהֶם] אַךְ אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל לְכָל נֶפֶשׁ הוּא לְבַדּוֹ יֵעָשֶׂה לָכֶם” (שמות יב:טז), דמשמע “לכם” לכל צרכיכם… ורוב דרשות הפסוקים הם כענין זה ממשמעות המקרא. (ג) השלישי מיתור המקרא כמו… “גם אתם” לרבות שלוחכם, ‘גם’ מיותר לרבויי. וכן כל לרבויי ולאיתויי שבתלמוד שהם באים מכח יתור המקרא…וכן כל ‘אך’ ו’רק’ וכיוצא בהן דיתירי למיעוטא. (ד) הרביעי סברא כמכניס בשבת דילפינן ליה מסברא ד”מה לי אפוקי [ו]מה לי עיולי” (שבת צו:) וכן הרבה.…(ה) החמישי הקשא …(ו) …הששי משלש עשרה מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהם…
Kiryat Sefer, Introduction, Chapter 1
There are a number of ways to derive laws from the Torah. (1) The first is [reading] what is written explicitly in the Torah, like the freeing of a Hebrew bondsman in the seventh year…and similarly, matters that are explained explicitly in the Torah and are according to their literal meaning, and do not require received tradition [to be understood]. (2) The second is what is learned from inferences from the verse. For example, “[And on the first day, it shall be a holy gathering for you, and on the seventh day it shall be a holy gathering for you. You shall not do any work] except for that which shall be eaten for any person, that alone shall be done for you” (Shemot 12:16). The implication of “for you” is “for all your needs.” …And most derashot [expoundings] of the verses are in that vein, from the implications of Scripture…. (3) The third is [interpreting] superfluous words in the text, like… “also you” as ‘to include your agents.’ [Bava Metzia 22a]. [Here, the] superfluous “also” (gam), is added to include [other cases within the law], and similarly, any [word expounded] in the Talmud to include [cases in the scope of the law] or to bring in [more applications], come on the strength of an extra word in the verse…And so, too, every “but” (ach) and “only” (rak) and the like, that are superfluous to exclude [cases from the law]. (4) The fourth is [applying] logic [to the text]. For example, [the prohibition against] carrying something into a private domain on Shabbat, which is derived by logic, for “what is the difference between bringing something in [explicit in the Torah] and taking it out [not mentioned]” [Shabbat 96b], and there are many like this…. (5) The fifth is [interpreting] juxtapositions… (6) …The sixth is [using one] of the Thirteen Principles by which the Torah is interpreted (shelosh esrei middot she-haTorah nidreshet bahem)…
The first and most basic tool in our rabbinic toolbox is careful reading. The first example Mabit brings is the law of freeing a Hebrew slave, which is clearly described in Shemot, 21:2.1
Other laws require analyzing details and drawing less obvious conclusions from the Torah’s verses. For example, in his description of the second method, Mabit cites a verse referring to Pesach that explicitly states that work is prohibited on the first and seventh days of the holiday, except for the labor of cooking food “for you.” In the Talmud, Rabbi Yehuda interprets “for you” to extend this exception beyond actual cooking and baking, and permit preliminary stages of food preparation that could not be performed in advance of the holiday.2 As Mabit notes, this type of careful textual interpretation is very common.
The third method of interpretation involves identifying textual superfluities and analyzing them. This method is based on the premise that the Torah does not use excess words.3 For example, the verse about separating the priestly gift of teruma uses the word “also,” which the Sages view as allowing not just the owners of produce to separate teruma from it, but also their agents, though the verse does not explicitly mention them.4
The fourth method entails making logical inferences from a known halacha. For example, the prohibition against carrying from a public domain into a private domain on Shabbat is not written or even hinted at anywhere in the text of the Torah. The Sages’ logical inference from the prohibition of carrying things out of a private domain (Shabbat 96b)–and similar inferences–have Torah-level force:
בבא קמא מו:
למה לי קרא? סברא הוא..
Bava Kamma 46b
Why do I need a verse? It is a logical inference…
A fifth method derives halachot from juxtapositions in the text. A classic example comes from a verse in Devarim discussing a case of rape. From the verse’s powerful and jarring juxtaposition of rape and murder, the sages derive that the potential victim in either case may be saved by killing the pursuer.5
The sixth method, laws derived via the “Thirteen Principles of Interpretation,” form a distinct group of hermeneutic principles used by the sages. We’ll look later at these rules and how they work.
The final three methods rest on traditions rooted outside of the text of the Chumash:
קרית ספר הקדמה א
(ז) …השביעי מדברי קבלה גילוי בעלמא למאי דכתיב באוריתא…בעינוי יום הכיפורים דילפינן מדברי קבלה דרחיצה וסיכה ונעילת הסנדל ותשמיש המטה עינוי מיקרו והוי גילוי בעלמא ללישנא דעינוי דכתיב בתורה… (ח) השמיני מהלכה למשה מסיני כשיעורין חציצין ומחיצין הלכה למשה מסיני ואית מינייהו דגמירי להו הכי הלכה למשה מסיני והדר אסמכוה אמקרא (ט) התשיעי משאר תורה שבעל פה שנמסרה למשה בסיני ויש סמך בכתובים אלא שלא היה נלמד ממשמעות הכתובים אם לא היה נאמר לו על פה…
Kiryat Sefer, Introduction, Chapter 1
(7) The seventh is [applying] the words of the Prophets (divrei kabbala), that merely reveal the meaning of [verses in] the Torah…. [For example, from the directive of] afflicting oneself on Yom Kippur, we learn from the words of the Prophets that washing, anointing, wearing [leather] shoes, and sexual relations are called affliction. And this is merely revealing the meaning of the language of affliction used in the Pentateuch…(8) The eighth is [applying] Halacha [transmitted] to Moshe at Sinai, for [the laws of] “measurements, interpositions, and partitions are all Halacha [transmitted] to Moshe at Sinai” (Eiruvin 4a)…and some of them we learn in this way as “Halacha to Moshe at Sinai” and later [the sages] connected them to Scripture. (9) The ninth is the rest of the Oral Torah that was given to Moshe at Sinai, for which there is support in the text, but would not be derived from the meaning of the verse if the [law] had not been stated to him orally.
The seventh method, known as divrei kabbala, employs verses in the Prophets to clarify Torah law. For instance, the Sages clarify the specific acts of affliction that are obligatory on Yom Kippur by drawing on words of the Prophets.
The eighth category of laws, halacha le-Moshe mi-Sinai, are not grounded in text at all, but rather transmitted by oral tradition alone, though they may later be linked to the text of the Torah. Rabbi Yehoshua describes this type of chain of transmission in the Mishna:
משנה עדויות ח:ז
אמר רבי יהושע מקובל אני מרבן יוחנן בן זכאי ששמע מרבו ורבו מרבו הלכה למשה מסיני
Mishna Eiduyot 8:7
Rabbi Yehoshua said: I received it [a halacha] from Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, who heard it from his rabbi, and his rabbi from his rabbi—a halacha le-Moshe mi-Sinai.
The final, ninth category that Mabit discusses refers to laws transmitted orally that, although they could not be derived from the text unassisted, can still be connected back to the text after the fact. We’ll discuss more about this in the next installment of this series.
Reasons for Commandments
Thus far, we’ve discussed quite a few methods of interpreting and deriving halacha from text. What about the reason for a mitzva? Can the ostensible rationale behind a biblical law serve to limit or expand its application?
In the following passage, Rabbi Yehuda uses the rationale behind a law to limit its scope. However, the Talmud states that he does so only because the rationale appears explicitly in the verse.
בבא מציעא קטו.
דתניא (דברים יז, יז) ולא ירבה לו נשים ר’ יהודה אומר מרבה הוא ובלבד שלא יהו מסירות את לבו…לעולם ר’ יהודה לא דריש טעמא דקרא ושאני הכא דמפרש קרא ולא ירבה לו נשים ולא יסור מאי טעמא לא ירבה לו נשים משום דלא יסור.
Bava Metzia 115a
For the baraita teaches: “And he [a king] shall not have many wives” (Devarim 17:17). Rabbi Yehuda says, he may have many wives, provided that they do not lead his heart astray…. Certainly, Rabbi Yehuda [generally] does not expound the reason behind a verse. But here, it is different, because the verse explicitly states, “and he shall not have many wives lest [his heart] be led astray.” [The verse is explicating] what is the reason he may not have many wives, because [of the danger that] he will be led astray.
Even when the reason is not explicit in the verse, but is strongly implied, the sages may take it into account. For instance, the Torah prohibits muzzling an ox when it threshes:
דברים כה:ד
לֹא תַחְסֹם שׁוֹר בְּדִישׁוֹ:
Devarim 25:4
You shall not muzzle an ox as it threshes.
Although the verse does not present a reason for this prohibition, the most obvious explanation is that the Torah is looking out for the animal’s welfare. The Talmudic sages take this rationale into account in debating whether this halacha applies when eating would harm the animal:
בבא מציעא צ.
בעו מיניה מרב ששת היתה אוכלת ומתרזת מהו משום דמעלי לה הוא והא לא מעלי לה או דלמא דחזיא ומצטערא והא חזיא ומצטערא
Bava Metzia 90a
The [sages] asked Rav Sheshet: If [the animal] was eating from the produce and getting diarrhea, what is [the halacha]? Is [the reason for not muzzling an animal] for its benefit, and this [eating] is not providing benefit? Or perhaps the reason [for the prohibition] is because [the animal] sees [food] and is distressed [when it cannot eat it], and this one [also] sees [food] and will be distressed [if it is muzzled]
Implicit in the Talmud’s question is the premise that the rationale behind this prohibition determines how we apply it. Moreover, given that no objections to this premise are raised, the passage indicates that halachic interpretation gives weight to the rationale for a mitzva, even when the rationale is clearly inferred but not explicit. Rabbeinu Asher (Rosh) explains:
תוספות הרא”ש בבא מציעא צ.
אפילו למאן דלא דריש טעמא דקרא… הכא פשיטא דרחמנא לא אזהר אלא לטובתה של בהמה אי משום דמעלו לה אי משום דלא ליצטער.
Tosfot Ha-Rosh, Bava Metzia 90a
Even according to those who don’t expound the reason behind the verse…here it is obvious that the verse prohibited only for the good of the animal, either because it will benefit, or so that it will not be distressed [by being muzzled].
In summary, when the rationale for a given mitzva is clear , or is clearly implied from the biblical text, it can be used to define the scope of law.6
Principles of Interpretation
So far, we’ve looked at several distinct methods of rabbinic interpretation: close reading, analyzing textual irregularities, and logical inferences from the text. Mabit identified these methods based on his vast knowledge of rabbinic works. The sixth refers to the “Thirteen Principles,” an early group of rules employed by the sages.
Such collections of rules appear in tannaitic sources in a couple of different iterations. The earliest listing is attributed to Hillel the Elder:
תוספתא סנהדרין ז: ה
שבע מדות דרש הלל לפני זקני בתירה (א) ק”ו [=קל וחומר] (ב) וגזרה שוה (ג) ובנין אב וכתוב אחד (ד) ובנין אב ושני כתובים (ה) וכלל ופרט וכלל (ו) וכיוצא בו ממקום אחר (ז) דבר הלמד מענינו. אלו שבע מדות שדרש הלל הזקן לפני זקני בתירה.
Tosefta Sanhedrin 7:5
Hillel expounded seven rules before the elders of Beteira: (1) kal va-chomer [a fortiori reasoning; i.e., drawing an inference from a more lenient case to a stricter one] (2) and gezeira shava [deriving a law from one case to another due to the same word root being used in both verses] (3) and binyan av ve-katuv echad [inferring a global principle from one verse] (4) and binyan av u-shnei ketuvim [inferring a global principle from two verses] (5) and kelal u-frat u-chlal: [a general statement followed by a particular case and then by another general statement] (6) and kayotzei bo mi-makom acher [something similar in a different place] (7) and davar ha-lameid me-inyano [something learned from its context]. These are the seven rules that Hillel the Elder expounded before the elders of Beteira.
Here are some examples of each of these rules in action:
(1) Kal Va-chomer
Drawing an inference from a more lenient case to a strict one. Kal va-chomer appears in the text of the Torah itself. For example, at the end of Parashat Be-ha’alotecha, Miriam is stricken with tzara’at in punishment for speaking ill of Moshe. Moshe prays for her to be healed, and God responds:
במדבר יב:יד
וַיֹּאמֶר ה’ אֶל מֹשֶׁה וְאָבִיהָ יָרֹק יָרַק בְּפָנֶיהָ הֲלֹא תִכָּלֵם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים תִּסָּגֵר שִׁבְעַת יָמִים מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה וְאַחַר תֵּאָסֵף:
Bemidbar 12:14
And God said to Moshe: If her father had just spit in her face, would she not be shamed for seven days? Let her be quarantined outside the camp for seven days, and afterwards she shall be brought in.
The verse is drawing an analogy from the more ordinary case of a human father showing anger to his daughter to the more serious case of Miriam being punished by God. If in the former case, the daughter would have to bear the consequences for a week, it follows that Miriam should suffer her punishment for angering God for at least as long.
(2) Gezeira Shava
Deriving a law from one verse and applying it to another due to a similar word or word root in both. An example of gezeira shava in action is the requirement to eat in the sukka on the first night of Sukkot:
סוכה כז:
אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי שמעון בן יהוצדק נאמר כאן חמשה עשר ונאמר חמשה עשר בחג המצות מה להלן לילה הראשון חובה מכאן ואילך רשות אף כאן לילה הראשון חובה מכאן ואילך רשות
Sukka 27b
Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: It says here [with regard to Sukkot] “the fifteenth” and it says “the fifteenth” [with regard to] Pesach. Just as over there, it is an obligation on the first night [of Pesach to eat matza], so too, here, it is an obligation on the first night [of Sukkot to eat a meal in the sukka]; from then on, it is optional.
On Pesach, there is only an obligation to eat matza on the first night of the holiday, the fifteenth of Nissan,7 at the seder. For the rest of the holiday, if one wants to eat grain-based products,8 one must eat matza rather than chametz; but if one wants to go for the rest of the seven days without eating any grains, one may do so.9 Similarly, on Sukkot, the obligation to eat in the sukka only exists on the first night, the fifteenth of Tishrei.10 After that, it is optional, depending on one’s desire to eat a meal. The usage of the same word, “fifteen,” in these two contexts is the basis for drawing a legal analogy between the halachot of eating on the first nights of Pesach and Sukkot.
(3) Binyan Av Ve-katuv Echad
Inferring a global principle from a single verse. Chapter fifteen in Sefer Vayikra speaks of the laws of impurity relating to the zav, a man with an abnormal genital emission.
These verses give us two examples of items to which a zav transmits ritual impurity by using them: an object on which he lies down (mishkav), or an object on which he sits (moshav).11 The midrash extrapolates a general rule from the fact that these two examples, specifically, were used by the text, seeking what they have in common:
ספרא, ברייתא דרבי ישמעאל
לא הרי המשכב כהרי המושב ולא המושב כהרי המשכב. הצד השוה שבהן שהן כלים עשויין לנוח אדם לבד…אף כלים שהן עשויין לנוח אדם לבדו יהא הזב מטמא אותו ברובו…יצא המרכב שהוא עשוי לסיבלון אחר.
Sifra, Baraita de-Rabbi Yishmael
An item for lying down (mishkav) differs from an item for sitting (moshav), and an item for sitting differs from an item for lying down. The common denominator between them: that they are implements made only for a person’s comfort …so too, [only] implements that are made only for a person’s comfort are rendered impure should a zav [use the implement to support] most of his [weight]…this excludes a tarkav [a large measuring instrument], which is made for carrying something else [for measuring, rather than for carrying a person in comfort].
The common denominator between objects used for sleeping and for sitting is that they are designed for physical comfort. The midrash thus infers a general Torah-level rule from the verses: only implements designed specifically for physical comfort can contract impurity from the sleeping or sitting of a zav.
(4) Binyan Av U-shnei Ketuvim
Inferring a global principle from two verses. This rule involves looking at two separate verses that have something in common. Looking at each verse on its own would not give us enough information to infer a general rule; but when we put both verses together, a pattern emerges.
For example, here is a passage about the commandment for Aharon to light the Menora in the Mishkan:
ויקרא כד:ב-ג
צַו אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְיִקְחוּ אֵלֶיךָ שֶׁמֶן זַיִת זָךְ כָּתִית לַמָּאוֹר לְהַעֲלֹת נֵר תָּמִיד: מִחוּץ לְפָרֹכֶת הָעֵדֻת בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד יַעֲרֹךְ אֹתוֹ אַהֲרֹן מֵעֶרֶב עַד בֹּקֶר לִפְנֵי ה’ תָּמִיד חֻקַּת עוֹלָם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם:
Vayikra 24:2-3
Command the children of Israel, and they shall bring you pure olive oil, crushed, for lighting, to light a lamp continually. Outside the curtain of testimony, in the Tent of Meeting, Aharon shall set it up, from evening until morning, before God continually, an everlasting statute for all your generations.
Though the passage starts off with “Command the children of Israel,” its ending makes clear that this command to light the Menora is not just for the children of Israel who were alive at that time, in the desert, but “for all your generations.” From this verse, we are left wondering regarding the status of other commands given to Moshe. Are they also “for all your generations”? Or just for the Jews in the desert?
Enter passage number two, about the laws of sending impure individuals outside of the camp:
במדבר ה:ב-ג
צַו אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וִישַׁלְּחוּ מִן הַמַּחֲנֶה כָּל צָרוּעַ וְכָל זָב וְכֹל טָמֵא לָנָפֶשׁ: מִזָּכָר עַד נְקֵבָה תְּשַׁלֵּחוּ אֶל מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה תְּשַׁלְּחוּם וְלֹא יְטַמְּאוּ אֶת מַחֲנֵיהֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי שֹׁכֵן בְּתוֹכָם:
Bemidbar 5:2-3
Command the children of Israel, and they shall send out from the camp any tzarua [person with tzara’at]or zav [man with bloody emissions] or anyone impure from contact with the dead. Male or female, you shall send them out, outside the camp you shall send them, and they shall not defile your camp, in which I dwell in their midst.
This passage, as well, is introduced by the phrase “Command the children of Israel.” And elsewhere, the Torah tells us that these laws of impurity apply for all generations:
במדבר, יט:כ-כא
וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִטְמָא וְלֹא יִתְחַטָּא וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא מִתּוֹךְ הַקָּהָל כִּי אֶת מִקְדַּשׁ ה’ טִמֵּא מֵי נִדָּה לֹא זֹרַק עָלָיו טָמֵא הוּא: וְהָיְתָה לָהֶם לְחֻקַּת עוֹלָם…
Bemidbar, 19:20-21
And a man that becomes impure and does not purify himself [before entering the Sanctuary], that soul shall be cut off from within the congregation, because he has defiled the Sanctuary of God, for the sprinkling waters were not sprinkled upon him, he is impure. And it shall be for them an everlasting statute…
By putting these passages together, we can see the pattern: any time a mitzva in the Torah is introduced by “command the children of Israel”, the mitzva applies for all time:
ספרא, ברייתא דרבי ישמעאל
לא פרשת הנרות כהרי פרשת שלוח טמאים ולא פרשת שלוח טמאים כהרי פרשת הנרות. הצד השוה שבהן שהם ב”צו” מיד ולדורות, אף כל דבר שהוא בצו יהא מיד ולדורות.
Sifra, Baraita De-Rabbi Yishmael
The passage [in the Torah] on the lamps is not like the passage on sending out the impure, and the passage on sending out the impure is not like the passage on the lamps. The common denominator [between these two passages] is that they have [the word] “Command,” and [the laws in them apply] immediately and for all generations; so too, any passage which has [the word] “command” [applies] immediately and for all generations.
(5) Kelal U-frat U-chlal
[When] a general rule is followed by a particular case and then followed by a rule.When a verse states a general law, then gives specific examples of that law, and then repeats the law in a generic way, the rule of “kelal u-frat u-chlal” dictates that the law be applied only in cases similar to (but not necessarily the same as) the specific examples mentioned.
One example is a verse about the second tithe (ma’aser sheni), which was a portion of produce the owner was obligated to consume in Jerusalem.
דברים יד:כו
וְנָתַתָּה הַכֶּסֶף בְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר תְּאַוֶּה נַפְשְׁךָ בַּבָּקָר וּבַצֹּאן וּבַיַּיִן וּבַשֵּׁכָר וּבְכֹל אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁאָלְךָ נַפְשֶׁךָ וְאָכַלְתָּ שָּׁם לִפְנֵי ה’ אֱלֹקיךָ וְשָׂמַחְתָּ אַתָּה וּבֵיתֶךָ:
Devarim 14:26
And you shall use the money for whatever your soul desires, for cattle and for sheep and for wine and strong drink, and for whatever your soul requires. And you shall eat [it] there, before the Lord your God, and rejoice, you and your household.
The verse first states a rather vague, general directive: the money must be used for “whatever your soul desires.” Then, the verse gives specific examples: animals, wine, and strong drink. Finally, the verse gives another generic-sounding requirement, “whatever your soul requires.”
Applying the rule of klal u-frat u-chlal to this verse, we learn that one may only use ma’aser sheni to buy foodstuffs similar to the particular examples in the verse.
ספרא, ברייתא דרבי ישמעאל
“ונתת הכסף בכל אשר תאוה נפשך” כלל, “בבקר ובצאן ביין ובשכר” פרט. “ובכל אשר תשאלך נפשך” חזר וכלל. כלל ופרט וכלל אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט. לומר לך מה הפרט מפורש, דבר שהוא וולד וולדות הארץ וגדולי קרקע, אף אין לי אלא כל דבר שהוא וולד וולדות הארץ וגדולי קרקע. יצאו כמהין ופטריות.
Sifra, Baraita De-Rabbi Yishmael
“And you shall use the money for whatever your soul desires”—a general statement. “For cattle and for sheep, for wine and for strong drink”—particulars. “And for whatever your soul requires”—again, a general statement. [When there is such a pattern of] “general statement, particulars, [and again a] general statement”—the rule is in accordance with the particulars. To teach you—just as the particulars stated are products—products of the ground, or things that are brought forth from products of the ground [i.e., plants, or animals that eat plants], so too I can [use for ma’aser sheni] only anything that is a product—a product of the ground, or something brought forth from the products of the ground. This excludes truffles and mushrooms [which are neither animals nor plants].
(6) Ka-yotzei bo mi-makom acher
There is disagreement on how to understand this principle. One possibility is that it’s identical to what is elsewhere termed “shenei ketuvim ha-mach’chishim zeh et zeh, ad sheyavo ha-katuv ha-shlishi u-machri’a beineihem”—“two verses that contradict one another, until a third verse comes and reconciles between them.”12 Here’s an example of this kind of thing in action:
ספרי, במדבר, נשא נח:א
…לפי שהוא אומר “וידבר ה’ אליו מאהל מועד לאמר” (ויקרא א א) שומע אני מאהל מועד ממש. תלמוד לומר “ונועדתי לך שם ודברתי אתך מעל הכפורת” (שמות כה כב)…כיצד יתקיימו שני כתובים הללו? זו מדה בתורה שני כתובים זה כנגד זה והרי הם סותרים זה על ידי זה יתקיימו במקומם עד שיבא כתוב אחר ויכריע ביניהם. מה ת”ל [=תלמוד לומר] “וּבְבֹא מֹשֶׁה אֶל אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לְדַבֵּר אִתּוֹ [וַיִּשְׁמַע אֶת הַקּוֹל מִדַּבֵּר אֵלָיו מֵעַל הַכַּפֹּרֶת אֲשֶׁר עַל אֲרֹן הָעֵדֻת מִבֵּין שְׁנֵי הַכְּרֻבִים…]” (במדבר ז:פט) מגיד הכתוב שהיה משה נכנס ועומד באהל מועד והקול יורד משמי שמים לבין שני הכרובים והוא שומע את הקול מדבר אליו מבפנים.
Sifri, Bemidbar, Naso 58:1
Because it says, “And God spoke to him [Moshe] from the ohel mo’ed, saying” (Vayikra 1:1), I would infer that [God spoke to Moshe] from the ohel mo’ed itself. A[nother] verse teaches, “And I [God] will be known to you [Moshe] there, and speak to you from atop the ark-covering [kaporet],” (Shemot 25:22). How can we uphold both these verses? This is a rule of [interpreting] the Torah: Two corresponding verses, this opposed to that, and behold, they contradict one another, they can only be upheld locally [within the text] until a third verse comes and reconciles between them. What does the verse teach? “And when Moshe came to the ohel moed to speak with Him, [he would hear the voice speaking to him from above the kaporet that was on the ark of testimony from between the two keruvim]…” (Bemidbar 7:89). The verse tells us that Moshe would enter and stand in the ohel mo’ed, and the voice [of God] would descend from highest heaven to between the two keruvim, and [Moshe] would hear the voice speaking to him from within [the Holy of Holies].
Here, we had two verses giving us mixed messages as to where God would speak to Moshe. Would God speak to him in the ohel mo’ed, the outer room of the mishkan, as the verse in Vayikra suggests? Or would the conversation happen in the space that housed the ark and the keruvim, the kodesh hakodashim, as the verse in Shemot describes? The Midrash shows us how this tension can be resolved using third verse which describes God speaking to Moshe, in Bemidbar. This verse shows us both can be true: Moshe would stand in the ohel mo’ed, and hear the voice emerging from between the keruvim in the kodesh hakodashim.
A second interpretation13 of this principle is that it refers to a cluster of other rules relating to interpreting kelal and perat, general statements and specific cases mentioned in scripture.14
(7) Davar Ha-lameid Me-inyano
Something learned from its context: A verse or phrase cannot be read in isolation. The surrounding verses often provide important framing for interpreting it properly. We find an example in this debate between Beruria and a mocking Sadducee:
ברכות י.
אמר לה ההוא צדוקי לברוריא כתיב רני עקרה לא ילדה משום דלא ילדה רני אמרה ליה שטיא שפיל לסיפיה דקרא דכתיב כי רבים בני שוממה מבני בעולה אמר ה’ אלא מאי עקרה לא ילדה רני כנסת ישראל שדומה לאשה עקרה שלא ילדה בנים לגיהנם כותייכו
Berachot 10a
A certain Sadducee said to Beruria: “It is written, ‘rejoice, o barren one, who has not given birth.’ Because she has not given birth, should she rejoice?” She said to him: “Foolish one, look further to the end of the verse, as it says, ‘for the children of the desolate are more numerous than children of the married woman, says God.’ Rather, what does [the verse mean when it says] ‘o barren one, who has not given birth’? [It means to say:] Rejoice, congregation of Israel, which resembles a barren woman in that it did not birth children destined for Gehinnom like you.”
In this passage, Beruria delivers a sharp defense of a biblical verse by pointing out its proper context.15
The best known and most authoritative compilation of rules of rabbinic interpretation is a list of thirteen known as the “Baraita of Rabbi Yishmael,” 16 commonly referred to as the “shelosh esrei middot” — “The Thirteen Principles.”
A close reading of the lists shows that Hillel’s is included in Rabbi Yishmael’s, though there are also some rules in Hillel’s list that Rabbi Yishmael splits into two. For example, Rabbi Yishmael lists three variations of interpreting in light of kelal u-frat.
A few rules that appear in Rabbi Yishmael’s list don’t appear to be referenced on Hillel’s. Why expand the list? One possibility is that Hillel’s list was never meant to be exhaustive, but rather reflected those rules that were used most frequently, or that needed review.17 It is also possible that some new rules were innovated only in the generations of sages after Hillel.18
There were also different schools of interpretation,19 most central the school of Rabbi Yishmael (from which we have the thirteen middot) and the school of Rabbi Akiva. Israeli scholar Anat Raizel explains some of the essential differences:
ענת רייזל, “מבוא למדרשי התנאים.” מתוך מבוא למדרשים, הוצאת מכללת הרצוג-תבונות, אלון שבות תשעג
הדרשות מבית מדרשו של ר’ ישמעאל קרובות יותר למשמעות הפשוטה של הפסוק על פי העיקרון “דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם”, בדרך כלל הן נבנות באמצעות מידות שהתורה נדרשת בהן והן מבוססות על השוואה בין פסוקים שונים. לעומת זאת, הדרשות מבית מדרשו של ר’ עקיבא מתמקדות במשמעות הפסוק הבודד תוך דרישת כל פרט בפסוק, כולל מיליות ואותיות מיוחדות. מהבדל עקרוני זה נובעים הבדלים נוספים בדרכי הדרשה בין שני בתי המדרש. ההבדלים בשיטות הדרשה בין בתי המדרש השונים לא גוררים בהכרח מחלוקות על עצם ההלכה, אלא על האופן שיש ללמוד את ההלכה מן הפסוק.
Anat Raizel, “Introduction to Tannaitic Midrash,” in Introduction to Midrashim (Alon Shevut: Herzog-Tevunot, 5773)
The derashot from the beit midrash of Rabbi Yishmael are closer to the simple meaning of the verse in accordance with the principle, “The Torah spoke in human language.” In general, these are constructed by means of the middot through which the Torah is expounded, and they are based on comparison between different verses. In contrast, the derashot from the beit midrash of Rabbi Akiva focus on the meaning of the individual verse through examination of every detail in the verse, including special wording and letters. From this fundamental difference, additional differences emerge between the systems of derasha of these two batei midrash. The differences in the methods of derasha between the different batei midrash don’t necessarily entail debate about the halacha itself, but rather about the way to learn the halacha from the verse.
On the whole, Mechilta of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, Sifra, and Sifri Devarim are ascribed to the school of Rabbi Akiva, while Mechilta of Rabbi Yishmael, the Mechilta of Arayot and Mechilta of Milu’im (within the Sifra), and Sifri Bemidbar are ascribed to the school of Rabbi Yishmael.20
The Role of Tradition
Different interpretive schools often reached the same halachic conclusions even through different methods of interpretation. We can wonder—what role did tradition play in deploying the toolbox, and in determining halacha?
Interpretive Methods
Some of the thirteen middot seem like pure logical inferences—kal va-chomer is a prime example of this. Others, like gezeira shava, are more formalistic, and not as intuitive. In that light, it makes sense that the Talmud distinguishes between the ways that kal va-chomer and gezeira shava can be applied:
נידה יט:
אדם דן קל וחומר מעצמו ואין אדם דן גזירה שוה מעצמו
Nidda 19b
A person can derive a kal va-chomer on his own, and a person may not derive a gezeira shava on his own.
Our sages can employ kal va-chomer as logically appropriate. In contrast, one may only employ a gezeira shava when warranted by tradition. Given that most words in the Torah occur multiple times, gezeira shava without the grounding of tradition could lead to grave error.21
What role, exactly, does tradition play in the application of gezeira shava? One might read the Talmud as saying that every aspect of the gezeira shava is dictated by tradition. But how could this be called a method of interpretation if no interpretive work is necessary? And how, then, can we understand debates between the sages about the meaning of a gezeira shava, which indicate limits to the tradition? For these reasons, commentaries clarify that tradition guides, but does not fully dictate, the use of gezeira shava.22
The Talmud had a clear rule about kal va-chomer and gezeira shava. But what about the other middot? Is the assumption that the middot in general are like kal va-chomer, and are logical tools that can be used independently to interpret the biblical text? Or are these tools only effective if guided in some way by tradition?
Rashi believes that all of the thirteen middot, aside from kal va-chomer, must be grounded in tradition:
רש”י סוכה לא. ד”ה לא מקשינן
ולא ניתן לדרוש מעצמו מכל י”ג מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן אלא ק”ו [=קל וחומר]:
Rashi Sukka 31a s.v. lo makshinan
One is not allowed to interpret on one’s own using any of the thirteen middot by which the Torah is expounded except for kal va-chomer.
Tosafot disagree, and maintain that only gezeira shava is circumscribed in this way:
תוספות שם ד”ה ור”י סבר
פי[רש] בקונטרס… ולא ניתן לידרוש מעצמו מכל י”ג מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן אלא קל וחומר ותימה גדולה …אלא כל המדות אדם דן מעצמו חוץ מגזרה שוה דאין דן אלא אם כן למדה מרבו
Tosafot ad loc. s.v. ve-Ri Savar
It is explained in Rashi… One is not allowed to interpret on one’s own using any of the thirteen middot by which the Torah is expounded except for kal va-chomer, and this is very puzzling…rather, a person may apply all of the middot on his own aside from gezeira shava, which a person may not apply except if he learned it from his teacher.
To summarize, in Rashi’s view, most of the middot are bound by tradition, and otherwise would not be considered authoritative. In Tosafot’s view, most of the middot are logical tools that our sages can apply freely to interpret the text.
Midrash Yotzer vs. Midrash Mekayem
The debate of Rashi and Tosafot regarding parameters for employing the tools of interpretation parallels another important debate about the results of interpretation.
There are two main models for viewing halachot derived through the thirteen middot:
I. This model views these halachot as being affirmed via interpretation. Tools of interpretation are used to scaffold the oral law, linking already-known halachot to the biblical text.
II. This model views these halachot as created by the interpretive process. Tools of interpretation are used to clarify nuances in the text, revealing previously unknown halachot.
These two models, midrash yotzer and midrash mekayem, are not mutually exclusive. Rambam describes both kinds of derashot in his categorization of Torah She-be’al Peh:
הקדמת הרמב”ם למשנה
החלק הראשון פירושים מקובלים מפי משה ויש להם רמז בכתוב ואפשר להוציאם בדרך סברא…החלק השלישי הדינין שהוציאו על דרכי הסברא
Rambam, Introduction to the Mishna
The first category are those interpretations received from Moshe, and they have a hint in the text, and it is possible to derive them by way of logic…The third category are the laws derived by logic [alone]
Rambam is telling us that both innovation and reinforcement can be at play in the rabbinic process.
Even so, views on the prevalence of each type of derasha vary. For example, medieval commentator Ralbag argues for the predominance of midrash mekayem:
רלב”ג, הקדמה לספר בראשית
והנה בביאור המצות והשרשים אשר מהם יצאו כל דיניהם אשר התבארו בחכמות התלמודיות, לא יהיה במנהגנו בכל המקומות לסמוך אותם השרשים אל המקומות אשר סמכו אותם חכמי התלמוד באחת מי”ג מדות לפי מנהגם. וזה שהם סמכו אלו הדברים האמתיים המקובלים להם במצות התורה לפסוקים ההם, להיות כדמות רמז ואסמכתא לדברי[ם] ההם, לא שיהיה דעתם שיהיה מוצא אלו הדינין מאלו המקומות. כי כבר יוכל האדם להפך כל דיני התורה בכמו אלו ההקשים עד שאפשר בהם לטהר את השרץ כמו שזכרו ז”ל…. הם אצלם מקובלים איש מפי איש עד משה רבינו ובקשו להם רמז מן הכתוב.
Ralbag, Introduction to Sefer Bereishit
Behold, in clarifying the mitzvot and the principles from which all of their laws that were clarified through Talmudic wisdom emerge, it will not be our practice in every place to have those principles rely on the same place [in the text of the Torah] that the Talmudic sages had them rely, as was their custom, via one of the thirteen middot. That which they had these true matters that they had received regarding mitzvot of the Torah rely on these verses, was to be as a type of hint or mnemonic for their words, not that their view was that the source of these laws would be from these places. For a person could turn all of the laws of the Torah on their head with juxtapositions like these, until it would be possible through them ‘to purify a creeping animal,’ as our Sages mentioned.…They [these laws] were received, one man from another going back to Moshe Rabbeinu, and they searched for a hint from Scripture.
In Ralbag’s view, midrashic tools are chiefly mnemonic devices meant to connect pre-existing oral laws back to verses. Ralbag supports this view by noting that some interpretive methods, such as analyzing the juxtaposition of passages, appear to be open to a variety of interpretations other than the halachic one.
Centuries later, Malbim vehemently disagrees with Ralbag, and argues for the predominance of midrash yotzer:
מלבי”ם, הקדמה לספר ויקרא
…וכאשר שאלנו לדור ראשון ומזקנים נתבונן — מה ענו על זאת? ראינו כי מלבם יוציאו מלים, שהכתובים המובאים לראיה אל ההלכות הם רק ציונים ואסמכתות, אשר הציבו להם ציונים לעורר הזכרון, ועקרי ההלכות היו מקובלות בידם בעל פה. וזה רחוק מאד, כי ראינו שהם שואלים תמיד מנא לך? ומשיבים מקרא פלוני, ומקשים והא האי קרא מבעיא ליה לכדתניא! ומתרצים ומקשים ומפלפלים — שלא יצויר שיקשו כן על דבר שהוא רק רמז וסימן לבד. וכשיש מחלוקת כל אחד מביא ראיה לדעתו מן המקרא ודוחה ראייתו של חברו. והגמרא מפלפל תמיד ביניהם בענין המקרא ומדקדק עד כחוט השערה, וסותר ובונה ומכריע ביניהם מן המקרא. עד שמבואר שעיקר ראייתם הוא מן הכתוב; ששם נוטעו ההלכות, גם שורשו; ולא באו כשורש מארץ ציה… וכי הדרוש הוא לבדו הוא הפשט הפשוט, המיוסד כפי חוקי הלשון האמיתיים והברורים. וכל מקום אשר דרשו חז”ל איזה דרוש יש שם איזה זר היוצא מכללי הלשון, ועל ידי הדרוש ישוב הכתוב לאיתנו כמשפט הלשון וחוקותיו.
Malbim, Introduction to Sefer Vayikra
…If we should inquire about the earlier generations and consider our elders—what did they respond to this? We saw that they brought out words from their hearts, [saying] that the verses brought as proofs for halachot are merely hints and supports created to jog the memory, and that the actual halachot were received orally. This is very far-fetched, for we see that [the Talmudic sages] constantly ask “Mena lach”—“how do you know?” and the response is “from such and such a verse.” And they raise a difficulty: “but this verse is needed for another purpose, as it is taught [in a baraita]!” And so they offer solutions and raise difficulties and argue back and forth. It is inconceivable that they would probe thus about something which is merely a hint and a symbol alone. And when there is a dispute, each one brings proof for his view from the verses, and refutes the proof of his fellow. And the Talmud goes back and forth constantly with regard to the verses, and is exacting to the point of a hair; it dismantles and builds and reconciles, all from the verses. Until it is clear that their proofs are fundamentally from the text. That is where the halachot were planted, and rooted; they did not come like a root from a barren land…that which is expounded from the text is also its plain meaning, as it is established according to the clear and true rules of language. Any place our sages expounded in a certain way, there is some exception to linguistic principles. And through the exposition, the verse is returned to its essence in accordance with the rules and principles of language.
According to Malbim, the interpretive rules are primarily concrete linguistic principles that uncover the true meaning of the text, and can thereby add new laws to the biblical canon. He supports his view by noting the lengths to which the Talmud goes to analyze, question, and resolve these types of interpretation. In his view, this indicates that interpretations based on the middot have inherent power.
Sometimes, the Talmud itself describes a given interpretation as a way of linking already known halachot, post facto, to the text:
ערובין ד.-ד:
אמר רבי חייא בר אשי אמר רב שיעורין חציצין ומחיצין הלכה למשה מסיני שיעורין דאורייתא הוא דכתיב ארץ חטה ושערה וגו’ ואמר רב חנן כל הפסוק הזה לשיעורין נאמר חטה לכדתנן הנכנס לבית המנוגע וכליו על כתיפיו וסנדליו וטבעותיו בידיו הוא והם טמאין מיד היה לבוש כליו וסנדליו ברגליו וטבעותיו באצבעותיו הוא טמא מיד והן טהורין עד שישהא בכדי אכילת פרס פת חיטין ולא פת שעורין מיסב ואוכל בליפתן שעורה דתנן עצם כשעורה מטמא במגע ובמשא ואינו מטמא באהל … אלא הלכתא נינהו ואסמכינהו רבנן אקראי:
Eruvin 4a-b
Rabbi Chiya bar Ashi said that Rav said: halachic measurements, barriers to immersion, and partitions are laws transmitted from Moshe at Sinai [without any hint in the text]. [The Gemara asks:] Halachic measurements [are not derived from the text]!? They are derived from the Torah itself! As it is written, “A land of wheat and barley,” etc. And Rav Chanan said: This entire verse is written about halachic measurements. “Wheat” corresponds to the teaching that one who enters a house that is impure due to a nega with his clothes on his shoulders, and his sandals and rings in his hands—he and they are impure immediately. If he was wearing his clothes, and his sandals were on his feet, and his rings were on his fingers—he is impure immediately, and they are pure until he stays there for the amount of time it takes to eat a half [a loaf of bread]. Bread of wheat , not bread of barley, while reclining and along with relish [which makes the eating process faster]. “Barley” corresponds to the teaching: a bone the size of a barleycorn transmits impurity through touch and being carried, but it does not transmit impurity via being under the same tent [or roof]….Rather, these are halachot [transmitted from Moshe at Sinai], and the rabbis supported them with a verse.
But most the time, there aren’t indicators one way or the other, and it is unclear whether a given halacha is a product of the derasha, or just linked via derasha to the biblical text. Different commentators might lean in different directions on this issue. For example, Rambam23 typically assumes that a derasha in such an instance is rabbinic in force, while Ramban24 will generally assume that it is on a Torah level.
Concluding Thought
Derashot seem to be a combination of received tradition and creative process, though it’s not always clear which ingredient is dominant. Does tradition merely set the rules of interpretation, leaving the sages to use their own logic to apply those rules and innovate halachot? To what degree are the halachot themselves set in place by tradition, leaving the tools of interpretation the job of grounding the halachot in the biblical text, and to what degree are they truly innovative?
A story in Menachot captures the interplay within derashot between the work of human minds and the guidance of Divine tradition.
מנחות כט:
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב בשעה שעלה משה למרום מצאו להקב”ה [=לקדוש ברוך הוא] שיושב וקושר כתרים לאותיות אמר לפניו רבש”ע [=ריבונו של עולם] מי מעכב על ידך אמר לו אדם אחד יש שעתיד להיות בסוף כמה דורות ועקיבא בן יוסף שמו שעתיד לדרוש על כל קוץ וקוץ תילין תילין של הלכות דאמר לפניו רבש”ע [=ריבונו של עולם] הראהו לי אמר לו חזור לאחורך הלך וישב בסוף שמונה שורות ולא היה יודע מה הן אומרים תשש כחו כיון שהגיע לדבר אחד אמרו לו תלמידיו רבי מנין לך אמר להן הלכה למשה מסיני נתיישבה דעתו
Menachot 29b
Rabbi Yehuda said that Rav said: At the time that Moshe ascended above [to receive the Torah] he found the Holy One, blessed be He, sitting and attaching crowns to the letters. [Moshe] said before Him: “Master of the world, who is holding you back [from giving the Torah without these crowns]?” [God] said to him: “There is a man who is destined to be at the end of several generations, Akiva the son of Yosef is his name, who is destined to expound from every spike [of the crowns] piles upon piles of halachot. [Moshe] said before Him: “Master of the world, show him to me.” [He] said to him: “Turn around.” [Moshe] went, [and found himself in Rabbi Akiva’s lecture hall. He] sat in the eighth row [of the lecture] and couldn’t understand what they were saying. His strength weakened [and he got discouraged]. When [Rabbi Akiva] got to one matter, his students asked him, “Rebbi, where [do you know this halacha] from?” [Rabbi Akiva] said to them: “It is a halacha [given] to Moshe at Sinai.” [When Moshe heard this], his mind became settled.
Were Rabbi Akiva’s teachings truly traditions given by God to Moshe? If so, why was Moshe unable to understand them? Were they affected by the process of transmission? Or were Rabbi Akiva’s words complex and novel, even to Moshe? If so, how could Rabbi Akiva proclaim, “it is a halacha from Moshe at Sinai”? To what extent were Rabbi Akiva’s derashot creative, and to what extent were they derived from what was received at Sinai?
This story suggests that both are true. The Netziv connects this dynamic nature of Torah She-be’al Peh with the process of making the second luchot, which, unlike the first luchot, were a product of a “joint effort” between God and Moshe.25
The Divine-human partnership in the physical makeup of the luchot represents our partnership in Torah She-be’al Peh as a whole:
העמק דבר שמות לד:א
…דלוחות שניות מכובדים מן הראשונים…והכוונה בכ”ז [=בכל זה] דבלוחות הראשונות לא ניתן כח החידוש אלא מה שקיבל משה דיוקי המקראות והלכות היוצא מזה, אבל לא לחדש דבר הלכה על ידי י”ג מדות וכדומה הויות התלמוד… אבל בלוחות השניות ניתן כח לכל תלמיד ותיק לחדש הלכה ע”פ [=על פי] המדות והתלמוד…ומזה הטעם עצמו צוה הקדוש ברוך הוא שיהיה הלוחות השניים בפיסול ידי משה, לא משום שלא זכו למעשה אלקים, אלא להורות דהלכה המתחדשת בכח לוחות הללו היא השתתפות עמל האדם בסיעתא דשמיא, כמו עצם הלוחות שהיה מעשה משה וכתיבת הקדוש ברוך הוא, וע”ע [=ועיין עוד] להלן מקרא כ”ז שגם בכתיבה היה השתתפות משה. והיינו מה שאמרו חז”ל דאפילו מה שתלמיד ותיק עתיד לחדש היה בלוחות, והכונה שבכח לוחות השניות היה נכלל הכל
Ha’amek Davar, Shemot 34:1
The second luchot were more esteemed than the first…and the intent in all of this is that with the first luchot, the power of innovation was not given. Rather, Moshe received the meaning of the details in the verses and halachot and the like, but not [the power] to innovate halachot through the thirteen middot, and similarly Talmudic discourse…but with the second luchot, the power was given to every distinguished scholar to innovate halachot through the middot and learning…And for this very reason the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded that the second luchot be carved by Moshe, not because they did not merit to have it made by God [as the first luchot were], but rather to teach as that the halacha created with the power of these luchot is a partnership between human toil and Divine assistance—just as the luchot themselves were carved by Moshe and engraved by the Holy One, blessed be He…And this is what the Sages said, that whatever a distinguished scholar is destined innovate in the future was in the luchot; the intent is that with the power of the second luchot everything was included.
An extra word, and added letter, even the spike of a crown—all these are like a beckoning of a Divine finger, a cosmic wink, an invitation from God to the Jewish people to partner in God’s Torah. A single drop of ink might inspire heaps of halachot, layers of complexity that mystifies even Moshe—but all of it is Torah, “received from Sinai”. The darshan is but a partner in the derasha’s creation.
Did women take part in the process of interpreting Torah She-be’al Peh?
Close reading, analysis, teasing meaning out of the biblical text—these are all open to and encouraged from all students of Torah, men and women. (Learn more here.) Indeed, the Talmud praises the daughters of Tzelofchad as wise and discerning readers of the text:
בבא בתרא קיט:
תנא בנות צלפחד חכמניות הן דרשניות הן צדקניות הן חכמניות הן
Bava Batra 119b
It was taught: The daughters of Tzelofchad—they were wise, they were expounders of the text (darshaniyot), they were righteous, they were wise…
As the Talmud goes on to explain, their close reading of the verses about the laws of inheritance enabled them to formulate a compelling argument for the right to their father’s portion in the land.
Beruria, quoted in our discussion of the Thirteen Middot above, was famed for her sharp analysis and prolific scholarship. The Talmud gives us a sense of the scope of her learning:
פסחים דף סב:
ברוריה דביתהו דרבי מאיר ברתיה דרבי חנניה בן תרדיון דתניא תלת מאה שמעתתא ביומא משלש מאה רבוותא
Pesachim 62b
Beruria, Rabbi Meir’s wife, daughter of Rabbi Chananya ben Teradyon, who learned three hundred teachings in a day from three hundred Rabbis…
Some of her halachic rulings are cited in rabbinic literature and accepted as halacha:
תוספתא כלים א:ג
קלוסטרא רבי טרפון מטמא וחכמים מטהרין וברוריא אומרת שומטה מן הפתח זה ותולה בחבירו בשבת כשנאמרו דברים לפני ר’ יהושע אמר יפה אמרה ברוריא…
Tosefta Keilim 1:3
A door bolt: Rabbi Tarfon says it is [susceptible to becoming] impure, the Sages say it is [always] pure, and Beruria says that one can remove it from one door and hang it on another on Shabbat. When these words were said before Rabbi Yehoshua, he said ‘Beruria said well’…
In the following case, Beruria actually disputes her brother’s view, and her view is preferred:
תוספתא כלים ד:ט
…רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר משם רבי שילא הטיחו בטהרה ונטמא מאימתי טהרתו אמר ר’ חלפתא איש כפר חנניא שאלתי את שמעון בן חנניא ששאל את בנו של רבי חנניא בן תרדיון ואמר משיסיענו ממקומו ובתו אומרת משיפשטו את חלוקו כשנאמרו דברים לפני ר’ יהודה בן בבא אמר יפה אמרה בתו מהוא
Tosefta Keilim 4:9
…Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said in the name of Rabbi Shila: if [an oven] was plastered in a state of purity, and then it became impure, from when can it become pure? Rabbi Chalafta from Kfar Chananya said: I asked Shimon ben Chananya who asked the son of Rabbi Chananya ben Teradyon, who said it is when [the oven] is removed from its place. His daughter said it is when its coating (lit. its garment) is removed. When these words were said before Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, he said “his daughter spoke better than he [did].”
While, as in the examples above, women could participate in the process of formal halachic textual interpretation, in practice, this rarely happened. Women are exempt from mitzva of Talmud Torah, and, until fairly recently, formal Torah education for women was rare. Women traditionally learned Halacha—and transmitted it to their children—imitatively, rather than through formal study. Therefore, women’s contribution to the halachic process has largely taken a more grassroots form. (Learn more here.)
Throughout rabbinic literature, women pose halachic questions that prompt innovation, set new norms of halachic practice, and craft customs to adorn Torah observance. But almost no women are interpreters of the text.
Inasmuch as there is creative input in the halachic process, and in light of the relative paucity of women’s voices, one might wonder—would Halacha look different if there had been more formal Torah learning for women? If there were more Berurias?
We’ll never know, but the thought that certain interpretations of halachot could have been different is not foreign to our halachic system.
By definition, wherever creative logic is involved, there will be a degree of variability in the result. Open just about any page of the Talmud, and you’ll see disagreements between sages. Our sages, who were all committed to the same fundamental framework of halacha—utilizing recognized tools of interpretation, analyzing the biblical text, and maintaining fidelity to tradition—sometimes came to differing conclusions, in part due to the traditions to which they were privy and specific schools of interpretation to which they subscribed, and in part because of differences in their perspectives. Ritva gives us insight into how to view these differences:
ריטב”א, עירובין יג:
אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים שאלו רבני צרפת ז״ל היאך אפשר שיהו אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים וזה אוסר וזה מתיר ותרצו כשעלה משה למרום לקבל התורה הראו לו על כל דבר ודבר מ״ט פנים לאיסור ומ״ט פני[ם] להיתר ושאל להקב״ה על זה ואמר שיהא זה מסור לחכמי ישראל שבכל דור ודור ויהיה הכרעה כמותם
Ritva, Eruvin 13b
“These and these [all differing halachic opinions] are the words of the living God.” The rabbis in France asked: “How is it possible that these and these are the words of the living God while one prohibits and the other permits? And they answered, that when Moshe ascended above to receive the Torah, they showed him regarding every single [halachic matter] forty-nine perspectives [that would lead] to prohibition and forty-nine perspectives [that would lead to] permission. And he asked the Holy One, Blessed be He, about this. And He said: this will be given over to the sages in every generation, and the decision will be according to them.
As Ritva describes it, Torah itself lends itself to multiple possibilities, a bit like a mathematical formula or a logic puzzle might have several solutions. God chose to entrust our sages with deciding which possibility would be practiced and God imbued the decisions that were reached with Divine authority, and even had a hand in guiding the process.
Ultimately, we have no way of knowing how and to what extent Halacha would have been affected if women had participated more in the formative stages of derasha and interpretation. Either way, the resulting halacha would not have been considered any more or less valid than what we have now.
At this point in time, we can no longer avail ourselves of Chazal’s full toolkit. Still, Halacha continues to develop, responding to new realities, questions, and insights. Today, women are increasingly participating in the halachic discourse alongside men, all praying as always for Divine support and guidance.
Further Reading
- Rav Amono Bazak, Nitzchuni Banai. Yediot Sefarim (2020).
- Anat Raizel, Mavo La-midrashim. Tevunot (5773).
- Yehuda Eisenberg and Amiram Domovitz, Torah Mi-Sinai. Sifriyat Haskel (5771). Available here.
Notes
שמות כא:ב
כִּי תִקְנֶה עֶבֶד עִבְרִי שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים יַעֲבֹד וּבַשְּׁבִעִת יֵצֵא לַחָפְשִׁי חִנָּם:
Shemot 21:2
When you buy a Hebrew bondsman, six years he shall work, and in the seventh he shall go out free, without payment.
ביצה כח:
ורבי יהודה אמר קרא לכם לכם לכל צרכיכם
Beitza 28b
Rabbi Yehuda said: “The verse states: ‘For you’ — ‘for all your needs’.”
3. There is debate amongst the Tanna’im with regard to how much each and every word must be expounded and accounted for:
ספרא, שלח קיב
הכרת תכרת. הכרת בעולם הזה תכרת לעולם הבא דברי ר׳ עקיבא א״ל [=אמר לו] ר’ ישמעאל [והלא כבר נאמר את ה’ הוא מגדף ונכרתה וכי ג’ עולמות יש. אלא ונכרתה בעולם הזה,] הכרת בעולם הבא, הכרת תכרת דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם
Sifra, Shelach 112
“[One who curses God] shall surely be cut off.” [The verse uses a double language of the verb karat, to cut off—hikaret tikaret. This redundancy is expounded as referring to a double punishment:] ‘Hikaret’, his soul will be cut off in this world, and ‘tikaret’, it will be cut off in the world to come. These are the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: [Does it not say [in the previous verse] ‘He is cursing God, and that soul shall be cut off (ve-nichreta) from its people’? Are there three worlds? Rather, the word ‘ve-nichreta’ – ‘and he shall be cut off’ refers to in this world.] The word ‘hikaret’ refers to the world to come. The [double language] of ‘hikaret tikaret’ [does not need to be explained, for] the Torah speaks in the language of people.
In the Hebrew language, doubling a verb is a way to express emphasis or assurance. According to Rabbi Yishmael, as the Divine message of the Torah is necessarily transmitted through human language, extra words like these can be attributed to the natural flow of language. In contrast, Rabbi Akiva is of the view that every word beyond the absolute minimum is ripe for interpretation. Not even one extra word or letter can be chalked up to a turn of phrase or figure of speech.
במדבר יח:כח
כֵּן תָּרִימוּ גַם אַתֶּם תְּרוּמַת ה’ מִכֹּל מַעְשְׂרֹתֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר תִּקְחוּ מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וּנְתַתֶּם מִמֶּנּוּ אֶת תְּרוּמַת ה’ לְאַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן:
Bemidbar 18:28
Thus, also you shall separate the teruma for God from all the tithes that you take from the children of Israel, and you will give from it the teruma for God to Aharon ha-kohen.
בבא מציעא כב.
גם אתם אמר רחמנא לרבות שלוחכם
Bava Metzia 22a
“Also you” said God [in the Torah], to include your agents.
דברים כב:כו
וְלַנַּעֲרָ לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה דָבָר אֵין לַנַּעֲרָ חֵטְא מָוֶת כִּי כַּאֲשֶׁר יָקוּם אִישׁ עַל רֵעֵהוּ וּרְצָחוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כֵּן הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה
Devarim 22:26
But to the young woman you shall not do anything [to punish her], the young woman has no death liability, for as a man who rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter.
סנהדרין עד.
מקיש רוצח לנערה המאורסה מה נערה המאורסה ניתן להצילו בנפשו אף רוצח ניתן להצילו בנפשו
Sanhedrin 74a
It juxtaposes a murderer to [the rape of] a young woman who is betrothed. Just as one may save a betrothed young woman at the cost of his [the rapist’s] life, so with a murderer one can save him [the potential victim] at the cost of his [the murderer’s] life.
מרדכי בבא קמא קלח
והלא רבנן דרבי שמעון לא דרשי טעמיה דקרא ויש לומר הכא דדבר תמוה הוא אפילו רבנן דרשי…
Mordechai, Bava Metzia 138
There is another possible exception, using a rationale to explain and define the scope of the halacha when a verse seems to go against usual halachic norms:
מרדכי בבא קמא קלח
והלא רבנן דרבי שמעון לא דרשי טעמיה דקרא ויש לומר הכא דדבר תמוה הוא אפילו רבנן דרשי…
Mordechai, Bava Metzia 138
This is surprising; don’t the rabbis [who disagree with] Rabbi Shimon not expound the reasoning behind a verse? One can say here that the law is something surprising, and so even [those] rabbis expound it [based on the reasoning behind it]…
ויקרא כג:ו
וּבַחֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר יוֹם לַחֹדֶשׁ הַזֶּה חַג הַמַּצּוֹת לַה’ שִׁבְעַת יָמִים מַצּוֹת תֹּאכֵלוּ:
Vayikra 26:6
And on the fifteenth day of this month, it is the Festival of Matzot for God, seven days shall you eat matzot.
ויקרא כג:לד
דַּבֵּר אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר בַּחֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר יוֹם לַחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי הַזֶּה חַג הַסֻּכּוֹת שִׁבְעַת יָמִים לַה’:
Vayikra 23:34
Speak to the children of Israel, saying: On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the Festival of Sukkot for seven days for God.
ויקרא טו:ד-ו
כָּל הַמִּשְׁכָּב אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב עָלָיו הַזָּב יִטְמָא וְכָל הַכְּלִי אֲשֶׁר יֵשֵׁב עָלָיו יִטְמָא: וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִגַּע בְּמִשְׁכָּבוֹ יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְרָחַץ בַּמַּיִם וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב: וְהַיֹּשֵׁב עַל הַכְּלִי אֲשֶׁר יֵשֵׁב עָלָיו הַזָּב יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְרָחַץ בַּמַּיִם וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב:
Vayikra 15:4-6
And any bed on which the zav lies down on shall become impure, and any implement on which he sits shall become impure. And anyone who touches his bed shall wash his clothes and bathe in water and is impure until the evening. And anyone who sits on an implement on which the zav sat shall wash his clothes and bathe in water and is impure until the evening.
14. The last rule talked about what happens when a verse has a kelal (a general rule), then a perat (a specific case) and then a kelal again. There are also other rules used by the sages that pertain to other klal u-frat sequences and combinations.Here’s an example of one other such rule, one that is used to interpret a kelal followed by a perat. The Midrash breaks this verse into two parts, a kelal and a perat, and analyzes it accordingly:You can see more examples of kelal u-frat type rules in Rabbi Yishmael’s list of rules, footnote 16.
ויקרא א:ב
דַּבֵּר אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם אָדָם כִּי יַקְרִיב מִכֶּם קָרְבָּן לַה’ מִן הַבְּהֵמָה מִן הַבָּקָר וּמִן הַצֹּאן תַּקְרִיבוּ אֶת קָרְבַּנְכֶם:
Vayikra 1:2
Speak to the Children of Israel and tell them: ‘when a person from among you brings a sacrifice to God, from the animals, from the cattle and from the flock shall you bring your sacrifice’.
ספרא, ברייתא דרבי ישמעאל
מכלל ופרט כיצד? “מן הבהמה” כלל, “מן הבקר ומן הצאן” פרט. כלל ופרט, אין בכלל אלא מה שבפרט.
Sifra, Baraita De-Rabbi Yishmael
“Miklal u-frat” (from a general rule followed by a specific case): How [is this rule applied?] “From the animals” is a general statement, “From the cattle and from the flock” is a specific case. [When] a general rule [is followed by] a detail, the general rule cannot be applied to anything but the specific case/s. [i.e., an animal sacrifice can only be brought from cattle, sheep, or goats.]
15. Here’s an example of this principle at play in a more halachic context:
ספרא, ברייתא דרבי ישמעאל
“ואיש כי ימרט ראשו קרח הוא טהור הוא”, יכול יהא טהור מכל טומאה? תלמוד לומר “וכי יהיה בקרחת או בגבחת נגע לבן אדמדם” דבר למד מענינו שאינו טהור מכל טומאה, אלא מטומאת נתקים בלבד.
Sifra, Baraita De-Rabbi Yishmael
“If a man loses hair from [the back of] his head, he is a keire’ach, he is pure” (Vayikra 13:40). Could it be that [the verse is teaching us] he is pure of all impurities? [The continuation of the verse] teaches: “And should there be in the bald spot at the front or back of his head a whitish-reddish lesion” (Vayikra 13:42) …The matter can be learned from context, [a bald man] is not pure from all impurities, only from the impurity of a netek.
ספרא, ברייתא דרבי ישמעאל
רבי ישמעאל אומר בשלש עשרה מדות התורה נדרשת א) מקל וחומר ב) מגזרה שוה ג) מבנין אב מכתוב אחד, מבנין אב משני כתובים ד) מכלל ופרט ה) מפרט וכלל ו) מכלל ופרט וכלל, אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט ז) מכלל שהוא צריך לפרט, ומפרט שהוא צריך לכלל ח) כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל ללמד, לא ללמד על עצמו יצא, אלא ללמד על הכלל כלו יצא ט) כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל ליטעון טען אחר שהוא כענינו יצא להקל ולא להחמיר י) כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל ליטעון טען אחר שלא כענינו, יצא להקל ולהחמיר יא) כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל לידון בדבר חדש, אי אתה יכול להחזירו לכללו עד שיחזירנו הכתוב לכללו בפירוש יב) דבר הלמד מעניינו ודבר הלמד מסופו (יג) וכן שני כתובין המכחישים זה את זה, עד שיבא הכתוב השלישי ויכריע ביניהם.
Sifra, Beraita De-Rabbi Yishmael:
Rabbi Yishmael said: The Torah is expounded via thirteen principles: (1) [Deriving a law from] a lenient [case] to a stricter [one] (2) [Deriving a law from one place to another because] the same/similar word [is used in both verses] (3) [Deriving] a general rule from one verse, or [deriving] a general rule from two verses (4) A general rule [followed by] a specific case (5) A specific case [followed by] a general rule (6) A general rule [followed by] a specific case [followed by another] general rule—the rule is in accordance with the particulars. (7) A [passage where] the general rule requires the specific case [to clarify it], or the specific case needs the general rule [to clarify it] (8) Anything that was subsumed in [a previously stated] general rule, and “departed from the rule” [i.e., was restated on its own] to teach us [a law]—in that case, it is not just teaching [a law] about itself, rather it “departed” in order to teach us about the general rule (9) Anything that was subsumed in a [previously stated] general rule, and “departed from the rule” [i.e., was stated on its own] to teach a particular requirement relating to itself—in that case, it “departed” to [teach us] a leniency, not a stringency (10) Anything that was subsumed in a [previously stated] general rule, and “departed from the rule” to teach us a particular requirement not related to itself—in that case it has “departed” [to teach us a] both a leniency and a stringency (11) Anything that was subsumed in a [previously stated] general rule, and “departed from the rule” for a new purpose, it cannot be applied back to the general rule, unless the verse does so explicitly (12) Something learned from its context, and something learned from the conclusion [of a passage] (13) And similarly, two verses that [appear to] contradict one another, until a third verse comes and reconciles between them.
הקדמה, ספר הכריתות נתיבות עולם
נראה בעיני הא דלא חשיב ר’ ישמעאל כל אלו אלא י”ג, מפני שאלו י”ג לא מצא אדם חולק עליו והם רהוטות בפי כל, שהרי ככה מצינו בהלל שלא מנה רק ז’ כדתניא בריש תורת כהנים …. לא מפני שלא היה דורש שאר המדות אלא שהיו סדורות בפיו או היו צריכין לאותו זמן שלא היו בקיאין בהם, ככה יתכן לר’ ישמעאל באותן י”ג מדות
Introduction, Sefer Ha-keritut, Netivot Olam
It appears to me that the fact that Rabbi Yishmael did not list all these [32 of Rabbi Eliezer], but only thirteen, is because these thirteen were undisputed, and familiar to everyone. For we have found with Hillel, that he listed only seven, as it is taught at the beginning of Torat Kohanim…This was not because [Hillel] did not make use of the other rules, but because these were well-ordered for him, or because they were needed at that time because people were not familiar with them, so too, this may also be the case with Rabbi Yishmael with these thirteen principles
העמק דבר, ויקרא כה:יח
ומתחילה היו שבע מדות שהביא הלל הזקן כדתניא בתוספתא דסנהדרין ז ה ובכמה מקומות ואחר תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל נתוספו עוד כללים והוא על פי עיון מחדש בכל דור ודור
Ha’amek Davar, Vayikra 25:18
At the beginning, there were the seven rules that Hillel brought, as it is taught in the Tosefta, Sanhedrin 7:5, and in several places. And after the teaching of the school of Rabbi Yishmael more rules were added; and this was based on new study in every generation.
19. There is also a third, even later, list in the Tannaitic canon, a list of 32, brought in the name of R’ Eliezer ben Rabbi Yosei. This list can be reconciled with the others in a lot of the same ways we reconciled Rabbi Yishmael’s with Hillel’s: there is a lot of overlap, Rabbi Yishmael’s list may not have been exhaustive, either, and new rules may have been added by Rabbi Eliezer’s time. In addition, many of the rules on Rabbi Eliezer’s list are more aggadic, rather than legal, in their application. As the Shelah writes:
של”ה כללי התלמוד ,כלל מדות’, כלל ט’
הרי מדות דרבי ישמעאל נשתנו ממדות דרבי אליעזר בר רבי יוסי הגלילי בשני עניינים. האחד, כי מדות דרבי ישמעאל הן להמציא מהם לימוד מחודש, ומדות דרבי אליעזר הנזכרים לעיל אינן אלא ליישב פשוטי המקראות במקומו. השני, כי מדות דרבי אליעזר הם בדברי אגדה ודרשה, ומדות דרבי ישמעאל הם בעיקר דיני התורה להוכיח חומרא או קולא
Shenei Luchot Ha-berit—Rules of the Talmud, Rules of Middot, Rule 9
For the middot of Rabbi Yishmael are different than those of Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Yosei Ha-Glili on two counts. First, the middot of Rabbi Yishmael are to create new derivations, and the middot of Rabbi Eliezer mentioned above are only to clarify the simple meaning of the text. Second, the middot of Rabbi Eliezer are used for matters of aggada and derasha, while the middot of Rabbi Yishmael are for the fundamental laws of the Torah, to prove stringency or leniency.
21. Sometimes the Torah repeats words simply because of linguistic necessity, while other repetitions are intentional, as a hint to a new halacha. It is not possible to logically differentiate between the two; therefore, a tradition is necessary to do so.
השגות הרמב”ן לספר המצוות לרמב”ם שורש ב
ובג”ש [=ובגזרה שווה] הצריכו בו קבלה מפורשת מפני שהוא דבר שיכול אדם לדרוש בו כל היום ולסתור בו כל דיני התורה כי התיבות יכפלו בתורה כמה פעמים אי אפשר לספר גדול להיות כלו במלות מחודשות
Ramban's Critiques to Rambam’s Sefer Ha-mitzvot , Shoresh 2, Shoresh 2
With regard to a gezeira shava they required a clear tradition, because a person could expound with it all day, and dismantle all of the laws of the Torah, since words are repeated a number of times in the Torah, and it would be impossible for such a large book to use only unique words.
22. There are several views about the exact role tradition plays in this process.According to Rabbeinu Tam, tradition played the minimal role of setting the number of laws that could be learned via gezeira shava:While the sages did the work of actually finding and analyzing duplicate words independently, the framework of a limited number of gezeirot shava ensured that only meaningful duplicates were analyzed.Others give a greater role to tradition:
תוספות שבת צז:, ד”ה גזירה שוה לא גמיר
ואור”ת [=ואומר רבינו תם] שהיה להם בקבלה מנין ג”ש [=גזרות שוות] שבכל התורה
Tosafot, Shabbat 97b, s.v. Gezeira shava lo gamir
Rabeinu Tam says they had a tradition regarding the number of gezeirot shava that exist in the entire Torah.
השגות הרמב”ן לספר המצוות לרמב”ם שורש בוהוי יודע שזה שאמרו חכמים שאין אדם דן גזירה שוה מעצמו אין כונתם לומר שכל גזירה שוה מבוארת להם מסיני ונמסרת להם מפי משה רבינו תלמדו מלה פלונית שבפסוק פלוני ממלה פלונית שבפסוק פלוני ותשוו דין שניהם לענין פלוני. אין הדבר כן. שהרי מצינו אותם חולקין תמיד בהרבה מקומות בענין הזה…..אבל הכוונה בגזירה שוה שהיא מסיני לומר שהיא בידם קבלה שדין שחיטה שאינה ראויה נלמד מגזירה שוה דשחיטה שחיטה…. וכן כולם
Ramban's Critiques to Rambam’s Sefer Ha-mitzvot , Shoresh 2
You should know, that which they said, that a person cannot derive a gezeira shava on their own [without a tradition], their intention is not to say that every gezeira shava was elaborated to them from Sinai and transmitted to them from Moshe Rabbeinu how to learn such and such a word in such and such a verse from such and such a word in such and such a verse, and to equate their law in such and such a case. This is not so. For we have found that they always disputed this matter in many places.…Rather, the intent with regard to saying gezeira shava is from Sinai is that [for example,] they had a tradition that the laws of shechita that is invalid can be derived from a gezeira shava of [the word] shechita [in one verse and the word] shechita [in a different verse]…And thus with all of them.
הליכות עולם ד:ב
והוי יודע שזה שאמרו חכמים שאין אדם דן גזירה שוה מעצמו אין כונתם לומר שכל גזירה שוה מבוארת להם מסיני ונמסרת להם מפי משה רבינו תלמדו מלה פלונית שבפסוק פלוני ממלה פלונית שבפסוק פלוני ותשוו דין שניהם לענין פלוני. אין הדבר כן. שהרי מצינו אותם חולקין תמיד בהרבה מקומות בענין הזה…..אבל הכוונה בגזירה שוה שהיא מסיני לומר שהיא בידם קבלה שדין שחיטה שאינה ראויה נלמד מגזירה שוה דשחיטה שחיטה…. וכן כולם
Ramban's Critiques to Rambam’s Sefer Ha-mitzvot , Shoresh 2
You should know, that which they said, that a person cannot derive a gezeira shava on their own [without a tradition], their intention is not to say that every gezeira shava was elaborated to them from Sinai and transmitted to them from Moshe Rabbeinu how to learn such and such a word in such and such a verse from such and such a word in such and such a verse, and to equate their law in such and such a case. This is not so. For we have found that they always disputed this matter in many places.…Rather, the intent with regard to saying gezeira shava is from Sinai is that [for example,] they had a tradition that the laws of shechita that is invalid can be derived from a gezeira shava of [the word] shechita [in one verse and the word] shechita [in a different verse]…And thus with all of them.
הליכות עולם ד:ב
ועתה דע והבן שרשו של דבר, דכל גזרות שוות נמסרו למשה מסיני סתם.. פעמים נמסרו המקומות לבד, כלומר פלוני ילמוד מפלוני, נשארו תיבות הגזירה שוה לחכמים לדון איזו הן.
Halichot Olam 4:2
Now, you should know and understand the root of the matter, that all of the gezeirot shavot were transmitted to Moshe from Sinai undefined…sometimes only the places were transmitted, meaning “one can learn such and such [a law] from such and such ]a passage[,” and it was left to the sages to derive which are the words of the gezeira shava.
רמב”ם, ספר המצוות, שורש ב
שכל מה שלא תמצאהו כתוב בתורה ותמצאהו בתלמוד שלמדוהו באחת משלש עשרה מדות, אם בארו הם בעצמם ואמרו שזה גוף תורה או שזה דאורייתא, הנה ראוי למנותו אחר שהמקובלים ממנו אמרו שהוא דאורייתא. ואם לא יבארו זה ולא דברו בו, הנה הוא דרבנן, שאין שם כתוב יורה עליו.
Rambam, Sefer Ha-mitzvot, Shoresh 2
For whatever you do not find written in the Torah, and you find it in the Talmud derived through one of the Thirteen Principles, if they [the sages] themselves clarified that this is part of the Torah, or is on a Torah level, then it is fitting to count it [as a biblical commandment], since those who received it said it is on a Torah level. And if they don’t clarify this, and don’t discuss it [either way], it is [considered] rabbinic, since there is no Scripture that teaches it.
השגות הרמב”ן לספר המצוות לרמב”ם שורש בולפי זה הראוי הוא שנאמר בהפך שכל דבר הנדרש בתלמוד באחת מכל י”ג מדות הוא מדאורייתא עד שנשמע אותם שיאמרו שהוא אסמכתא:
Ramban's Critiques to Rambam’s Sefer Ha-mitzvot , Shoresh 2
According to this, the fitting [conclusion] is to say the opposite [of what Rambam wrote], that anything that is expounded in the Talmud through one of the Thirteen Principles is on a Torah level, until we hear them say [explicitly] that [the verse is just a] support [to a rabbinic law].
ולפי זה הראוי הוא שנאמר בהפך שכל דבר הנדרש בתלמוד באחת מכל י”ג מדות הוא מדאורייתא עד שנשמע אותם שיאמרו שהוא אסמכתא:
Ramban's Critiques to Rambam’s Sefer Ha-mitzvot , Shoresh 2
According to this, the fitting [conclusion] is to say the opposite [of what Rambam wrote], that anything that is expounded in the Talmud through one of the Thirteen Principles is on a Torah level, until we hear them say [explicitly] that [the verse is just a] support [to a rabbinic law].
שמות לד:א
וַיֹּ֤אמֶר ה’ אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֔ה פְּסָל־לְךָ֛ שְׁנֵֽי־לֻחֹ֥ת אֲבָנִ֖ים כָּרִאשֹׁנִ֑ים וְכָתַבְתִּי עַל־הַלֻּחֹ֔ת אֶת־הַדְּבָרִ֔ים אֲשֶׁ֥ר הָי֛וּ עַל־הַלֻּחֹ֥ת הָרִאשֹׁנִים אֲשֶׁר שִׁבַּֽרְתָּ׃
Shemot 34:1
And God said to Moshe: carve for yourself two tablets of stone like the first, and I will write on the tablets the words that were on the first tablets that you broke.
Sources
Methods of Interpretation
משנה חגיגה א:ח
היתר נדרים פורחין באויר ואין להם על מה שיסמכו הלכות שבת חגיגות והמעילות הרי הם כהררים התלויין בשערה שהן מקרא מועט והלכות מרובות הדינין והעבודות הטהרות והטומאות ועריות יש להן על מי שיסמכו הן הן גופי תורה:
Mishna Chagiga 1:8
The laws of releasing vows float in the air, and do not have anything [in the verses] upon which to rely. The laws of Shabbat, festival sacrifices, and misappropriation of sacred property, are like mountains hanging by a hair—they have few verses and many halachot. [Not explicitly written monetary] laws, sacrifices, [laws of] purity and impurity and forbidden relationships—they have something [in the verses] upon which to rely. These [and] these [categories] are essential to the Torah.
תניא, אגרת הקודש כט
כל מצות שבתורה בין מצוות עשה בין מצות לא תעשה אינן גלויות וידועות ומפורשות אלא על ידי תורה שבעל פה כמצות לא תעשה שנאמר בשבת לא תעשה מלאכה ולא פירש מה היא מלאכה ובתורה שבעל פה נתפרש שהן ל”ט מלאכות הידועות ולא טלטול אבנים וקורות כבידות וכיוצא בהן הן כל המצות בין מצוות עשה בין מצוות ל”ת [=לא תעשה] הן סתומות ולא מפורשות וגלויות וידועות אלא על ידי תורה שבעל פה ומשום הכי כתיב על תורה שבעל פה אל תטוש תורת אמך כמו שאיתא בזהר משום שעל דרך משל כמו שכל אברי הולד כלולים בטיפת האב בהעלם גדול והאם מוציאתו לידי גילוי בלידתה ולד שלם ברמ”ח אברים ושס”ה גידים ככה ממש כל רמ”ח מצוות עשה ושס”ה מצוות לא תעשה באים מההעלם אל הגילוי בתורה שבעל פה
Tanya, Iggeret Ha-kodesh 29
All the mitzvot in the Torah, both positive and negative, are not revealed and known and explicit except through the Oral Torah. Such as the negative mitzva stated with regard to Shabbat, “You shall not do any work,” which does not explain what is work [that is prohibited]. And in the Oral Torah, it explains that they are the thirty-nine defined [categories of creative] work [that are prohibited], and not [strenuous labor such as] carrying rocks and heavy beams. And all mitzvot, whether positive or negative, are similarly ambiguous and undefined, and are revealed and known only by means of the Oral Torah. Therefore, it is written about the Oral Torah, ‘do not spurn the teachings of your mother,’ as it is stated in the Zohar, because by way of analogy, it is like all body parts of a child are encapsulated in the drop [of semen] of the father in a greatly concealed manner, and the mother brings it into revelation by birthing a child complete with 248 limbs and 365 sinews; so too, exactly, all of the 248 positive mitzvot and the 365 negative mitzvot emerge from concealment into revelation through the Oral Torah.
קרית ספר הקדמה א
דרכי לימוד הדינים מן התורה על כמה פנים. (א) הראשון מה שהוא כתוב בפירוש בתורה כיציאת עבד עברי בשביעית לחפשי… וכיוצא בהם דברים שנתפרשו בפי[רוש] בתורה והן כמשמען ואינם צריכין לקבלה (ב) השני מה שנלמד ממשמעות הפסוק כמו “[וּבַיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן מִקְרָא קֹדֶשׁ וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי מִקְרָא קֹדֶשׁ יִהְיֶה לָכֶם כָּל מְלָאכָה לֹא יֵעָשֶׂה בָהֶם] אַךְ אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל לְכָל נֶפֶשׁ הוּא לְבַדּוֹ יֵעָשֶׂה לָכֶם” (שמות יב:טז), דמשמע “לכם” לכל צרכיכם… ורוב דרשות הפסוקים הם כענין זה ממשמעות המקרא. (ג) השלישי מיתור המקרא כמו… “גם אתם” לרבות שלוחכם, ‘גם’ מיותר לרבויי. וכן כל לרבויי ולאיתויי שבתלמוד שהם באים מכח יתור המקרא…וכן כל ‘אך’ ו’רק’ וכיוצא בהן דיתירי למיעוטא. (ד) הרביעי סברא כמכניס בשבת דילפינן ליה מסברא ד”מה לי אפוקי [ו]מה לי עיולי” (שבת צו:) וכן הרבה.…(ה) החמישי הקשא …(ו) …הששי משלש עשרה מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהם…
Kiryat Sefer, Introduction, Chapter 1
There are a number of ways to derive laws from the Torah. (1) The first is [reading] what is written explicitly in the Torah, like the freeing of a Hebrew bondsman in the seventh year…and similarly, matters that are explained explicitly in the Torah and are according to their literal meaning, and do not require received tradition [to be understood]. (2) The second is what is learned from inferences from the verse. For example, “[And on the first day, it shall be a holy gathering for you, and on the seventh day it shall be a holy gathering for you. You shall not do any work] except for that which shall be eaten for any person, that alone shall be done for you” (Shemot 12:16). The implication of “for you” is “for all your needs.” …And most derashot [expoundings] of the verses are in that vein, from the implications of Scripture…. (3) The third is [interpreting] superfluous words in the text, like… “also you” as ‘to include your agents.’ [Bava Metzia 22a]. [Here, the] superfluous “also” (gam), is added to include [other cases within the law], and similarly, any [word expounded] in the Talmud to include [cases in the scope of the law] or to bring in [more applications], come on the strength of an extra word in the verse…And so, too, every “but” (ach) and “only” (rak) and the like, that are superfluous to exclude [cases from the law]. (4) The fourth is [applying] logic [to the text]. For example, [the prohibition against] carrying something into a private domain on Shabbat, which is derived by logic, for “what is the difference between bringing something in [explicit in the Torah] and taking it out [not mentioned]” [Shabbat 96b], and there are many like this…. (5) The fifth is [interpreting] juxtapositions… (6) …The sixth is [using one] of the Thirteen Principles by which the Torah is interpreted (shelosh esrei middot she-haTorah nidreshet bahem)…
בבא קמא מו:
למה לי קרא? סברא הוא..
Bava Kamma 46b
Why do I need a verse? It is a logical inference…
קרית ספר הקדמה א
(ז) …השביעי מדברי קבלה גילוי בעלמא למאי דכתיב באוריתא…בעינוי יום הכיפורים דילפינן מדברי קבלה דרחיצה וסיכה ונעילת הסנדל ותשמיש המטה עינוי מיקרו והוי גילוי בעלמא ללישנא דעינוי דכתיב בתורה… (ח) השמיני מהלכה למשה מסיני כשיעורין חציצין ומחיצין הלכה למשה מסיני ואית מינייהו דגמירי להו הכי הלכה למשה מסיני והדר אסמכוה אמקרא (ט) התשיעי משאר תורה שבעל פה שנמסרה למשה בסיני ויש סמך בכתובים אלא שלא היה נלמד ממשמעות הכתובים אם לא היה נאמר לו על פה…
Kiryat Sefer, Introduction, Chapter 1
(7) The seventh is [applying] the words of the Prophets (divrei kabbala), that merely reveal the meaning of [verses in] the Torah…. [For example, from the directive of] afflicting oneself on Yom Kippur, we learn from the words of the Prophets that washing, anointing, wearing [leather] shoes, and sexual relations are called affliction. And this is merely revealing the meaning of the language of affliction used in the Pentateuch…(8) The eighth is [applying] Halacha [transmitted] to Moshe at Sinai, for [the laws of] “measurements, interpositions, and partitions are all Halacha [transmitted] to Moshe at Sinai” (Eiruvin 4a)…and some of them we learn in this way as “Halacha to Moshe at Sinai” and later [the sages] connected them to Scripture. (9) The ninth is the rest of the Oral Torah that was given to Moshe at Sinai, for which there is support in the text, but would not be derived from the meaning of the verse if the [law] had not been stated to him orally.
משנה עדויות ח:ז
אמר רבי יהושע מקובל אני מרבן יוחנן בן זכאי ששמע מרבו ורבו מרבו הלכה למשה מסיני
Mishna Eiduyot 8:7
Rabbi Yehoshua said: I received it [a halacha] from Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, who heard it from his rabbi, and his rabbi from his rabbi—a halacha le-Moshe mi-Sinai.
Reasons for Commandments
בבא מציעא קטו.
דתניא (דברים יז, יז) ולא ירבה לו נשים ר’ יהודה אומר מרבה הוא ובלבד שלא יהו מסירות את לבו…לעולם ר’ יהודה לא דריש טעמא דקרא ושאני הכא דמפרש קרא ולא ירבה לו נשים ולא יסור מאי טעמא לא ירבה לו נשים משום דלא יסור.
Bava Metzia 115a
For the baraita teaches: “And he [a king] shall not have many wives” (Devarim 17:17). Rabbi Yehuda says, he may have many wives, provided that they do not lead his heart astray…. Certainly, Rabbi Yehuda [generally] does not expound the reason behind a verse. But here, it is different, because the verse explicitly states, “and he shall not have many wives lest [his heart] be led astray.” [The verse is explicating] what is the reason he may not have many wives, because [of the danger that] he will be led astray.
דברים כה:ד
לֹא תַחְסֹם שׁוֹר בְּדִישׁוֹ:
Devarim 25:4
You shall not muzzle an ox as it threshes.
בבא מציעא צ.
בעו מיניה מרב ששת היתה אוכלת ומתרזת מהו משום דמעלי לה הוא והא לא מעלי לה או דלמא דחזיא ומצטערא והא חזיא ומצטערא
Bava Metzia 90a
The [sages] asked Rav Sheshet: If [the animal] was eating from the produce and getting diarrhea, what is [the halacha]? Is [the reason for not muzzling an animal] for its benefit, and this [eating] is not providing benefit? Or perhaps the reason [for the prohibition] is because [the animal] sees [food] and is distressed [when it cannot eat it], and this one [also] sees [food] and will be distressed [if it is muzzled]
תוספות הרא”ש בבא מציעא צ.
אפילו למאן דלא דריש טעמא דקרא… הכא פשיטא דרחמנא לא אזהר אלא לטובתה של בהמה אי משום דמעלו לה אי משום דלא ליצטער.
Tosfot Ha-Rosh, Bava Metzia 90a
Even according to those who don’t expound the reason behind the verse…here it is obvious that the verse prohibited only for the good of the animal, either because it will benefit, or so that it will not be distressed [by being muzzled].
Principles of Interpretation
תוספתא סנהדרין ז: ה
שבע מדות דרש הלל לפני זקני בתירה (א) ק”ו [=קל וחומר] (ב) וגזרה שוה (ג) ובנין אב וכתוב אחד (ד) ובנין אב ושני כתובים (ה) וכלל ופרט וכלל (ו) וכיוצא בו ממקום אחר (ז) דבר הלמד מענינו. אלו שבע מדות שדרש הלל הזקן לפני זקני בתירה.
Tosefta Sanhedrin 7:5
Hillel expounded seven rules before the elders of Beteira: (1) kal va-chomer [a fortiori reasoning; i.e., drawing an inference from a more lenient case to a stricter one] (2) and gezeira shava [deriving a law from one case to another due to the same word root being used in both verses] (3) and binyan av ve-katuv echad [inferring a global principle from one verse] (4) and binyan av u-shnei ketuvim [inferring a global principle from two verses] (5) and kelal u-frat u-chlal: [a general statement followed by a particular case and then by another general statement] (6) and kayotzei bo mi-makom acher [something similar in a different place] (7) and davar ha-lameid me-inyano [something learned from its context]. These are the seven rules that Hillel the Elder expounded before the elders of Beteira.
במדבר יב:יד
וַיֹּאמֶר ה’ אֶל מֹשֶׁה וְאָבִיהָ יָרֹק יָרַק בְּפָנֶיהָ הֲלֹא תִכָּלֵם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים תִּסָּגֵר שִׁבְעַת יָמִים מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה וְאַחַר תֵּאָסֵף:
Bemidbar 12:14
And God said to Moshe: If her father had just spit in her face, would she not be shamed for seven days? Let her be quarantined outside the camp for seven days, and afterwards she shall be brought in.
סוכה כז:
אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי שמעון בן יהוצדק נאמר כאן חמשה עשר ונאמר חמשה עשר בחג המצות מה להלן לילה הראשון חובה מכאן ואילך רשות אף כאן לילה הראשון חובה מכאן ואילך רשות
Sukka 27b
Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: It says here [with regard to Sukkot] “the fifteenth” and it says “the fifteenth” [with regard to] Pesach. Just as over there, it is an obligation on the first night [of Pesach to eat matza], so too, here, it is an obligation on the first night [of Sukkot to eat a meal in the sukka]; from then on, it is optional.
ספרא, ברייתא דרבי ישמעאל
לא הרי המשכב כהרי המושב ולא המושב כהרי המשכב. הצד השוה שבהן שהן כלים עשויין לנוח אדם לבד…אף כלים שהן עשויין לנוח אדם לבדו יהא הזב מטמא אותו ברובו…יצא המרכב שהוא עשוי לסיבלון אחר.
Sifra, Baraita de-Rabbi Yishmael
An item for lying down (mishkav) differs from an item for sitting (moshav), and an item for sitting differs from an item for lying down. The common denominator between them: that they are implements made only for a person’s comfort …so too, [only] implements that are made only for a person’s comfort are rendered impure should a zav [use the implement to support] most of his [weight]…this excludes a tarkav [a large measuring instrument], which is made for carrying something else [for measuring, rather than for carrying a person in comfort].
ויקרא כד:ב-ג
צַו אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְיִקְחוּ אֵלֶיךָ שֶׁמֶן זַיִת זָךְ כָּתִית לַמָּאוֹר לְהַעֲלֹת נֵר תָּמִיד: מִחוּץ לְפָרֹכֶת הָעֵדֻת בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד יַעֲרֹךְ אֹתוֹ אַהֲרֹן מֵעֶרֶב עַד בֹּקֶר לִפְנֵי ה’ תָּמִיד חֻקַּת עוֹלָם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם:
Vayikra 24:2-3
Command the children of Israel, and they shall bring you pure olive oil, crushed, for lighting, to light a lamp continually. Outside the curtain of testimony, in the Tent of Meeting, Aharon shall set it up, from evening until morning, before God continually, an everlasting statute for all your generations.
במדבר ה:ב-ג
צַו אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וִישַׁלְּחוּ מִן הַמַּחֲנֶה כָּל צָרוּעַ וְכָל זָב וְכֹל טָמֵא לָנָפֶשׁ: מִזָּכָר עַד נְקֵבָה תְּשַׁלֵּחוּ אֶל מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה תְּשַׁלְּחוּם וְלֹא יְטַמְּאוּ אֶת מַחֲנֵיהֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי שֹׁכֵן בְּתוֹכָם:
Bemidbar 5:2-3
Command the children of Israel, and they shall send out from the camp any tzarua [person with tzara’at]or zav [man with bloody emissions] or anyone impure from contact with the dead. Male or female, you shall send them out, outside the camp you shall send them, and they shall not defile your camp, in which I dwell in their midst.
במדבר, יט:כ-כא
וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִטְמָא וְלֹא יִתְחַטָּא וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא מִתּוֹךְ הַקָּהָל כִּי אֶת מִקְדַּשׁ ה’ טִמֵּא מֵי נִדָּה לֹא זֹרַק עָלָיו טָמֵא הוּא: וְהָיְתָה לָהֶם לְחֻקַּת עוֹלָם…
Bemidbar, 19:20-21
And a man that becomes impure and does not purify himself [before entering the Sanctuary], that soul shall be cut off from within the congregation, because he has defiled the Sanctuary of God, for the sprinkling waters were not sprinkled upon him, he is impure. And it shall be for them an everlasting statute…
ספרא, ברייתא דרבי ישמעאל
לא פרשת הנרות כהרי פרשת שלוח טמאים ולא פרשת שלוח טמאים כהרי פרשת הנרות. הצד השוה שבהן שהם ב”צו” מיד ולדורות, אף כל דבר שהוא בצו יהא מיד ולדורות.
Sifra, Baraita De-Rabbi Yishmael
The passage [in the Torah] on the lamps is not like the passage on sending out the impure, and the passage on sending out the impure is not like the passage on the lamps. The common denominator [between these two passages] is that they have [the word] “Command,” and [the laws in them apply] immediately and for all generations; so too, any passage which has [the word] “command” [applies] immediately and for all generations.
דברים יד:כו
וְנָתַתָּה הַכֶּסֶף בְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר תְּאַוֶּה נַפְשְׁךָ בַּבָּקָר וּבַצֹּאן וּבַיַּיִן וּבַשֵּׁכָר וּבְכֹל אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁאָלְךָ נַפְשֶׁךָ וְאָכַלְתָּ שָּׁם לִפְנֵי ה’ אֱלֹקיךָ וְשָׂמַחְתָּ אַתָּה וּבֵיתֶךָ:
Devarim 14:26
And you shall use the money for whatever your soul desires, for cattle and for sheep and for wine and strong drink, and for whatever your soul requires. And you shall eat [it] there, before the Lord your God, and rejoice, you and your household.
ספרא, ברייתא דרבי ישמעאל
“ונתת הכסף בכל אשר תאוה נפשך” כלל, “בבקר ובצאן ביין ובשכר” פרט. “ובכל אשר תשאלך נפשך” חזר וכלל. כלל ופרט וכלל אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט. לומר לך מה הפרט מפורש, דבר שהוא וולד וולדות הארץ וגדולי קרקע, אף אין לי אלא כל דבר שהוא וולד וולדות הארץ וגדולי קרקע. יצאו כמהין ופטריות.
Sifra, Baraita De-Rabbi Yishmael
“And you shall use the money for whatever your soul desires”—a general statement. “For cattle and for sheep, for wine and for strong drink”—particulars. “And for whatever your soul requires”—again, a general statement. [When there is such a pattern of] “general statement, particulars, [and again a] general statement”—the rule is in accordance with the particulars. To teach you—just as the particulars stated are products—products of the ground, or things that are brought forth from products of the ground [i.e., plants, or animals that eat plants], so too I can [use for ma’aser sheni] only anything that is a product—a product of the ground, or something brought forth from the products of the ground. This excludes truffles and mushrooms [which are neither animals nor plants].
ספרי, במדבר, נשא נח:א
…לפי שהוא אומר “וידבר ה’ אליו מאהל מועד לאמר” (ויקרא א א) שומע אני מאהל מועד ממש. תלמוד לומר “ונועדתי לך שם ודברתי אתך מעל הכפורת” (שמות כה כב)…כיצד יתקיימו שני כתובים הללו? זו מדה בתורה שני כתובים זה כנגד זה והרי הם סותרים זה על ידי זה יתקיימו במקומם עד שיבא כתוב אחר ויכריע ביניהם. מה ת”ל [=תלמוד לומר] “וּבְבֹא מֹשֶׁה אֶל אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לְדַבֵּר אִתּוֹ [וַיִּשְׁמַע אֶת הַקּוֹל מִדַּבֵּר אֵלָיו מֵעַל הַכַּפֹּרֶת אֲשֶׁר עַל אֲרֹן הָעֵדֻת מִבֵּין שְׁנֵי הַכְּרֻבִים…]” (במדבר ז:פט) מגיד הכתוב שהיה משה נכנס ועומד באהל מועד והקול יורד משמי שמים לבין שני הכרובים והוא שומע את הקול מדבר אליו מבפנים.
Sifri, Bemidbar, Naso 58:1
Because it says, “And God spoke to him [Moshe] from the ohel mo’ed, saying” (Vayikra 1:1), I would infer that [God spoke to Moshe] from the ohel mo’ed itself. A[nother] verse teaches, “And I [God] will be known to you [Moshe] there, and speak to you from atop the ark-covering [kaporet],” (Shemot 25:22). How can we uphold both these verses? This is a rule of [interpreting] the Torah: Two corresponding verses, this opposed to that, and behold, they contradict one another, they can only be upheld locally [within the text] until a third verse comes and reconciles between them. What does the verse teach? “And when Moshe came to the ohel moed to speak with Him, [he would hear the voice speaking to him from above the kaporet that was on the ark of testimony from between the two keruvim]…” (Bemidbar 7:89). The verse tells us that Moshe would enter and stand in the ohel mo’ed, and the voice [of God] would descend from highest heaven to between the two keruvim, and [Moshe] would hear the voice speaking to him from within [the Holy of Holies].
ברכות י.
אמר לה ההוא צדוקי לברוריא כתיב רני עקרה לא ילדה משום דלא ילדה רני אמרה ליה שטיא שפיל לסיפיה דקרא דכתיב כי רבים בני שוממה מבני בעולה אמר ה’ אלא מאי עקרה לא ילדה רני כנסת ישראל שדומה לאשה עקרה שלא ילדה בנים לגיהנם כותייכו
Berachot 10a
A certain Sadducee said to Beruria: “It is written, ‘rejoice, o barren one, who has not given birth.’ Because she has not given birth, should she rejoice?” She said to him: “Foolish one, look further to the end of the verse, as it says, ‘for the children of the desolate are more numerous than children of the married woman, says God.’ Rather, what does [the verse mean when it says] ‘o barren one, who has not given birth’? [It means to say:] Rejoice, congregation of Israel, which resembles a barren woman in that it did not birth children destined for Gehinnom like you.”
ענת רייזל, “מבוא למדרשי התנאים.” מתוך מבוא למדרשים, הוצאת מכללת הרצוג-תבונות, אלון שבות תשעג
הדרשות מבית מדרשו של ר’ ישמעאל קרובות יותר למשמעות הפשוטה של הפסוק על פי העיקרון “דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם”, בדרך כלל הן נבנות באמצעות מידות שהתורה נדרשת בהן והן מבוססות על השוואה בין פסוקים שונים. לעומת זאת, הדרשות מבית מדרשו של ר’ עקיבא מתמקדות במשמעות הפסוק הבודד תוך דרישת כל פרט בפסוק, כולל מיליות ואותיות מיוחדות. מהבדל עקרוני זה נובעים הבדלים נוספים בדרכי הדרשה בין שני בתי המדרש. ההבדלים בשיטות הדרשה בין בתי המדרש השונים לא גוררים בהכרח מחלוקות על עצם ההלכה, אלא על האופן שיש ללמוד את ההלכה מן הפסוק.
Anat Raizel, “Introduction to Tannaitic Midrash,” in Introduction to Midrashim (Alon Shevut: Herzog-Tevunot, 5773)
The derashot from the beit midrash of Rabbi Yishmael are closer to the simple meaning of the verse in accordance with the principle, “The Torah spoke in human language.” In general, these are constructed by means of the middot through which the Torah is expounded, and they are based on comparison between different verses. In contrast, the derashot from the beit midrash of Rabbi Akiva focus on the meaning of the individual verse through examination of every detail in the verse, including special wording and letters. From this fundamental difference, additional differences emerge between the systems of derasha of these two batei midrash. The differences in the methods of derasha between the different batei midrash don’t necessarily entail debate about the halacha itself, but rather about the way to learn the halacha from the verse.
The Role of Tradition
נידה יט:
אדם דן קל וחומר מעצמו ואין אדם דן גזירה שוה מעצמו
Nidda 19b
A person can derive a kal va-chomer on his own, and a person may not derive a gezeira shava on his own.
רש”י סוכה לא. ד”ה לא מקשינן
ולא ניתן לדרוש מעצמו מכל י”ג מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן אלא ק”ו [=קל וחומר]:
Rashi Sukka 31a s.v. lo makshinan
One is not allowed to interpret on one’s own using any of the thirteen middot by which the Torah is expounded except for kal va-chomer.
תוספות שם ד”ה ור”י סבר
פי[רש] בקונטרס… ולא ניתן לידרוש מעצמו מכל י”ג מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן אלא קל וחומר ותימה גדולה …אלא כל המדות אדם דן מעצמו חוץ מגזרה שוה דאין דן אלא אם כן למדה מרבו
Tosafot ad loc. s.v. ve-Ri Savar
It is explained in Rashi… One is not allowed to interpret on one’s own using any of the thirteen middot by which the Torah is expounded except for kal va-chomer, and this is very puzzling…rather, a person may apply all of the middot on his own aside from gezeira shava, which a person may not apply except if he learned it from his teacher.
הקדמת הרמב”ם למשנה
החלק הראשון פירושים מקובלים מפי משה ויש להם רמז בכתוב ואפשר להוציאם בדרך סברא…החלק השלישי הדינין שהוציאו על דרכי הסברא
Rambam, Introduction to the Mishna
The first category are those interpretations received from Moshe, and they have a hint in the text, and it is possible to derive them by way of logic…The third category are the laws derived by logic [alone]
רלב”ג, הקדמה לספר בראשית
והנה בביאור המצות והשרשים אשר מהם יצאו כל דיניהם אשר התבארו בחכמות התלמודיות, לא יהיה במנהגנו בכל המקומות לסמוך אותם השרשים אל המקומות אשר סמכו אותם חכמי התלמוד באחת מי”ג מדות לפי מנהגם. וזה שהם סמכו אלו הדברים האמתיים המקובלים להם במצות התורה לפסוקים ההם, להיות כדמות רמז ואסמכתא לדברי[ם] ההם, לא שיהיה דעתם שיהיה מוצא אלו הדינין מאלו המקומות. כי כבר יוכל האדם להפך כל דיני התורה בכמו אלו ההקשים עד שאפשר בהם לטהר את השרץ כמו שזכרו ז”ל…. הם אצלם מקובלים איש מפי איש עד משה רבינו ובקשו להם רמז מן הכתוב.
Ralbag, Introduction to Sefer Bereishit
Behold, in clarifying the mitzvot and the principles from which all of their laws that were clarified through Talmudic wisdom emerge, it will not be our practice in every place to have those principles rely on the same place [in the text of the Torah] that the Talmudic sages had them rely, as was their custom, via one of the thirteen middot. That which they had these true matters that they had received regarding mitzvot of the Torah rely on these verses, was to be as a type of hint or mnemonic for their words, not that their view was that the source of these laws would be from these places. For a person could turn all of the laws of the Torah on their head with juxtapositions like these, until it would be possible through them ‘to purify a creeping animal,’ as our Sages mentioned.…They [these laws] were received, one man from another going back to Moshe Rabbeinu, and they searched for a hint from Scripture.
מלבי”ם, הקדמה לספר ויקרא
…וכאשר שאלנו לדור ראשון ומזקנים נתבונן — מה ענו על זאת? ראינו כי מלבם יוציאו מלים, שהכתובים המובאים לראיה אל ההלכות הם רק ציונים ואסמכתות, אשר הציבו להם ציונים לעורר הזכרון, ועקרי ההלכות היו מקובלות בידם בעל פה. וזה רחוק מאד, כי ראינו שהם שואלים תמיד מנא לך? ומשיבים מקרא פלוני, ומקשים והא האי קרא מבעיא ליה לכדתניא! ומתרצים ומקשים ומפלפלים — שלא יצויר שיקשו כן על דבר שהוא רק רמז וסימן לבד. וכשיש מחלוקת כל אחד מביא ראיה לדעתו מן המקרא ודוחה ראייתו של חברו. והגמרא מפלפל תמיד ביניהם בענין המקרא ומדקדק עד כחוט השערה, וסותר ובונה ומכריע ביניהם מן המקרא. עד שמבואר שעיקר ראייתם הוא מן הכתוב; ששם נוטעו ההלכות, גם שורשו; ולא באו כשורש מארץ ציה… וכי הדרוש הוא לבדו הוא הפשט הפשוט, המיוסד כפי חוקי הלשון האמיתיים והברורים. וכל מקום אשר דרשו חז”ל איזה דרוש יש שם איזה זר היוצא מכללי הלשון, ועל ידי הדרוש ישוב הכתוב לאיתנו כמשפט הלשון וחוקותיו.
Malbim, Introduction to Sefer Vayikra
…If we should inquire about the earlier generations and consider our elders—what did they respond to this? We saw that they brought out words from their hearts, [saying] that the verses brought as proofs for halachot are merely hints and supports created to jog the memory, and that the actual halachot were received orally. This is very far-fetched, for we see that [the Talmudic sages] constantly ask “Mena lach”—“how do you know?” and the response is “from such and such a verse.” And they raise a difficulty: “but this verse is needed for another purpose, as it is taught [in a baraita]!” And so they offer solutions and raise difficulties and argue back and forth. It is inconceivable that they would probe thus about something which is merely a hint and a symbol alone. And when there is a dispute, each one brings proof for his view from the verses, and refutes the proof of his fellow. And the Talmud goes back and forth constantly with regard to the verses, and is exacting to the point of a hair; it dismantles and builds and reconciles, all from the verses. Until it is clear that their proofs are fundamentally from the text. That is where the halachot were planted, and rooted; they did not come like a root from a barren land…that which is expounded from the text is also its plain meaning, as it is established according to the clear and true rules of language. Any place our sages expounded in a certain way, there is some exception to linguistic principles. And through the exposition, the verse is returned to its essence in accordance with the rules and principles of language.
ערובין ד.-ד:
אמר רבי חייא בר אשי אמר רב שיעורין חציצין ומחיצין הלכה למשה מסיני שיעורין דאורייתא הוא דכתיב ארץ חטה ושערה וגו’ ואמר רב חנן כל הפסוק הזה לשיעורין נאמר חטה לכדתנן הנכנס לבית המנוגע וכליו על כתיפיו וסנדליו וטבעותיו בידיו הוא והם טמאין מיד היה לבוש כליו וסנדליו ברגליו וטבעותיו באצבעותיו הוא טמא מיד והן טהורין עד שישהא בכדי אכילת פרס פת חיטין ולא פת שעורין מיסב ואוכל בליפתן שעורה דתנן עצם כשעורה מטמא במגע ובמשא ואינו מטמא באהל … אלא הלכתא נינהו ואסמכינהו רבנן אקראי:
Eruvin 4a-b
Rabbi Chiya bar Ashi said that Rav said: halachic measurements, barriers to immersion, and partitions are laws transmitted from Moshe at Sinai [without any hint in the text]. [The Gemara asks:] Halachic measurements [are not derived from the text]!? They are derived from the Torah itself! As it is written, “A land of wheat and barley,” etc. And Rav Chanan said: This entire verse is written about halachic measurements. “Wheat” corresponds to the teaching that one who enters a house that is impure due to a nega with his clothes on his shoulders, and his sandals and rings in his hands—he and they are impure immediately. If he was wearing his clothes, and his sandals were on his feet, and his rings were on his fingers—he is impure immediately, and they are pure until he stays there for the amount of time it takes to eat a half [a loaf of bread]. Bread of wheat , not bread of barley, while reclining and along with relish [which makes the eating process faster]. “Barley” corresponds to the teaching: a bone the size of a barleycorn transmits impurity through touch and being carried, but it does not transmit impurity via being under the same tent [or roof]….Rather, these are halachot [transmitted from Moshe at Sinai], and the rabbis supported them with a verse.
מנחות כט:
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב בשעה שעלה משה למרום מצאו להקב”ה [=לקדוש ברוך הוא] שיושב וקושר כתרים לאותיות אמר לפניו רבש”ע [=ריבונו של עולם] מי מעכב על ידך אמר לו אדם אחד יש שעתיד להיות בסוף כמה דורות ועקיבא בן יוסף שמו שעתיד לדרוש על כל קוץ וקוץ תילין תילין של הלכות דאמר לפניו רבש”ע [=ריבונו של עולם] הראהו לי אמר לו חזור לאחורך הלך וישב בסוף שמונה שורות ולא היה יודע מה הן אומרים תשש כחו כיון שהגיע לדבר אחד אמרו לו תלמידיו רבי מנין לך אמר להן הלכה למשה מסיני נתיישבה דעתו
Menachot 29b
Rabbi Yehuda said that Rav said: At the time that Moshe ascended above [to receive the Torah] he found the Holy One, blessed be He, sitting and attaching crowns to the letters. [Moshe] said before Him: “Master of the world, who is holding you back [from giving the Torah without these crowns]?” [God] said to him: “There is a man who is destined to be at the end of several generations, Akiva the son of Yosef is his name, who is destined to expound from every spike [of the crowns] piles upon piles of halachot. [Moshe] said before Him: “Master of the world, show him to me.” [He] said to him: “Turn around.” [Moshe] went, [and found himself in Rabbi Akiva’s lecture hall. He] sat in the eighth row [of the lecture] and couldn’t understand what they were saying. His strength weakened [and he got discouraged]. When [Rabbi Akiva] got to one matter, his students asked him, “Rebbi, where [do you know this halacha] from?” [Rabbi Akiva] said to them: “It is a halacha [given] to Moshe at Sinai.” [When Moshe heard this], his mind became settled.
העמק דבר שמות לד:א
…דלוחות שניות מכובדים מן הראשונים…והכוונה בכ”ז [=בכל זה] דבלוחות הראשונות לא ניתן כח החידוש אלא מה שקיבל משה דיוקי המקראות והלכות היוצא מזה, אבל לא לחדש דבר הלכה על ידי י”ג מדות וכדומה הויות התלמוד… אבל בלוחות השניות ניתן כח לכל תלמיד ותיק לחדש הלכה ע”פ [=על פי] המדות והתלמוד…ומזה הטעם עצמו צוה הקדוש ברוך הוא שיהיה הלוחות השניים בפיסול ידי משה, לא משום שלא זכו למעשה אלקים, אלא להורות דהלכה המתחדשת בכח לוחות הללו היא השתתפות עמל האדם בסיעתא דשמיא, כמו עצם הלוחות שהיה מעשה משה וכתיבת הקדוש ברוך הוא, וע”ע [=ועיין עוד] להלן מקרא כ”ז שגם בכתיבה היה השתתפות משה. והיינו מה שאמרו חז”ל דאפילו מה שתלמיד ותיק עתיד לחדש היה בלוחות, והכונה שבכח לוחות השניות היה נכלל הכל
Ha’amek Davar, Shemot 34:1
The second luchot were more esteemed than the first…and the intent in all of this is that with the first luchot, the power of innovation was not given. Rather, Moshe received the meaning of the details in the verses and halachot and the like, but not [the power] to innovate halachot through the thirteen middot, and similarly Talmudic discourse…but with the second luchot, the power was given to every distinguished scholar to innovate halachot through the middot and learning…And for this very reason the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded that the second luchot be carved by Moshe, not because they did not merit to have it made by God [as the first luchot were], but rather to teach as that the halacha created with the power of these luchot is a partnership between human toil and Divine assistance—just as the luchot themselves were carved by Moshe and engraved by the Holy One, blessed be He…And this is what the Sages said, that whatever a distinguished scholar is destined innovate in the future was in the luchot; the intent is that with the power of the second luchot everything was included.
בבא בתרא קיט:
תנא בנות צלפחד חכמניות הן דרשניות הן צדקניות הן חכמניות הן
Bava Batra 119b
It was taught: The daughters of Tzelofchad—they were wise, they were expounders of the text (darshaniyot), they were righteous, they were wise…
פסחים דף סב:
ברוריה דביתהו דרבי מאיר ברתיה דרבי חנניה בן תרדיון דתניא תלת מאה שמעתתא ביומא משלש מאה רבוותא
Pesachim 62b
Beruria, Rabbi Meir’s wife, daughter of Rabbi Chananya ben Teradyon, who learned three hundred teachings in a day from three hundred Rabbis…
תוספתא כלים א:ג
קלוסטרא רבי טרפון מטמא וחכמים מטהרין וברוריא אומרת שומטה מן הפתח זה ותולה בחבירו בשבת כשנאמרו דברים לפני ר’ יהושע אמר יפה אמרה ברוריא…
Tosefta Keilim 1:3
A door bolt: Rabbi Tarfon says it is [susceptible to becoming] impure, the Sages say it is [always] pure, and Beruria says that one can remove it from one door and hang it on another on Shabbat. When these words were said before Rabbi Yehoshua, he said ‘Beruria said well’…
תוספתא כלים ד:ט
…רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר משם רבי שילא הטיחו בטהרה ונטמא מאימתי טהרתו אמר ר’ חלפתא איש כפר חנניא שאלתי את שמעון בן חנניא ששאל את בנו של רבי חנניא בן תרדיון ואמר משיסיענו ממקומו ובתו אומרת משיפשטו את חלוקו כשנאמרו דברים לפני ר’ יהודה בן בבא אמר יפה אמרה בתו מהוא
Tosefta Keilim 4:9
…Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said in the name of Rabbi Shila: if [an oven] was plastered in a state of purity, and then it became impure, from when can it become pure? Rabbi Chalafta from Kfar Chananya said: I asked Shimon ben Chananya who asked the son of Rabbi Chananya ben Teradyon, who said it is when [the oven] is removed from its place. His daughter said it is when its coating (lit. its garment) is removed. When these words were said before Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, he said “his daughter spoke better than he [did].”
ריטב”א, עירובין יג:
אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים שאלו רבני צרפת ז״ל היאך אפשר שיהו אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים וזה אוסר וזה מתיר ותרצו כשעלה משה למרום לקבל התורה הראו לו על כל דבר ודבר מ״ט פנים לאיסור ומ״ט פני[ם] להיתר ושאל להקב״ה על זה ואמר שיהא זה מסור לחכמי ישראל שבכל דור ודור ויהיה הכרעה כמותם
Ritva, Eruvin 13b
“These and these [all differing halachic opinions] are the words of the living God.” The rabbis in France asked: “How is it possible that these and these are the words of the living God while one prohibits and the other permits? And they answered, that when Moshe ascended above to receive the Torah, they showed him regarding every single [halachic matter] forty-nine perspectives [that would lead] to prohibition and forty-nine perspectives [that would lead to] permission. And he asked the Holy One, Blessed be He, about this. And He said: this will be given over to the sages in every generation, and the decision will be according to them.
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Hashkafic Q&A
Did women take part in the process of interpreting Torah She-be’al Peh?
Close reading, analysis, teasing meaning out of the biblical text—these are all open to and encouraged from all students of Torah, men and women. (Learn more here.) Indeed, the Talmud praises the daughters of Tzelofchad as wise and discerning readers of the text:
בבא בתרא קיט:
תנא בנות צלפחד חכמניות הן דרשניות הן צדקניות הן חכמניות הן
Bava Batra 119b
It was taught: The daughters of Tzelofchad—they were wise, they were expounders of the text (darshaniyot), they were righteous, they were wise…
As the Talmud goes on to explain, their close reading of the verses about the laws of inheritance enabled them to formulate a compelling argument for the right to their father’s portion in the land.
Beruria, quoted in our discussion of the Thirteen Middot above, was famed for her sharp analysis and prolific scholarship. The Talmud gives us a sense of the scope of her learning:
פסחים דף סב:
ברוריה דביתהו דרבי מאיר ברתיה דרבי חנניה בן תרדיון דתניא תלת מאה שמעתתא ביומא משלש מאה רבוותא
Pesachim 62b
Beruria, Rabbi Meir’s wife, daughter of Rabbi Chananya ben Teradyon, who learned three hundred teachings in a day from three hundred Rabbis…
Some of her halachic rulings are cited in rabbinic literature and accepted as halacha:
תוספתא כלים א:ג
קלוסטרא רבי טרפון מטמא וחכמים מטהרין וברוריא אומרת שומטה מן הפתח זה ותולה בחבירו בשבת כשנאמרו דברים לפני ר’ יהושע אמר יפה אמרה ברוריא…
Tosefta Keilim 1:3
A door bolt: Rabbi Tarfon says it is [susceptible to becoming] impure, the Sages say it is [always] pure, and Beruria says that one can remove it from one door and hang it on another on Shabbat. When these words were said before Rabbi Yehoshua, he said ‘Beruria said well’…
In the following case, Beruria actually disputes her brother’s view, and her view is preferred:
תוספתא כלים ד:ט
…רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר משם רבי שילא הטיחו בטהרה ונטמא מאימתי טהרתו אמר ר’ חלפתא איש כפר חנניא שאלתי את שמעון בן חנניא ששאל את בנו של רבי חנניא בן תרדיון ואמר משיסיענו ממקומו ובתו אומרת משיפשטו את חלוקו כשנאמרו דברים לפני ר’ יהודה בן בבא אמר יפה אמרה בתו מהוא
Tosefta Keilim 4:9
…Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said in the name of Rabbi Shila: if [an oven] was plastered in a state of purity, and then it became impure, from when can it become pure? Rabbi Chalafta from Kfar Chananya said: I asked Shimon ben Chananya who asked the son of Rabbi Chananya ben Teradyon, who said it is when [the oven] is removed from its place. His daughter said it is when its coating (lit. its garment) is removed. When these words were said before Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, he said “his daughter spoke better than he [did].”
While, as in the examples above, women could participate in the process of formal halachic textual interpretation, in practice, this rarely happened. Women are exempt from mitzva of Talmud Torah, and, until fairly recently, formal Torah education for women was rare. Women traditionally learned Halacha—and transmitted it to their children—imitatively, rather than through formal study. Therefore, women’s contribution to the halachic process has largely taken a more grassroots form. (Learn more here.)
Throughout rabbinic literature, women pose halachic questions that prompt innovation, set new norms of halachic practice, and craft customs to adorn Torah observance. But almost no women are interpreters of the text.
Inasmuch as there is creative input in the halachic process, and in light of the relative paucity of women’s voices, one might wonder—would Halacha look different if there had been more formal Torah learning for women? If there were more Berurias?
We’ll never know, but the thought that certain interpretations of halachot could have been different is not foreign to our halachic system.
By definition, wherever creative logic is involved, there will be a degree of variability in the result. Open just about any page of the Talmud, and you’ll see disagreements between sages. Our sages, who were all committed to the same fundamental framework of halacha—utilizing recognized tools of interpretation, analyzing the biblical text, and maintaining fidelity to tradition—sometimes came to differing conclusions, in part due to the traditions to which they were privy and specific schools of interpretation to which they subscribed, and in part because of differences in their perspectives. Ritva gives us insight into how to view these differences:
ריטב”א, עירובין יג:
אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים שאלו רבני צרפת ז״ל היאך אפשר שיהו אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים וזה אוסר וזה מתיר ותרצו כשעלה משה למרום לקבל התורה הראו לו על כל דבר ודבר מ״ט פנים לאיסור ומ״ט פני[ם] להיתר ושאל להקב״ה על זה ואמר שיהא זה מסור לחכמי ישראל שבכל דור ודור ויהיה הכרעה כמותם
Ritva, Eruvin 13b
“These and these [all differing halachic opinions] are the words of the living God.” The rabbis in France asked: “How is it possible that these and these are the words of the living God while one prohibits and the other permits? And they answered, that when Moshe ascended above to receive the Torah, they showed him regarding every single [halachic matter] forty-nine perspectives [that would lead] to prohibition and forty-nine perspectives [that would lead to] permission. And he asked the Holy One, Blessed be He, about this. And He said: this will be given over to the sages in every generation, and the decision will be according to them.
As Ritva describes it, Torah itself lends itself to multiple possibilities, a bit like a mathematical formula or a logic puzzle might have several solutions. God chose to entrust our sages with deciding which possibility would be practiced and God imbued the decisions that were reached with Divine authority, and even had a hand in guiding the process.
Ultimately, we have no way of knowing how and to what extent Halacha would have been affected if women had participated more in the formative stages of derasha and interpretation. Either way, the resulting halacha would not have been considered any more or less valid than what we have now.
At this point in time, we can no longer avail ourselves of Chazal’s full toolkit. Still, Halacha continues to develop, responding to new realities, questions, and insights. Today, women are increasingly participating in the halachic discourse alongside men, all praying as always for Divine support and guidance.
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