Physical Intimacy III: Touch in Practice

In the previous installments of this series, we explored the significance of physical intimacy for our relationships, beginning with a discussion of marital intimacy. We next delved into halachic boundaries that apply when a couple are sexually prohibited to each other, in and out of marriage.

In this piece, we explore the permissibility of touch between people who are sexually prohibited to each other, in contexts that are not sexual or romantic.

To recap: We learned previously that, when a man and woman are prohibited from having sexual relations with each other, they must also refrain from keriva la-arayot, coming close to illicit sexual intercourse. Rambam rules that keriva la-arayot, which he seems to define narrowly as sexually affectionate touch, is a distinct, Torah-level prohibition:

Rambam also rules that, during nidda, any touch between husband and wife that is not prohibited on a Torah level is prohibited rabbinically. There is debate regarding his views, including how he rules on non-sexually-affectionate touch for men and women who are not married to each other.

In practice, some halachic authorities take a maximalist view. (See our previous piece for the basis for this position.) For an extreme example, Chazon Ish rules that a man giving his hand to a woman is a matter of “yehareg ve-al ya’avor” (one should be killed rather than transgress), even if the woman in question is the man’s adoptive mother!¹

On the other hand, many halachic authorities embrace a more straightforward reading of Rambam, according to which (1) non-sexually-affectionate touch is prohibited rabbinically between husband and wife, and (2) touch between a man and a woman who are not married to each other is, at most, prohibited rabbinically, and at times fully permitted. Rav Moshe Feinstein, for example, states that touch is permissible between a man and woman not married to each other so long as its non-sexual nature is clearly recognizable .

Later on,² we’ll see that Rav Moshe himself is not confident regarding how to characterize a handshake. The distinction between affectionate touch and sexually-affectionate touch is not well-defined in classical sources. Taking that into account, we can formulate as a guiding principle that recognizably non-affectionate touch is permitted outside of marriage.

For a married couple during nidda, however, even non-affectionate touch is prohibited. Moreover, married couples are presumed to have affection for each other, which makes distinctions between different modes of touch even more difficult to establish or maintain.

Halachic literature discusses a range of practical scenarios that entail physical interactions: sitting next to someone on a bus, assisting someone who has fallen, caring for an ill spouse, seeing a physician, shaking hands, or kissing relatives. We cannot cover every possible scenario here, so our study will focus on how these questions are usually decided and key halachic factors that come into play.

A Framework

Halachic rulings on the permissibility of different types of touch hinge on two central questions:⁴

First, what is the halachic status of this touch? Is it included in the Torah prohibition of keriva la-arayot (or considered a rabbinic case of yehareg ve-al ya’avor)? Is it rabbinically prohibited? Is it permissible? We’ve seen that there is often fundamental disagreement on this point.

Second, are there countervailing halachic factors at play that are strong enough to permit touch in a given scenario?

In classic responsa, there are usually three conditions that must be met for a questionable touch to be permitted. (These conditions, in some ways, anticipate the guiding principle articulated by Rav Moshe Feinstein, above.)

(1) Clear Rabbinic Status There needs to be clarity that the touch in question is not prohibited by the Torah, that it is non-affectionate, or at least non-sexual.

(2) Recognized Need There needs to be a halachically recognized need for the touch.

(3) Lack of Alternatives There needs to be no readily available alternative to the touch.

Even with all these criteria in place, rulings on whether to permit touch that is prohibited rabbinically will generally seek additional arguments or precedents for permission. A few key factors arise as potential grounds for permission in analyzing touch: intentionality, touch through clothing, professional preoccupation, and physical and psychological health needs. We’ll discuss each of these considerations, and then explore the specific cases of cultural etiquette and touch within a family.

What about more casual everyday touch among friends or acquaintances? This type of touch is less likely to meet the criteria outlined above, because it often has less clearly delineated intentions, is one of a few alternatives, and does not address a halachically recognized need. Therefore, this piece only briefly addresses some of the most common questions about touch between men and women, those concerning affectionate touch between friends. Learning about what touch may be permissible can nevertheless provide insight into how to assess and navigate a range of interactions, including these.

How someone intends a touch may be distinct from how they actually experience it. Halachic authorities differ in how they weigh intention for touch versus the experience of touch.

Rivash, for example, seems to view touch as prohibited on a Torah level when it is pleasurable, regardless of intent:

Meiri,⁵ however, applies the Torah prohibition only to touch with sexual intent. In other cases, he applies the Talmud’s warning against engaging in touch even without such intent.⁶

Intention can be difficult to assess. In the twentieth century, Rav Ya’akov Breisch argues that intentionality can serve as a factor for leniency when it is demonstrable. The case is a husband who needs to provide physical care to his wife at home during nidda.

Rav Breisch views the prohibition as rabbinic because there is no sexual intent. He adds an additional factor for leniency, for the husband to place a piece of cloth (like a sleeve or glove) over his hands. His deliberately doing so before assisting his wife demonstrates that he does not have in mind to take pleasure in the touch. Not only do the gloves physically disrupt skin-to-skin contact, but they serve as a clear signifier of non-sexual intentionality.

This argument reminds us of Rav Moshe Feinstein’s rule of thumb that touch that is recognizably non-affectionate in nature can be permitted between a man and woman who are not married to each other. It opens up the possibility that, even with a married couple for whom non-affectionate touch is prohibited, it would be possible to devise recognizably non-affectionate forms of touch in a very pressing situation.

Rav Menashe Klein employs a similar logic to permit helping up someone who has fallen:

Unintentional Touch

An extreme example of touch without pleasurable or sexual intent is totally unintentional—sometimes unavoidable—touch, as when men and women jostle against each other in a crowded bus or train car.

Some halachic authorities maintain that men and women who are prohibited to each other are prohibited from sitting next to each other on a bus if there is any other option.⁷ Rav Moshe Feinstein’s ruling regarding this situation is different, consistent with his overall approach permitting touch that is recognizably non-affectionate in nature. Though he, too, prefers that a man take a seat next to another man when one is free, he rules that there is no prohibition involved, even when a man and woman sit beside each other and will inevitably jostle against each other, because this type of unintentional touch is not prohibited:

Rav Moshe adds that there is room for stringency if someone knows they are liable to have a pleasurable experience, but the key Halacha is based on intention. Concern for unintentional touch should not interfere with day-to-day activities.

Rav Breisch suggested that a man wear gloves when caring for his wife during nidda because it might demonstrate the non-sexual intent of the touch. He also mentions that a garment disrupts skin-to-skin contact, which reduces pleasure. Indeed, part of a passage from the Talmud Yerushalmi (cited more fully here), suggests that an interpolating garment may have been one factor in permitting a kohen to hold a married woman’s arm when she brought the meal offering of the sota:

So, too, if we look again at Rambam’s phrasing of the Torah prohibition, he seems to single out direct skin-to-skin contact, “closeness of the flesh”:⁸

Many halachic authorities, including Maharsham, infer that touch through a garment is a rabbinic prohibition:

Others, however, argue that if the touch is sexually pleasurable, then intervening clothing might not affect a Torah prohibition:

Even according to this view, cloth interfering with direct contact can serve as a contributing factor for halachic leniency regarding touch.

The Talmud suggests that in some cases, preoccupation with doing one’s job can allow for behavior that would otherwise be prohibited. For example, animal husbandry can take place without halachic concern about watching animals mate.

In the fourteenth century, Rav Ashturi Ha-parchi, a talmid chacham and a practicing physician, argued that this principle provides a basis for a male Jewish physician in a case of need to treat a woman with a choli she-ein bo sakana (a non-life-threatening illness serious enough to impede her functioning),⁹ and that this ruling would also apply to a man treating his wife during nidda:

As we’ll see shortly, medical health is itself a major halachic consideration,¹⁰ so this argument can be readily extended to other health professionals, like nurses, physiotherapists, and occupational therapists, who are engaged in medically significant touch.

Without other halachic factors for leniency, it is more difficult to extend professional preoccupation as a halachic factor to other professionals who might have cause to touch clients, like sports coaches or photographers, where the need for touch is less evident and health is not a primary consideration.¹¹

In Talmudic times, a bloodletter was akin to a physician. The Talmud describes a man called Abba the bloodletter, who was praised in Heaven for his good deeds, which included being careful to uncover no more of a woman’s body than necessary to provide treatment:

We can infer from this passage that medical care entailing touch between a man and woman who are not married to each other was taken for granted. In fact, male physicians attending to women was so commonplace that Shach cites it in support of his argument that Rambam cannot possibly have meant to prohibit all forms of touch on a Torah level:

At the end of his comments about professional preoccupation, Rav Ha-parchi introduces an additional argument for leniency with touch in a medical context. There is halachic precedent for the health needs of a choleh she-ein bo sakana—someone with an illness that impedes functioning but is not life-threatening—pushing aside rabbinic prohibitions in the laws of Shabbat. (In practice, life-threatening situation also pushes aside Torah-level Shabbat prohibitions.) Rashba and Radbaz disagree on whether physical contact is analogous to Shabbat, at least with respect to a husband and wife during nidda. Rashba maintains that not all rabbinic laws are the same, and we cannot assume that health needs can push aside rabbinic prohibitions of touch:

Radbaz, however, maintains that health needs can push away rabbinic prohibitions on touch, though he still prefers that spouses, who are assumed to have affection for each other, not care for each other during nidda if someone else is available:

According to this ruling, spouses can care for each other when necessary during nidda. The advantages of more expert medical care can also override concerns about touch, even when the life of the person who is ill is not at risk.

Shulchan Aruch rules accordingly regarding a woman taking care of her husband, though he is more cautious in the case of a husband caring for his wife, out of concern for his sexual drive being unaffected by illness. Rema, however, rules that this concern is pushed aside in in cases of great need.¹²

Rav Moshe Feinstein points out that medical care clearly falls within the parameters of his guideline, since the purpose of the touch is recognizably for healing:

In practice, many halachic authorities express a preference for a woman to see a female doctor and man to see a male doctor, when this will have no negative affect on medical care (including financial and logistical considerations).¹³

Women are often more comfortable with female healthcare providers, especially when there are concerns of modesty. This was the impetus behind the founding of Ezras Nashim, an all-female volunteer emergency medical service in Brooklyn, NY. In the words of founder Rachel “Ruchie” Freier:¹⁴

Still, it is widely accepted for men and women to see male or female doctors as needed.

In some cases, halachic authorities compare mental health struggles to physical illness. So, for example, Rav Ya’akov Breisch confidently applies the halachic category of a person with a medical condition that impairs functioning (choleh she-ein bo sakana) to someone whose functioning is impaired by “nervous illness,” and suggests that some cases of mental illness would be considered life threatening:

It is unusual for physical contact to be necessary as part of psychological treatment, so the main questions that arise relate to touch to support mental health in specific contexts, such as childbirth and for a husband and wife during nidda.

During Childbirth

A key talmudic precedent establishing the halachic significance of emotional and mental health is the case of childbirth.

A woman becomes nidda at some point during labor, and touch between husband and wife is prohibited from that point. (Learn more here.) At the same time, Halacha clearly considers a woman during labor and childbirth to be a chola she-yesh bah sakana, someone in life-threatening danger. If a birthing woman needs direct physical assistance from her husband, as with an emergency home birth, physical contact is permitted.

The Talmud adds that a woman’s mental state, yishuv ha-da’at, is sufficiently important to a safe delivery that it, too, provides grounds for pushing aside prohibitions, as a matter of piku’ach nefesh. So, for example, it is permissible to light a candle for a blind woman in childbirth on Shabbat, because it will put her mind at ease to know that others can see her in order to more easily attend to her:

The unresolved fears of a woman in labor can place her life at risk.¹⁵

Once a woman in labor becomes nidda, the question arises whether her husband can provide her with supportive touch to assist her emotionally. On the one hand, this touch between husband and wife would be affectionate. On the other, sexual relations are clearly out of the question, and the wife’s lack of peace of mind might endanger her. Rav Yitzchak Weiss cites Shulchan Aruch’s stringent position on touch in general when the wife is sick, to permit touch only when a woman in childbirth is so distressed that the lack of touch clearly creates a risk for her, and only through gloves.

According to this view, the prohibition of touch between husband and wife is too grave to allow for leniency, and others can provide the needed emotionally supportive touch.

Others, however, notably Rav Shlomo Daichovsky, are more lenient when a woman’s yishuv hada’at is highly compromised and she is convinced that only her husband’s touch can calm her:

Note that Rav Daichovsky does something we have not previously seen: He addresses the woman as a halachic subject who requires permission to receive the touch as much as her husband requires permission to give it. He shows confidence in the power of education to prevent publicizing halachic permission in a specific case from leading to unwarranted leniencies. In recent years, there has indeed begun to be discussion about whether this ruling could be broadened to less acute situations.¹⁶

Rav Daichovsky also emphasizes that personal stringencies in the area of touch cannot trump another person’s medical need.

The case of childbirth deals with a person who is characterized medically as being at risk, and whose emotional distress could bring about very direct medical consequences. This lays the groundwork for taking mental health needs into account in halachic decision-making, in situations where there is no clear danger to physical health.

In Nidda

Many couples experience the physical distancing of nidda as a challenge. Those struggling with mental illness may have a more extreme experience. For example, can a person with severe depression receive a hug from a spouse during nidda?

When a spouse is suicidal, then this question perhaps becomes simpler, because suicidality, like childbirth, is clearly in the category of life-threatening danger. What of less extreme manifestations of mental illness?

In his recent work on mental health and Halacha, Rav Yonatan Rosensweig canvassed a range of contemporary halachic authorities on this issue:

Though there is some variation, the consensus is that touch can be permissible, preferably through clothing, when the mental illness is severe. Rav Rabinovitch took care to say that he views the clothing as establishing intentionality, not as inherently needed to provide permission.

Emotional Distress

What of situations of emotional distress when there is no background of mental illness? This can be ongoing, as when an older foster child seeks physical nurturing from caregivers, or more acute, as when a specific incident raises distress levels to an extreme. When key caregivers are not married to those needing care, the questions raise special sensitivities.

In recent years, Rav Ya’akov Ariel has ruled leniently regarding foster children.¹⁷ Though the touch is clearly affectionate in intent, it is also both non-sexual and desperately needed for the child’s mental health:

This responsum, too, prefers touch other than hugs and kisses and touch through clothing, and suggests that single women should be more restricted than married women in applying this ruling, since there may be a greater likelihood of impropriety.

Spousal Support

Even more recently, in the wake of October 7th, questions reemerged about farewell hugs between a husband and wife in nidda during wartime, when there is real concern that the husband might not return. Such hugs are not typically sexual, but the couple’s bond is. Not long thereafter, Nishmat’s Yoatzot Halacha published a response on this issue that reflected a difference of opinion among its rabbis:¹⁸

Even the more lenient position of Rav Warhaftig, a veteran Rosh Kollel and synagogue rabbi, stipulates that the touch be through clothing and in public, to help prevent a sexual tone from developing.

These responses relate to extreme situations and, even so, present constraints on how touch might be permissible. Rav Ariel’s responsum calls for extra stringency with touch involving unmarried women, while this last case relates to a married couple during nidda. The strong implication of these responsa, is that, in less extreme scenarios, emotionally supportive touch would be prohibited between a man and a woman in most types of friendly or romantic relationships.

Returning to the framework we presented at the beginning of this piece, touch in such scenarios would sometimes meet Rav Moshe’s rule of thumb, but usually would not—it is not easily recognizable as not being sexually affectionate. Intentions themselves may be somewhat opaque. The rabbinic nature of emotionally supportive touch might be harder to establish because the borders between emotional affection and sexual affection are slippery. A halachically recognized need and lack of alternatives would also be more challenging to establish.

Can observing cultural etiquette present grounds to permit touch? The Talmud teaches that a man may not count out money into a woman’s hand in order to create an opportunity to gaze at her. This strongly implies that handing her money would otherwise be fully permissible:

This passage is often cited in discussions of cultural rituals—for sealing a business deal, greeting, or showing respect—that entail hand-to-hand contact. Are such rituals akin to handing money, and dependent on intention, or are they treated more stringently?

At the beginning of this piece, we saw that Chazon Ish rejected the idea of any context making a difference to the permissibility of a man and woman touching hands, but in much stronger terms, as yehareg ve-al ya’avor, so he would prohibit cultural rituals involving touch. A more measured disapproval comes from Sefer Chasidim, addressing Jews and non-Jews grasping hands in a business context, presumably because it was a norm in gentile society.

Sefer Chasidim seems to suggest that this is a precaution, and not necessarily a formal prohibition. Sedei Chemed cites Sefer Chasidim to explain why he neither allows for handshaking nor for a woman to kiss his hand, a common Mizrachi gesture of respect for a Chacham. Along the way, in the excerpt below, he suggests that handshaking is the more problematic of the two actions, because it is more intimate than a kiss. And that both surely would entail something stronger than the desire to ogle that is rejected by the Talmud:

Contrast his view with that of Rav Chayyim Berlin, who argues that a handshake is merely a matter of courtesy, so that the Talmudic precedent supports its permissibility, especially when that contributes to making Torah and its adherents seem respectable:

For his part, Rav Moshe Feinstein is uncertain as to whether a handshake is perforce an affectionate and pleasurable act, or whether it can be treated as something more pro forma. Using his regular rule of thumb, cultural etiquette might affect whether a handshake is clearly recognizable as non-affectionate. In practice, some handshakes are warmer greetings, while others are more formal.

Out of doubt, he stakes out a stringent-leaning middle position. He prohibits extending a hand in greeting out of concern for affection and pleasure. At the same time, he recognizes the possibility that someone might be able to return a handshake in a manner that is neither affectionate nor pleasurable, so that it could be permissible.

As usual, the fundamental questions, if we recognize a standard handshake as a matter of rabbinic law, are whether it is necessary, whether there is an alternative, and whether there is a mitigating halachic factor. In this case, the central point of disagreement with returning a handshake is whether a friendly social gesture can be treated as a matter of etiquette and interpersonal civility,¹⁹ or should be suspected as a potentially erotically charged interaction, which might be a matter of Torah law.

The discussion of handshakes seems to leave more room for social conventions of touch when handshakes are clearly formal, like shaking on a deal. Some other forms of touch, like a fist bump or a pat on the shoulder, might be treated comparably, where they are the norm. However, touch that typically reflects more affection, such as social hugs of greeting or parting, would be more difficult to justify halachically. First, because they entail more touch. Second, because they are a less formal type of interaction. Where Rav Moshe might have applied his rule of thumb to returning a collegial handshake, a hug in greeting would be less recognizably a formal social convention, and in fact generally expresses a different level of connection.

The Torah’s list of prohibited sexual relationships includes many close familial relationships. The Talmud, however, teaches us that God acceded to prayer by the Men of the Great Assembly to abolish desire for incestuous contact:

Unfortunately, this does not mean that nothing of this sort ever happens within a family, only that this prayer made it a clearly marginal phenomenon.

Even though close family members are sexually prohibited to each other, their presumed lack of desire for each other creates a basis for a more permissive approach to touch within the family, and this is reflected in a few Talmudic passages.

For example, Rav Acha bar Abba would set his granddaughter on his knee, explaining that this was permissible because his intentions were only for the sake of heaven, i.e. innocent, not sexual:

So, too, a mishna states that a male is permitted to sleep unclothed with his young daughter and, when he is young, with his mother. (This scenario reflects the cultural norms of the time and would generally not be appropriate in our day past infancy. The general principle, however, remains relevant.)

This Talmudic passage is the basis for broader permission for contact between parents, and children throughout their lives:

Perisha deduces out that it is only sleeping unclothed that becomes prohibited when the children grow, and not other physical contact:

In practice, this halacha is also extended to all direct descendants:

What of siblings or aunts and uncles? Here, a Talmudic discussion of the behavior of the sage Ulla comes into play:

This passage does not have a clear halachic conclusion. Does Ulla maintain that kissing one’s siblings is permissible, or that any type of affectionate touch should be avoided? Tosafot maintain that Ulla allowed only those with scrupulous conduct to act leniently.²⁰ Rambam (in a passage we’ll cite below) suggests that Ulla’s view evolved over time in the direction of stringency.²¹

Ramban rules that limited affectionate contact between relatives is fundamentally permissible to anyone who is not suspected of sexual impropriety:

Rambam takes a more stringent approach, suggesting that Ulla changed his mind:

In Mishneh Torah, however, Rambam uses more measured language:

Some authorities understand his ruling in Mishneh Torah as more of a caution than a full-fledged prohibition:

Rav Moshe Feinstein understands Rambam’s ruling as a measure meant to prevent affectionate contact with close family members leading to affectionate contact with others. Given this understanding of the prohibition, he argues that one need not protest when a sibling or aunt or uncle (and, by extension, nephew or niece) insists on such contact:

More recently, Rav Yehuda Henkin has taken a more lenient approach, arguing that such contact is permissible, even with other relatives, as needed, as long as it occurs only on an occasional basis:

As Rav Henkin notes, hugs and kisses are common custom in many circles when relatives have not seen each other for a long time. In practice, some circles also exercise extra leniency with siblings—at least with more casual touch—while in others, this stops by bar and bat mitzva.

Other Halachic Presumptions

Presumptions about whether sexually affectionate touch is fully off the table are also relevant to discussions of the age at which prohibitions set in and of whether they are affected by sexual orientation.

I. Age These laws clearly apply in full following bar and bat mitzva. What about beforehand? From the perspective of chinuch, children begin to be educated for a mitzva earlier, depending on their development and their ability to understand the prohibition. This could be as early as six or seven.

However, the halachot prohibiting yichud (seclusion) apply from age three for a girl and age nine for a boy:

A woman typically exercises more caution touching boys outside her immediate family starting when a boy is nine, with puberty presenting an upper limit in pressing situations.

Age three is quite young. We can ask if lo tikrevu is relevant when a child is below the age of sexual awareness or of others being sexually aware of them. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach uses this logic, though he employs it to allow for touching a girl in pressing cases only up to age six!²² Even so, for a girl before bat mitzva, the laws of erva with those outside her immediate family do not apply until she becomes a nidda, upon menstruation.

II. Sexual Orientation We’ve seen that Rav Moshe’s leniency in pressing circumstances among close family is based on a presumption that neither party feels sexually attracted to the other. Physical contact where one party might be attracted—as between a heterosexual woman and a gay man, or a lesbian and a heterosexual man—would be treated more stringently than the case of family members having physical contact with each other.

In contrast, non-sexual affectionate contact between two men or two women is widely permitted. Both parties are halachically presumed to have no sexual interest. Thus, even though a prohibition on relations between men appears in the Torah among the arayot,²³ the Talmud explicitly permits seclusion for two men, because their relationship is presumed not to be sexual in nature.²⁴ A similar principle could be applied to women, especially since sexual prohibition for women is not formally categorized as one of the arayot. Individuals attracted to members of the same sex should seek personal halachic counsel about whether additional boundaries on touch would apply.

Concluding Thought

Halacha invites a dialogue between broader principles and specific situations. Not every touch will be prohibited and not every touch will be permissible. Though there are some general guidelines, Halacha recognizes the range of human experience and places much responsibility upon the shoulders of the individual.